Beyond the Welfare Queen: The Rhetorical Construction of Single Mothers in American News Media by Eaves, Katherine
 








BEYOND THE WELFARE QUEEN: THE RHETORICAL CONSTRUCTION OF 










SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE FACULTY 
 


























BEYOND THE WELFARE QUEEN: THE RHETORICAL CONSTRUCTION OF 
SINGLE MOTHERS IN AMERICAN NEWS MEDIA 
 
 
A DISSERTATION APPROVED FOR THE 













Dr. Ralph Beliveau, Chair 
 
 
Dr. Charles C. Self 
 
 
Dr. Meta G. Carstarphen 
 
 
Dr. Ann M. Beutel 
 
 



















































To my parents, Kenny and Cathy Eaves, for their unyielding love, support, and 





 It has been said that it takes a village to raise a child. In this way, a dissertation is not 
so unlike a child, as this project is the product of many minds, not just my own. Without the 
guidance and support of this scholarly village, my research might never have come to 
fruition.  
 I would first like to acknowledge my advisor, Ralph Beliveau, for sticking with me 
through this extended process. His encouragement, wisdom, suggestions, and sense of 
humor helped me stay the course. I took a number of detours along the way, but I never 
doubted his belief that I could prevail. Thank you for all your help.  
 My committee members also deserve a special “thank you” here. To Meta, Charles, 
and Ann: Thank you all for your guidance and willingness to support my continued 
candidacy through a number of personal and professional challenges. The courses I took 
with each of you provided the foundation of my academic career and have made me a better 
person. I am grateful for the perspectives you have brought to this project. And to Jensen, 
your willingness to join my committee at such a late stage puts me in your debt.  
 My sister Jane has been an unwavering, sometimes borderline annoying, source of 
optimism throughout my doctoral studies. Her ceaseless positivity is usually the perfect 
antidote to my sometimes overly pessimistic personality. But her ability to make me laugh 
and see the bright side is unmatched, and for that, I’m grateful.  
 Finally, I am forever thankful for my parents and daughter. They are the reason I 
have gone from a delinquent teenager to a Ph.D. candidate. I cannot begin to articulate how 
much I appreciate their support, love, encouragement, and steadfast belief that I can do 




TABLE OF CONTENTS 
DEDICATION ............................................................................................................................. iv 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ............................................................................................................ v 
LIST OF TABLES ......................................................................................................................... ix 
LIST OF FIGURES ....................................................................................................................... x 
ABSTRACT .................................................................................................................................... xi 
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................... 1 
Research Goals and Purpose ............................................................................................. 2 
Research Questions ............................................................................................................ 3 
Selection of Historical Representative Anecdotes ........................................................... 4 
Sampling Procedures.......................................................................................................... 7 
Analytic Procedures ......................................................................................................... 10 
Rationale and Significance ............................................................................................... 16 
A Personal Connection .................................................................................................... 19 
Preview of Chapters ......................................................................................................... 21 
CHAPTER 2. THE SINGLE MOTHER “PROBLEM” ......................................................... 24 
Single Mothers in Historical Context ............................................................................. 28 
Single Mothers and Poverty ............................................................................... 34 
Motherhood and Morality .................................................................................. 39 
Conceptual Frameworks .................................................................................................. 40 
Intensive Mothering ............................................................................................ 40 
Folk Devils and Moral Panics ............................................................................ 45 
Moral Regulation ................................................................................................. 50 
Linking Moral Panic and Moral Regulation ...................................................... 52 
Chapter Summary............................................................................................................. 53 
CHAPTER 3. JUST ANOTHER LIFESTYLE CHOICE? SINGLE MOTHERS AND 
FAMILY VALUES ....................................................................................................................... 54 
Dan Quayle vs. Murphy Brown ...................................................................................... 55 
The Myth of the Traditional Family ............................................................................... 57 
Family Values Rhetoric and the Moral Regulation of Single Mothers ........... 59 
(Im)moral Single Mothers .................................................................................. 61 
(Re)Defining “Family Values” ........................................................................... 66 
 
vii 
Mothers (and Others) Push Back ................................................................................... 68 
The “Bootstrap” Principle.................................................................................. 75 
Sex, Welfare, and Single Women ....................................................................... 80 
Chapter Summary............................................................................................................. 83 
CHAPTER 4. ENDING WELFARE AS WE KNOW IT ...................................................... 84 
The Development of Welfare ......................................................................................... 86 
Single Mothers and Social Safety Nets .............................................................. 88 
From Political Rhetoric to Painful Reality ......................................................100 
Consequences for Children ..............................................................................105 
Education Takes a Backseat .............................................................................107 
Moral and Sexual Regulation of Welfare Mothers Under PRWORA/TANF ..........111 
The Structural and Individualistic View of Poverty .......................................113 
TANF as a Tool of Moral Regulation .............................................................120 
Chapter Summary...........................................................................................................126 
CHAPTER 5. THE UNFINISHED BUSINESS OF WELFARE REFORM ....................129 
The Healthy Marriage and Responsible Fatherhood Initiative ..................................130 
Shifting Meaning of Marriage ........................................................................................135 
Bush’s Marriage Promotion Agenda ...............................................................139 
Divergent Perspectives of Marriage ................................................................142 
A Focus on Fathers ........................................................................................................145 
The Marriageable Men Theory.........................................................................149 
Silencing Single Mothers ..................................................................................152 
Chapter Summary...........................................................................................................155 
CHAPTER 6. BEYOND THE WELFARE QUEEN ...........................................................158 
Mixed Messages About Single Motherhood ................................................................159 
Defining Themselves ........................................................................................159 
Revisiting Past Rhetoric .................................................................................................172 
Chapter Summary...........................................................................................................176 
CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSION .................................................................................................178 
Research Questions ........................................................................................................178 































LIST OF TABLES 
Table 2.1. Nonmarital Childbearing by Race and Hispanic Origin of Mother, and Maternal 
Age: United States, selected years 1970–2015 (%) .................................................. 27 
Table 4.1. Key Differences Between AFDC and TANF ........................................................... 85 
Table 4.2. Attitudes Toward Government Responsibility to Provide for Those in Need, 
1938–1995 .................................................................................................................. 97 
Table 4.3. Attitudes Toward Welfare Recipients, 1976–1994 ................................................... 98 




LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 2.1. Views on single women raising children .................................................................. 25 







This research employed a critical rhetorical lens to examine the construction of single 
mothers in American news media during four discrete but interconnected historical 
representative anecdotes that reflect periods of high interest in single mothers: after Dan 
Quayle’s Murphy Brown speech; during the 1996 welfare reform legislation; surrounding the 
Bush administration’s marriage initiative; and the calendar year 2012. I examined the ways in 
which media discourses perpetuate moral regulatory discourse and employ heteronormative, 
hegemonic, patriarchal ideals of family and mothering to single-mother families. This 
research found that news media narratives about single mothers largely support a decades-
long project of moral regulation undertaken by political and social elites who have a vested 
interest in maintaining the patriarchal status quo. This research further found that the voices 
of single mothers are largely absent from news media discourse, which instead gives space to 
politicians, academics, political pundits, and others who contribute to negative stereotypes 
about single-mother families. Moreover, single mothers are often rhetorically positioned in 
relation to men, and only recently have they begun to articulate their identities for 
themselves within news media discourse.   
Keywords: Critical Rhetoric, Motherhood, Single Mothers, Marriage, Poverty, Welfare 





CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION    
We are seeing it. We are seeing the fabric of this country fall apart, and it’s 
falling apart because of single moms.  
       
What we have is moms raising children in single-parent households simply 
breeding more criminals. 
— Rick Santorum, 1994 
 
 According to the United States Census Bureau, the number of American households 
headed by women with children increased from 19.5% in 1980 to 29.5% in 2008. The 
percentage of births to unmarried women in the United States rose from 18.4% to 40.8% 
during that same time period (Vespa, Lewis, & Kreider, 2012). Single-parent families, 
whether headed by women or, less commonly, by men, are no longer a rarity but a fixture in 
this country. But the prevalence of single-mother-headed families has not translated into 
their widespread acceptance, as public opinion of single mothers remains overwhelmingly 
negative. According to a 2010 report published by the Pew Research Center, 69% of 
respondents said the trend toward more single women having children is bad for society, and 
61% said a child needs both a mother and a father to grow up happily (Taylor, Parker, Wang, 
Morin, Horowitz, & Cohen, 2010). A more recent study supported these conclusions, 
finding that never-married custodial single mothers are viewed less positively than their male 
counterparts in terms of personal characteristics and parenting abilities (DeJean, McGeorge, 
& Stone Carlson, 2012).  
Despite the significant increase in single mothers during the past several decades, 
scant academic literature exists that examines how they are discussed in news media 
contexts. The few investigations in this realm focus almost exclusively on representations of 
single mothers in stories about poverty and welfare policy (Bullock, Fraser Wyche, & 





representations of single mothers in other contexts, such as popular television shows 
(Larson, 1996), movies (Valdivia, 1998), popular fiction (Silbergleid, 2002), as well as 
magazines and social science journals (Usdansky, 2003, 2008, 2009).  
Research Goals and Purpose 
Previous research has identified two predominant foci in single mother discourse: 
poverty and morality. One or both of these themes seem to permeate nearly every discussion 
of single motherhood I have encountered both academically and personally. The goal of this 
research is to further examine the articulation of these themes from a critical perspective. I 
also identified the discursive contexts in which various definitions of single motherhood are 
articulated. Much of the academic work on single motherhood—intentionally or not— plays 
into negative stereotypes of single mothers because the focus is on poverty or morality. 
However, and importantly, not all single mothers are on welfare, and not all people on 
welfare are single mothers. But the disproportionate volume of literature examining single 
mothers specifically and exclusively in the context of welfare policies and poverty would lead 
one to believe as much. By analyzing news media constructions of single mothers, I aimed to 
explore the connections between institutional power and public discussions of single 
mothers. Moreover, mainstream media discourses tend to impart dominant sociocultural 
values and ideologies. In doing so, they can serve as effective tools of moral regulation (Hier, 
Lett, Walby, & Smith, 2011; Hunt, 1999). In this dissertation, I argue the relationships 
between prevailing institutional attitudes about single mothers and news media coverage of 
these various strains of discourse align with negative public opinions about single mothers 
like those represented in the aforementioned Pew Research Center report.  
Further, I examined the ways in which these discourses seek to impose 





families. Put another way, it is likely the voices prevalent in stories about single mothers are 
not overwhelmingly those of single mothers themselves, but rather voices of representatives 
from various social and political institutions whose interests lie in regulating the behavior of 
single mothers and defining the condition of single motherhood as morally and financially 
problematic. A critical feminist theoretical perspective is useful in examining the ways in 
which single mothers and their allies have pushed back against the dominant lines of 
discourse the same way Murphy Brown used her platform as a news anchor to push back 
against Dan Quayle. New media technologies have increased access to blogs, web forums, 
and other venues of public discourse where mothers, single or otherwise, can “talk back” to 
the mainstream media and voice approval or dissent. Because I examined discourse about 
this topic from 1992 to 2012, a timeframe encompassing multiple significant political and 
social discussions about single mothers, developments in mediated communication play a 
critical role in the dissemination and proliferation of media and popular culture dialogues. 
Examining if and how single mothers have leveraged these platforms to confront stereotypes 
and issue counter-narratives is also valuable.  
Research Questions 
 This research sought to explore the following questions with regard to news media 
discourse about single mothers: 
1. How is the definition of single mother articulated rhetorically within news media? 
2. What are the overarching themes associated with discourse about single mothers 
in news media?   
2A. In addressing the already-identified theme of poverty, what common 
sub-themes or stereotypes routinely appear? 





sub-themes or stereotypes appear?  
3. How are media discourses about single mothers connected to larger sociocultural, 
policy, and political institutions? 
 3A. Are these connections implicit or explicit?  
3B. How are these connections articulated? 
3C. Are certain ideological positions favored over others?  
3D. Does ideological positioning vary by the historical period being 
examined? 
4. Do stories about single mothers primarily feature the voices of single mothers?  
5A. If so, what are these women saying?  
5B. If not, who is featured instead?  
5. In counter-discourses, how do single mothers and their allies discuss themselves 
and the condition of single motherhood? 
Selection of Historical Representative Anecdotes 
To address these research questions most effectively, I focused my analysis narrowly 
on a series of historical representative anecdotes in which discussions of single mothers 
became prominent in media. In “The Grammar of Motives,” Burke (1969) identified the 
representative anecdote as an approach to identifying symbolic patterns within discourses 
(Engstrom, 2012; Harter & Japp, 2001). Harter and Japp (2001) interpret Burke’s (1969) 
definition of a representative anecdote as “an idea that is both representative (i.e. broad 
enough to be diffused throughout the discourse in question), yet reductive (i.e., the essence 
of the discourse is condensed into a concise and readily understood equation)” (p. 412). 





consistent themes and stories that are broad enough to encompass the overall qualities of the 
discourse that includes its dialectical tensions and oppositions. 
When one engages in the search for a representative anecdote, he or she is looking 
for a stable form or set of relations that pervade a discourse, one that appears and 
reappears in different guises or variations on a theme. Therefore, a representative 
anecdote reveals the fundamental characteristics of a discourse and fuses its essential 
values. (Harter & Japp, 2001, p. 412) 
Summarily, a representative anecdote is essentially a “nutshell version of what narratives 
have in common, and gives us a way of talking about a range of discourses that say 
essentially the same thing” (Engstrom, 2012, p. 3).  
In looking for these representative anecdotes, I was principally interested in 
understanding the rhetorical and ideological constructions of single mothers in news media 
contexts. The selection of these anecdotes stems from the consideration of both 
chronological and rhetorical factors detailed below.  
 The analysis begins with an examination of the discourse surrounding single 
mothers following Dan Quayle’s infamous 1992 Murphy Brown speech. This speech was an 
unprecedented convergence of popular culture and politics, which blurred the lines between 
fantasy and reality (Benoit & Anderson, 1996). Cloud (1998) also identified this particular 
piece of rhetoric as a site of significant political and ideological discourse as it related to 
family values—a salient theme during the 1992 presidential election. Quayle’s speech also 
ignited a tidal wave of discourse about the growing number of single-mother families in the 
United States and the impact these families had on various aspects of culture and society.  
The second representative anecdote selected for analysis is the passage of the 





legislation, signed by Democratic President Bill Clinton, is significant for three reasons. First, 
it fundamentally altered the entitlement structure of the American social safety net. Second, 
low-income single mothers were disproportionally affected by the implementation of its 
reforms by design, as the legislation specifically sought to reduce rates of “illegitimacy” and 
wean “welfare queens” off the government teat. Third, there is both a political and 
ideological relationship between the “family values” rhetoric deployed by Dan Quayle a few 
years earlier and the welfare reform rhetoric of the PRWORA era. Both used the rhetoric of 
“personal responsibility” and “dependency” to justify criticisms of single mothers with little 
consideration of the structural factors that cause and perpetuate single motherhood and 
poverty. Although congressional and public debates about welfare policy spanned many 
years and took different forms, the passage of the PRWORA represents a profound shift in 
the sociopolitical climate in which low-income single mothers live their lives.  
The third representative anecdote took place during the early 2000s, when President 
George W. Bush designated $150 million annually to support marriage promotion projects 
and fatherhood initiatives. These programs were explicitly designed to further the objectives 
of Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), the cash assistance program created 
under Clinton’s welfare reform legislation years earlier. While governmental involvement in 
marriage was not new, unambiguous state promotion of marriage was. It was also 
controversial. Conservatives largely applauded the measure, while feminists and most liberals 
saw it as an unnecessary intrusion into the private lives of Americans and a potentially 
dangerous form of coercion directed toward vulnerable women. The selection of this 
anecdote is related, both conceptually and pragmatically, to welfare reform legislation, as the 
PRWORA created space for the federal government to establish and fund marriage and 





The final representative anecdote spans the calendar year of 2012, which was a point 
of convergence for discourse about single motherhood in the contexts of family values 
rhetoric, welfare reform, and marriage promotion. This year marked the 20th anniversary of 
Dan Quayle’s Murphy Brown speech and thus functions as an ideal point of rhetorical 
comparison. Also, some of the most stringent policies enacted under the PRWORA were 
rolled back by President Barack Obama in 2012, resulting in renewed discourse about 
welfare reliance and, by proxy, single mothers. Third, multiple reports were published in 
2012 reviewing the outcomes of the Bush marriage initiative projects, sparking increased 
media scrutiny of government funding for such programs.  
From a rhetorical perspective, these historical representative anecdotes characterize 
four discrete periods of increased interest in single-mother families. Moreover, they are 
ideologically connected: one period of discourse informs the next, building on previous 
narratives about the ways in which single mothers deviate from social norms of family, 
marriage, and accepted practices of mothering.  
Sampling Procedures 
 To best address the previously articulated research questions, I looked primarily, but 
not exclusively, to three of the nation’s top five print media outlets—The New York Times, 
USA Today, and Washington Post—and their associated electronic platforms. The bulk of texts 
for this analysis were identified using two archival media databases, ProQuest and 
LexisNexis Academic, because they allow for similar search parameters. If a sufficient 
sample was not available via one database, the second was consulted. Searches were 
conducted for news and feature articles within these three publications using keywords 
related to each of the anecdotes.  





Quayle’s Murphy Brown speech, I searched LexisNexis Academic using the keywords “Dan 
Quayle,” “Murphy Brown,” “single mom,” and “single mother” for articles between May 1, 
1992, and December 31, 1993. This led to a total of 551 results, which were then further 
narrowed by publication name. The sample for this chapter thus consisted of 50 New York 
Times articles, 45 Washington Post stories, and 39 USA Today articles. In addition, using the 
same databases, I identified a further grouping of significant texts published by mainstream, 
nationally circulating monthly magazines. This subsegment of the sample includes prominent 
feature stories published in The Atlantic, The New Republic, Essence, The National Review, and 
U.S. News & World Report.  
 For the second representative anecdote, which focuses on discourse surrounding the 
1996 welfare reform legislation, my sample consisted of newspaper articles identified using 
procedures similar to those outlined above. Using keyword searches for “single mom,” 
“single mother,” “TANF,” and “welfare” for texts published between January 1, 1996, and 
December 31, 1997, I identified 159 results from The New York Times, 116 from The 
Washington Post, and 25 from USA Today. To supplement this sample, I also identified 35 
radio and television news stories in LexisNexis that focused specifically on single mothers in 
the context of welfare reform. These programs aired on National Public Radio, CBS, ABC, 
and CNN.  
 The third representative anecdote examines discourse surrounding President George 
W. Bush’s marriage and fatherhood promotion program. This sample required casting a 
broader net than previous samples, as the Healthy Marriage and Responsible Fatherhood 
initiative was discussed in media for years before it was officially enacted. To collect texts for 
this sample, I used keyword searches in LexisNexis and ProQuest for “single mom” or 





entire span of Bush’s presidency—January 1, 2001, to January 20, 2009. The collection of 
this sample was complicated by debates about gay marriage occurring at the time, which is 
why the keyword “fatherhood” was also used to identify texts relevant to the marriage 
promotion efforts. Many articles that contained “single mom” or “single mother” as well as 
“marriage promotion” focused not on single mothers or marriage promotion programs, but 
on discussions about gay marriage and related laws being enacted and considered by 
legislatures at the time. I was able to limit this sample to 28 Washington Post stories, 31 New 
York Times stories, and 16 USA Today articles. Again, to supplement, I conducted a similar 
keyword search for television and radio news programs. This yielded an additional 129 
combined results from ABC, NBC, CBS, and NPR. 
 For the final representative anecdote, which examines discourse for the calendar year 
2012, the procedure was essentially the same as for the prior anecdotes. Time- and 
publication-limited keyword searches yielded 416 New York Times, 342 Washington Post, and 
83 USA Today stories. The number of results for this timeframe bolsters my argument about 
this particular year as a representative anecdote for discourse about single mothers. For 
comparison, in the calendar year 2008 only 30 stories in total featuring the same keywords 
appeared in The New York Times.  
 Thus, this research analyzed approximately 841 unique media texts to identify, 
examine, and critique the ways in which these news outlets and their associated digital 
platforms discussed single-parent families. Given that representations of single-parent 
families vary widely between news and entertainment contexts, and that public opinion data 
and social science research all find evidence of negative attitudes toward single parents, a 
comprehensive investigation of depictions of single-parent families in network television 





dimension to the existing literature. Moreover, because the studies of single mothers in news 
media have focused primarily on poverty and welfare, this study provides an opportunity to 
examine a wider array of contexts. Because no similar studies have been conducted, this 
study will fill a significant gap in the current body of research on mediated representations of 
single-mother families. 
Analytic Procedures 
I employed a critical rhetorical approach to the textual analysis for this research. In a 
theoretical sense, critical rhetoric blends the assumptions of both critical and rhetorical 
theories to analyze constructions of power and ideology in a text. First articulated by 
McKerrow (1989), critical rhetoric is both a theoretical perspective and a practical approach 
to rhetorical analysis that “seeks to unmask or demystify the discourse of power” (p. 91). 
Unlike initial iterations of ideological criticism that view power as an inherently repressive 
force, critical rhetoric views power as having the potential for liberation or freedom. “Power 
. . . is not repressive, but productive—it is an active potentially positive force which creates 
social relations and sustains them through the appropriation of a discourse that ‘models’ the 
relations through its expression” (McKerrow, 1989, p. 99). Further, discourse is viewed by 
critical rhetoric as not just a means by which juridical power is normalized and 
institutionalized, but also as a tool of freedom:  
The analysis of the discourse of power focuses on the “normalization” of language 
intended to maintain the status quo. By producing a description of “what is,” 
unfettered by predetermined notions of “what should be,” the critic is in a position 
to posit the possibilities of freedom. Recharacterization of the images changes the 





McKerrow argued for four generic features of a critical rhetoric. First, it shares the 
“critical spirit” of theories stemming from the likes of Gramsci, McGee, Habermas, and 
Foucault and is concerned with power, ideology, and rhetoric. Second, critical rhetoric serves 
a demystifying function, seeking to reveal the ways in which rhetoric conceals its relationship 
to power. Third, it does not seek objectivity as its aim; rather, critical rhetoric takes a 
position and provides an argument against something. Finally, critical rhetoric must have 
consequences. That is, it must either provide social judgments about courses of action or 
identify the possibilities for future action.  
Unlike traditional approaches to criticism, critical rhetoric is interested in not only 
what is present in a text or set of texts but also, and perhaps more importantly, what is 
absent, such as the idea of the constructive capacity of power. In this way, the critic, in some 
sense, becomes the rhetorician. Rather than viewing the text as a complete entity in need of 
explanation, critical rhetoric allows the critic to view the text as “a collection of fragments 
from culture. The critic interprets for the reader the meaning of these fragments and 
identifies how they have been arranged in a meaningful way” (Borchers, 2006, p. 191).  
In a pragmatic sense, my analysis consisted of a close consideration of each unique 
text through the lens of critical rhetoric. Using the principles of critical discourse analysis 
(CDA) outlined by Wood and Kroger (2000), I viewed each text “in relation to social 
problems; to social structural variables such as race, gender and class; and above all to 
power” (p. 21). When deployed as a methodology, CDA goes beyond the linguistic concerns 
characteristic of other discourse analytic methods to consider the ways in which discourses 
construct objects and subjects. Phillips and Hardy (2002) and van Dijk (1996) emphasize the 
use of CDA to help “describe and explain how power abuse is enacted, reproduced or 





Drawing upon the work of Fairclough (1995a, 1995b), Phillips and Jorgensen (2002) 
present five features they believe are common among approaches to CDA. First, “the 
character of social and cultural processes and structures is partly linguistic-discursive” (p. 61). 
This essentially means that discursive practices are seen as a social practice, which 
contributes to the constitution of the social world and thus helps to construct the practices 
of everyday life. Second, “discourse is both constitutive and constituted” (p. 61), meaning 
that not only does discourse constitute the social reality, it is constituted by other social 
forces and practices. “It does not just contribute to the shaping and reshaping of social 
structures, but also reflects them” (Phillips and Jorgensen, 2002, p. 61). Third, “language use 
should be empirically analyzed within its social context” (p. 62). To look at discourse outside 
of its proper social context does not allow one to fully understand the importance of what is 
happening or being said. Fourth, “discourse functions ideologically” (p. 63). A society’s 
discourse about a given topic inherently works to create and reproduce widely accepted 
values and ideological standards. These ideological standards often lead to an imbalance of 
power between two or more social groups, such as social classes, men and women, racial and 
ethnic minorities, etc. Finally, “CDA does not understand itself as politically neutral but as a 
critical approach which is politically committed to social change” (p. 64). These five 
characteristics provide the backbone of any CDA. Ultimately, Phillips and Jorgensen define 
CDA as; 
. . . an explanatory critique. . . . that takes its starting point in a problem that 
the research should help to solve. This can either be a problem identified by 
individuals or groups in society, perhaps formulating an unmet need, or it 
can be identified by the researcher who may want to disclose a 





have of this reality that functions ideologically (p. 77). 
In addition to defining the four features of critical rhetoric, McKerrow (1989) also 
outlined eight principles of critical practice that should function as a guide for the critic. 
First, critical rhetoric is not a method but a perspective or orientation taken by the critic 
toward a rhetorical text. There is no recipe or formula for “doing” critical rhetoric. This, 
McKerrow (1989) argued, “maximizes the possibilities for what will ‘count’ as evidence for 
critical judgment and allows for creativity in the assessment of the ‘effects of truth’ upon 
social practices” (p. 102).  
Second, critical rhetoric views the discourse of power as material. Or, put another 
way, power manifests itself in tangible rhetorical texts and discourses that are accessible via 
popular culture and thus have a profound effect on ideology and power (Borchers, 2006).  
Third, “rhetoric constitutes doxastic rather than epistemic knowledge” (McKerrow, 1989, p. 
103). In other words, critical rhetoric is not so much concerned with questions of “truth” or 
“falsity,” but it is instead interested in identifying how rhetorical symbols come to possess 
power. The focus of critical rhetoric is to “explain how symbols come to have a meaning 
that is more or less widely shared within a culture” (Borchers, 2006, p. 192). Fourth, naming 
is the central symbolic act of a nominalist rhetoric. The labels we create and use for objects 
should never be presumed to be fixed or static, since the naming is, in a rhetorical sense, an 
assertion of the unity of power and identity in a term. To the contrary, critical rhetoric sees 
the act of naming an object as a process that should be constantly evaluated and situated 
alongside other objects in the appropriate context. How we name things influences how we 
view them and respond to them (Borchers, 2006).  
Fifth, critical rhetoric does not presume that influence is the same as causality. All 





rhetoric is more concerned with the potential for influence that exists through symbol use. 
McKerrow (1989) used this example: “The potential for images of crime to influence the 
social reality of the elderly is present through the depiction of such symbolic acts on nightly 
crime drama” (p. 106). Sixth, absence is just as important as presence in understanding and 
evaluating symbolic action. As stated previously, a critical practice allows the critic to look at 
both what is being communicated as well as what is not being addressed by a text, under the 
assumption that what is not present often makes what is present more powerful or 
meaningful. Seventh, critical rhetoric presumes that meanings are polysemic or multiple, 
rather than monosemic or singular. This essentially means that a rhetorical text may mean 
different things to different people. Moreover, critical rhetoric “seeks to find the meaning 
that exists in a text that subverts or rejects the prevailing ideology of a culture” (Borchers, 
2006, p. 192). While a text may have an obvious ideological perspective, critical rhetoric is 
more interested in finding its subversive meanings. Eighth and finally, critical rhetoric views 
criticism as performance. This allows the critic to take the role of an inventor or advocate 
for an interpretation of the fragments of a text. Going beyond the mere justification of a 
particular interpretation, critical rhetoric “moves the focus from criticism as method to 
critique as practice” (McKerrow, 1989, p. 108).  
Critical rhetoric’s concern with ideology, power, and discourse begs questions about 
how to go about identifying the presence of an ideology in a text. To be sure, in some cases 
the author of a text may express his or her ideology explicitly. Take as an example Kellner’s 
(2006) essay “9/11, Spectacles of Terror, and Media Manipulation,” in which he forcefully 
criticized the Bush administration’s handling of the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, 





Moreover, since the September 11 strikes, the Bush administration has arguably used 
fear tactics to advance its political agenda, including tax breaks for the rich, 
curtailment of social programs, military build-up, the most draconian assaults on US 
rights and freedoms in the contemporary era in the so-called USA Patriot Act, and a 
highly controversial and divisive March 2003 war in Iraq. (p. 47)  
In contrast to this overtly politicized and ideological analysis, Murphy (2003) explored the 
ways in which the same Bush administration “crafted the authority to dominate public 
interpretation of those events and the appropriate response to them” (p. 607) but abstained 
from making any visibly ideological or political assertions about the impact, morality, or 
“rightness” of those efforts. Instead, Murphy withheld judgment, allowing the resulting 
insights to emerge from the process of analysis (Kuypers, 2008). Both critics presented 
examples of critical rhetorical analyses, but their goals, objectives, and approaches to the 
texts were vastly different with regard to the articulation (or lack thereof) of ideology. It then 
becomes the role of critical theory to determine whether a particular ideology is present in a 
text, or whether the text is attempting to be ideologically neutral.   
Thus, my analysis focused acutely on the articulation and positionality of power 
within each text, looking closely at the sources used to contextualize each story and the 
source’s implicit or explicit relationship to institutions that perpetuate the rhetoric of single 
mothers as a social problem. I also paid particular attention to the ways in which journalistic 
narrative contributed to or contested/critiqued articulations of power within each text, 
asking whether journalists situate institutional sources prominently, and to what extent the 
voices of single mothers and their allies are featured in relation to institutional sources. 
Moreover, the analysis of each text and the sample as a whole consisted of an identification 





discussions of race, for example, were largely absent, and in some cases, media discourse 
wholly ignored critical elements of policy that impacted mothers’ lives. Further, I considered 
each text’s possible subversive meanings by examining the presence, absence, or centrality of 
structural explanations for single motherhood and its associated social ills, the sources used 
to contextualize each narrative, and the journalistic narrative itself. This strategy is both 
consistent with established CDA procedures and McKerrow’s (1989) guiding principles for 
critical rhetoric.  
Rationale and Significance 
 Media representations and narratives are important. Studies have found relationships 
between media discourse, public policy, and public opinion, although the directionality of 
these relationships remains a subject of contestation. In their meta-analysis of research on 
media and public policy, Walgrave and van Aelst (2006) found 12 of the 19 studies published 
during a 30-year period reported strong or considerable media effects on policymaking, and 
seven reported weak or minimal impact. There are many reasons to assume the media have 
little opportunity to influence policymaking. Koch-Baumgarten and Voltmer (2010) posited 
the fleeting and increasingly fractured nature of contemporary news coverage “generates 
only spotlights of attention that hardly leave any traces in the memory of the audience” (p. 
2). They additionally stated media coverage may be limited in its impact due to the 
conflicting agendas of policymakers and media outlets:   
The substance of the media agenda differs from the policy agenda in that it is driven 
by newsworthy events rather than structural problems . . . . . Thus there seems to be 
a fundamental mismatch between the way in which the media operate and the 
process of policymaking. (Koch-Baumgarten & Voltmer, 2010, p. 2) 





discourse and public policy can be found in research about public opinion. Rightly or 
wrongly, policymakers have traditionally considered the media a fast lane to public opinion 
because they tend to assume the general public is heavily influenced by what they read and 
watch (Herbst, 1998). Consequently, policymakers may adapt their agendas based on media 
priorities and the ways in which coverage of issues may influence public opinion (Davis, 
2007). This orientation toward media has served policymakers in important ways. First, the 
relationship between journalists and political figures has changed, with journalists adopting 
an adversarial or aggressive style of reporting (Blumler & Gurevitch, 1995), which has 
increased pressure on politicians and government officials to engage in active news 
management techniques (Koch-Baumgarten & Voltmer, 2010). The internet has provided 
infinite opportunities for politicians to communicate with their constituencies, and vice 
versa. And while democratically this may be a positive development, it has also diminished 
mainstream legacy news media’s already tenuous influence on policy and public opinion 
(Koch-Baumgarten & Voltmer, 2010). However, in their adoption of web-based platforms 
to disseminate news, traditional media outlets have started to regain some of their foothold 
in the digital age. Coupled with the growing acceptance of journalist blogs, web-shows, 
Twitter feeds, and other social media tools, the agenda-setting function of the fourth estate 
remains intact, if fractured (McCombs, 2014). 
The strength of media influence on public policy and public opinion is mitigated in 
no small part by the degree of political agreement or indecision around a given issue. 
Robinson (2001) argued elite consensus and policy uncertainty function as variables that can 
enhance or reduce media’s ability to shape policy decisions. The assumption, he argued, is 
that uncertainty makes politicians more susceptible to media pressures, particularly when an 





policymakers decreases media interest and functions like a kind of shield. Koch-Baumgartner 
and Voltmer (2010) argued this is because 
[t]ypically, the media’s attention is drawn to a policy debate when internal splits or 
sharp divisions between political parties become obvious. Once the media have 
become involved, the dynamic and direction of a policy can change dramatically. 
Increased media coverage usually intensifies the conflict and invites new actors to 
enter the debate and to join one of the opposing camps. Policy alternatives must 
then be formulated in a manner that suits the media’s thirst for soundbites and catch 
headlines and, since the conflict is now enacted in front of the public eye, 
compromises and backstage deals become less likely. (p.5) 
 This discussion of public policy and public opinion is important for articulating the 
significance of the present study. Two of the four representative anecdotes  
selected for analysis focus on articulations and constructions of single mothers in the face of 
major, unprecedented shifts in public policy. Chapter 3 examines news media discourse 
surrounding the landmark 1990s welfare reform debate, and Chapter 4 analyzes discourses 
about single mothers in the wake of George W. Bush’s marriage promotion efforts. Given 
the punitive nature of welfare reform legislation and its ideological relationship to marriage 
promotion programs a few years later, it is worth considering the possible role media 
coverage might have played in shaping public perceptions about single mothers during this 
era. It is also worth considering media coverage surrounding Dan Quayle’s comments about 
Murphy Brown in 1992 might have shaped welfare reform policies a few years later. While 
the current study did not orient itself toward answering these questions with authority, I 
found evidence for at least a conceptual connection between media coverage of single 





A Personal Connection 
If, as conservative pundit Charles Murray contended in the 1990s, unmarried 
childbearing is truly the most important social problem of the time, then I am part of that 
problem. And so was my mother. And so was her mother. In the 1940s, my maternal 
grandmother, Lola Bannon, bore her first child out of wedlock. It was a scandalous affair, 
and the circumstances under which she became pregnant are still not something I fully 
understand. The child—my aunt Lynn, who is now in her 70s—spent the first few years of 
her life living with her grandparents, my great-grandparents. After Lola met and married my 
grandfather, Robert Conner, Lynn became part of the family and, in fairly rapid fashion, was 
joined by seven siblings, the fifth of whom is my mother, Cathy. My mother was 26 and 
unmarried when I was born in 1984. I never met my biological father, who is now deceased, 
and I was legally adopted by the only man I have ever known as a father after my parents 
were married in 1989. Most of my six maternal aunts have, at various periods in their lives, 
raised children as single mothers as well. Even my lone maternal uncle, Robert Jr., is 
currently raising his son alone. He legally adopted his late wife’s African-American grandson 
after she passed away of pancreatic cancer in 2016. 
Continuing the legacy of unmarried motherhood, at age 20 I became pregnant with a 
daughter of my own, Lola Grace. While her biological father is active and involved in her 
life, we have never been married, nor are we currently romantic partners. In fact, Lola 
(named after her maternal great-grandmother) and I have lived in a different state than her 
father since she was only two years old. As of this writing, I am 34, have never been married, 
am not in a relationship, nor have I never even been engaged. While my pregnancy was 





force in my life since the sunny day in February 2005 when both lines on the pregnancy test 
strip turned pink.  
The social, cultural, and political issues surrounding single motherhood are therefore 
of great personal interest and significance to me. Raising my daughter in a world where we 
and other nontraditional families are not judged by the nature of our family structure, but 
rather viewed as fully formed human beings with agency and autonomy, is important as a 
matter not only of social justice but of human rights. Individuals are more than their 
circumstances, but circumstances are often critical to success. For a time when I was very 
young, my bedroom was a closet and my bed was a dresser drawer. Before my parents got 
married, my mother and I lived in a house the size of a two-car garage. Neither of my 
parents went to college, but my dad has worked at an aircraft manufacturing plant for nearly 
40 years, and his income allowed my mother to stay home and take care of my sister, Jane, 
who is six years younger than I am. Even after Jane and I were both in school, my mother 
continued to mostly stay home, only occasionally working part-time jobs for short periods. 
This is the epitome of middle-class privilege, and I often wonder what would have become 
of my mother and me had she not married out of the lower working class. Would we have 
been one of the families affected by the 1996 welfare reforms? Would I have ever gone to 
college? I almost certainly would not be toiling over this dissertation right now.  
I also want to acknowledge here my privilege as a cisgender White person, as 
someone with a college education, and as a member of the middle class. I have not faced 
racial discrimination or felt the kind of prejudices that LGBTQ individuals or women of 
color have to endure in navigating social safety net infrastructure. But none of these 
privileges have fully insulated me from poverty either. After having my daughter and 





poverty level. I have had to rely periodically on food stamps, Medicaid, subsidized childcare, 
loans from my parents (which, as an aside, are a middle-class luxury not available to many 
people of color) and astronomical student loans all in the hopes that someday I too will be 
able to join the ranks of the middle class and provide for my daughter like my parents 
provided for me. Yet there is still shame associated with filling out a food stamp application 
and stating I am a university instructor with two degrees, working on a third. I am guilty of 
looking over my shoulder in the grocery checkout line, trying to hide my EBT card while 
praying no one says anything about my smartphone, shoes, manicure, or the $300 Michael 
Kors tote bag on my arm (it was a gift! I carry it to work! I prefer my students operate under 
the illusion that I am not actually living below the poverty level!).  
Preview of Chapters 
 The following chapters explore four discrete but interconnected frames of discourse 
about single mothers in American news media in order to understand how media coverage 
has constructed and perpetuated narratives about these women and their lives. But in order 
to properly situate this study, I must first review the relevant literature on moral regulation, 
moral panic, and intensive motherhood—the three predominant frameworks through which 
this analysis was centered. Additionally, Chapter 2 presents an overview of the relevant 
sociological literature about marriage, family, and single mothers.  
Chapter 3 analyzes media coverage about Dan Quayle’s 1992 Murphy Brown speech in 
the context of the family values rhetoric so common during this time period. Using a critical 
rhetorical lens, the chapter discusses how much of the political and social conversation 
surrounding single mothers and single motherhood functions as a tool of moral regulation 
intended to apply heteropatriarchal ideals of family onto single women who bear and raise 





Chapter 4 focuses on the landmark welfare reform legislation passed by President 
Clinton in 1996. It begins with an overview of the reforms and how they compare and 
contrast with previous welfare programs. I analyzed the discourse through a framework of 
moral regulation, considering how media narratives were deployed to construct single 
mothers as morally deficient social deviants, and how mothers engaged with those discourses 
to resituate themselves as the worthy or deserving poor. Chapter 5 moves into an analysis of 
President George W. Bush’s marriage- and fatherhood-promotion programs on federal and 
state levels. Beginning with a review of the origins of these programs, the analysis then 
reflects on the ways in which news media descriptions of marriage and fatherhood programs 
largely excluded single mothers, focusing instead on increasing the involvement of 
“absentee” fathers. Chapter 5 further analyzes media constructions of marriage as a broad, 
positive social force and how that construction has been misaligned with the lived 
experiences of poor single mothers.  
Chapter 6 considers the discursive themes present in news media about single 
mothers without the influence of previous representative anecdotes. Then I move into a 
more focused analysis, reconsidering how media framed Dan Quayle’s rhetoric about 
Murphy Brown 20 years after his initial speech. Next, I examined the implications of 
Clinton’s welfare reforms in the wake of Obama-era reforms during 2012. Finally, I focused 
on discourse about the outcomes of the Bush administration’s marriage- and fatherhood-
promotion programs in light of the government reports that studied their impacts. To 
conclude, in Chapter 7 I revisit my stated research questions and then present a discussion of 
the ways in which news media reports about single mothers and the issues that affect them 





gender, family, and standards of mothering. I then offer remarks on the value of studying 









CHAPTER 2. THE SINGLE MOTHER “PROBLEM” 
Illegitimacy is the single most important social problem of our time—more 
important than crime, drugs, poverty, illiteracy, welfare or homelessness 
because it drives everything else.  
     — Charles A. Murray, 1993 
 
During his first U.S. Senate campaign in 1994, Senator Rick Santorum blamed single 
mothers for the downfall of America, saying “We are seeing it. We are seeing the fabric of 
this country fall apart, and it’s falling apart because of single moms” (Murphy & Kroll, 2012). 
A few months later, Santorum also accused single mothers of “breeding more criminals” 
(Kroll & Murphy, 2012). In her book In Defense of Single Parent Families, Nancy Dowd (1997) 
summarized popular sentiments about single-parent families in these words: 
A remarkably consistent view of single parent families dominates popular 
culture as well as public policy. “Single parent family” is a euphemism . . . for 
“problem family,” for some kind of social pathology. Single parent families 
are characterized as part of the “underclass”; broken and deviant, as 
compared to the nuclear, traditional, patriarchal family. (p. 3) 
Dowd (1997) was right. A majority of Americans apparently do hold this view. In 2010, the 
Pew Research Center published an extensive and widely circulated report on social and 
demographic trends in the United States (Taylor et al., 2010). The report’s most striking 
findings were about public attitudes toward changing family structures: nearly 70% of 
Americans disapproved of the growing rates of single motherhood, agreeing the trend was 
“bad for society.” This attitude held true for a majority of men and women of all 
racial/ethnic groups and age ranges (Fig. 2.1). Further, 61% of respondents believed a child 
needs both a mother and a father to grow up happily. In fact, the trend toward unmarried 









Figure 2.1. Views on single women raising children.  







It is true that the share of births to unmarried women in the United States has risen 
sharply in the past 50 years—from five percent overall in the mid-1960s to 40% in the mid-
2000s (Martin, et al., 2017). There are also significant differences in unmarried birth rates 
among racial groups. According to the CDC report (Martin et al., 2017), Asian and Pacific 
Islander women have the lowest rates of nonmarital childbearing, which was slightly more 
than 16%, followed by White women (35.8%) and Hispanic women (53%), and Black 
women had the highest rate by far with 71% (Table 2.1). 
It is important to be clear, though, that not all children born to unmarried mothers 
live with only one biological parent. Concurrent with the rise in unmarried birth rates has 
been a significant increase in cohabitation among unmarried partners. During the past 20 
 
Figure 2.2. Views on changing family structures 






years, according to the National Survey of Family Growth, “virtually all of the growth in 
births outside of marriage has been driven by increases in births to cohabitating women” 
(Pew Research Center, 2015, p. 22). Many so-called single mothers, then, are not parenting 
alone; they are just parenting unmarried. The typical child in these families, therefore, is not 
growing up in one-parent households but is more likely being raised by an unmarried mother 
or father, or possibly by a mother and a partner who is not the biological father.  
 
Table 2.1. Nonmarital Childbearing by Race and Hispanic Origin of Mother, and Maternal 
Age: United States, selected years 1970–2015 (%) 
Maternal race, Hispanic 
origin & age 
1970 1980 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2013 2014 2015 
All races and origins 10.7 18.4 28 32.2 33.2 36.9 40.8 40.6 40.2 40.3 
White 5.5 11.2 20.4 25.3 27.1 31.7 35.9 35.8 35.7 35.8 
Black of African American 37.5 56.1 66.5 69.9 68.5 69.3 72.1 71 70.4 70.1 
American Indian/ Alaska 
Native 
22.4 39.2 53.6 57.2 58.4 63.5 65.6 66.4 65.7 65.8 
Asian or Pacific Islander --- --- 13.2 16.3 14.8 16.2 17 17 16.4 16.4 
Hispanic or Latina --- --- 36.7 40.8 42.7 48 53.4 53.2 52.9 53 
(Source: Martin et al., 2015. Centers for Disease Control) 
 
While sociological and psychological studies have consistently indicated that married 
unions are the most stable structures in which to raise children, even children born within 
the sanctity of marriage are likely to experience a shift in family structure at some point. 
Demographers Kennedy and Bumpass (2008) found that 20% of children born to a married 
couple will experience the breakup of that family by age nine, and half of children born to 
cohabiting parents will see changes in family structure by that same age.  
 To position this study socially, politically, historically, and theoretically, it is 
important to have at least a cursory understanding of the social and economic circumstances 
of American single mothers in the early 20th century. First, this chapter reviews relevant 
sociological literature on marriage, family, and motherhood to explain the causes and 





literature on single mothers in the context of poverty. This situates the analyses in Chapters 
3 and 4, which focus on Dan Quayle’s public feud with fictional TV journalist Murphy 
Brown and the overhaul of the American welfare system under President Bill Clinton. Third, 
I consider literature on the intersection of motherhood and morality, a topic that, along with 
poverty, has shown to be a salient theme in discussions about single mothers. Fourth and 
finally, I detail the three central theoretical frameworks—moral panic, moral regulation, and 
intensive mothering—that guided my analysis and grounded this research in a media 
sociology context. Taken together, this literature review provides the structure for my 
argument that media coverage about single mothers is both ideologically driven and wielded 
as a tool of moral regulation intended to bring single mothers back into the idealized 
heteronormative and patriarchal matrix of the American family.  
Single Mothers in Historical Context 
The increased number of single-mother families in the United States is a product of 
several simultaneously occurring trends. First, increased rates of divorce beginning in the 
1970s made single parents out of previously married couples. Mostly thanks to the spread of 
no-fault divorce laws, couples began splitting up and subsequently cohabiting, remarrying, 
creating stepfamilies, or, in a small portion of cases, remaining single. Presently, it is 
estimated that approximately 50% of all marriages will end in divorce (Cherlin, 2009). 
Second, increased rates of cohabitation have also led to the rise of single motherhood. But 
simply because a woman is not married at the time she gives birth does not necessarily mean 
she will be parenting alone. By the mid-1990s, cohabitation had become commonplace, with 
45% of woman aged 19–44 ever having lived with an unmarried partner (Bumpass & Lu, 
2000). This phenomenon has since expanded to half of all women aged 15–44 (Chandra et 





that figure had risen to nearly 50% (Kennedy & Bumpass, 2008). These cohabiting unions 
are tenuous, however. More than half of cohabiting couples in the United States will either 
marry or separate within two years, and only about one-fifth of cohabiting couples are still 
cohabiting after four years (Kennedy & Bumpass, 2008). Third, the feminist movement and 
resultant advances in women’s employment, educational opportunities, and reproductive 
freedom led to an increase, albeit a small one, in so-called “single mothers by choice” (Bock, 
2000). These women are typically in their mid- to late thirties or early forties, well-educated, 
and career-oriented (much like Murphy Brown) and actively choose to forgo partnered 
childbearing to pursue lone motherhood (Bock, 2000; Hertz, 2006).  
Familial upheaval has long been the cause of political and social handwringing. In the 
first half of the 20th century, having a child out of wedlock was a shameful and secretive act. 
Unmarried pregnant women would either be pressured into marrying quickly, or shipped off 
to maternity homes (usually under the guise of visiting relatives), where they would give birth 
and often be coerced into giving their illegitimate—to use the parlance of the time—babies 
up for adoption (Fessler, 2006). When the sexual revolution began to take hold in the early 
1960s, discussions of sex and sexuality began to mosey their way out of the marital bedroom 
and into the public sphere, allowing women to display their sexuality and assert their 
independence more openly. At the same time, social and religious conservatives were 
lamenting the decay of traditional family values and decrying the evils of feminism. These 
debates about family and women’s social roles were also beginning to play out in popular 
media.  
The invention of the birth control pill in 1960 was undoubtedly a large part of this 
shift, but so too was the newfound ability of women to talk about the problems they were 





“the problem that has no name”—an overall feeling of unhappiness and discontent felt by 
millions of women but rarely, if ever, articulated. This newfound freedom to express 
dissatisfaction with marital and child-rearing drudgery was just one of many social forces at 
play in the early ’60s that ultimately fueled the whirlwind of cultural and legal changes that 
would take place over the next two decades.  
Between 1960 and 1980, women fought for and won numerous protections against 
workplace gender and pay discrimination, abortion rights, legal recognition for marital rape, 
and no-fault divorce laws, among other things. They also went to work en masse. Women’s 
labor force participation rates skyrocketed between 1960 and 1980. According to the Bureau 
of Labor Statistics (2007), in 1960 just 38% of women participated in the labor force. By 
1980, that figure had jumped to more than 51%. Furthermore, marriages were dissolving in 
greater numbers thanks in large part to the advent of no-fault divorce laws. Between 1960 
and 1980, divorce rates more than doubled, rising from 9.2 divorces per 1,000 married 
women to 22.6 divorces per 1,000 married women (Wilcox, 2009). This, of course, led to an 
increase in the number of women raising children on their own. Adding fuel to the fire of 
concern, rates of nonmarital childbearing were increasing simultaneously. According to a 
2015 report issued by ChildTrends, a nonpartisan Maryland-based think tank, in 1960, 5.3% 
of all births were to unmarried women (ChildTrends, 2015). By 1970, that figure had more 
than doubled to 10.7%, and it more than doubled again by 1985 to 22%.   
Clearly, the trend toward out-of-wedlock births did not go unnoticed. By the early 
1990s, rates of unmarried childbearing had risen to nearly 30%, and the “social problem” of 
single motherhood had been articulated and deployed politically, resulting in increased news 
media coverage of the issue. A host of conservatives joined Rick Santorum in denouncing 





conservative American Enterprise Institute, a Washington, D.C.-based public policy think 
tank. Murray wrote in a 1993 Wall Street Journal op-ed that “illegitimacy is the single most 
important social problem of our time—more important than crime, drugs, poverty, illiteracy, 
welfare or homelessness because it drives everything else.” And it did not stop there. As 
recently as the 2012 election cycle, Republican presidential nominee Mitt Romney joined the 
chorus of politicians like Santorum in denouncing single motherhood. He insinuated during 
the second presidential debate that single parents were responsible for gun violence: 
We need moms and dads to raise kids. Wherever possible, the benefit of 
having two parents in the home. That's not always possible. Lot of great 
single moms and single dads. But gosh, to tell our kids, before they have 
babies, they ought to think about getting married to someone. That's a great 
idea. Because if there's a two-parent family, the prospect of living in poverty 
goes down dramatically. The opportunities that the child will be able to 
achieve increase dramatically. So we can make changes in the way our culture 
works to help bring people away from violence and give them opportunity 
and bring them into the American system. (Follman, 2012).  
Statements like these were—and frequently still are—part of media discourse about single 
mothers, the issues surrounding poverty, and what are often perceived to be the lifestyle 
choices of mothers parenting without partners. It is critical to remember that beyond the 
statistics—about nonmarital childbearing, government welfare, food stamp expenditures, 
divorce rates, and women’s labor force participation data—are real mothers, real children, 
real lives, real struggles, real joy, and, most importantly, often very real and serious policy 
consequences for poor and low-income mothers and their families. Media reports are the 





public and, in a properly functioning democratic society, a primary way for the citizenry to 
talk back to their government. Therefore, the ways in which media discuss, depict, construct, 
and debate single motherhood and the sociopolitical issues pertaining directly to them is of 
critical importance to this growing segment of the population and their children.  
Despite much rhetoric to the contrary, single mothers are not a new phenomenon, 
nor was single motherhood unprecedented when the out-of-wedlock birthrate began to rise 
in the 1960s. What is a (somewhat) new phenomenon, however, is the all-encompassing use 
of the term “single mother” to describe any woman raising children by herself. Gordon 
(1994) explained how early terminology used to refer to single mothers was more 
explanatory than today’s vague phrasing: 
“Single,” or “lone” or “solo” mother is itself a relatively recent aggregate term. In the 
early twentieth century women alone with children were referred to more specifically 
as widows, deserted women, unmarried, “illegitimate” mothers, and, very 
occasionally, divorced women. These categories have the advantage that they tell us 
something about the histories of these women . . . we can learn something about the 
causes of single motherhood. (p. 19) 
Perhaps what Gordon (1994) saw here as an advantage (at least from a historical 
research perspective) women later in the 20th century viewed as unnecessarily descriptive 
and intrusive. Now, when someone utters the phrase “single mom” it could refer to any 
woman raising a child alone: from a pregnant teenager to a 40-something undergoing IVF 
via a sperm donor to have a child without a partner. And while the pathways to single 
parenthood are even more varied now, thanks to technology, than they were in the 1900s, 





loaded. There are some notable exceptions to this, however, which will be discussed in a 
later section.    
 According to Gordon and McLanahan (1991), 8.5% of children lived with a single 
parent in 1900. Breaking down Gordon’s (1994) categories of lone mothers a bit further, 
unlike today, the overwhelming majority of women raising children alone in 1900 were 
widows. Approximately 75% of lone parents (primarily, although not exclusively, mothers), 
regardless of race, had suffered the death of a spouse (Gordon & McLanahan, 1990). By 
1933, that figure had fallen to 55% (Gordon, 1994). So-called deserted women were the 
second largest category of single mothers—16% in 1900. Today, these women would be 
considered permanently separated from their husbands. In that era, divorce was extremely 
rare, and men would not infrequently abandon their wives and children for economic 
reasons, leaving the woman to care and provide for the children financially. Few deserted 
wives ever sought divorce, partially because they were expensive, and also because many 
women found the idea of divorce morally objectionable. Even as late as the 1930s only 
about 1.3% of single mothers were legally divorced (Gordon, 1994). Almost as infrequent 
was the occurrence of “illegitimate” birth. In 1900, 4.6% of children in female-headed 
households were born outside of marriage.  
Even though the overall rate of lone motherhood was low during this era, and the 
overwhelming cause was not “unchaste” or immoral women but the death of a husband, 
lone mothering was still viewed as cause for concern.  
The role of mothers when they are single, the responsibility laid upon them for 
earning and caring for children, may also help explain why single parenthood has 





norms in a society that defined a two-parent family as “male-headed” that its 
occurrence created alarm and denial. (Gordon & McLanahan, 1991, p. 113)   
Gordon (1994) further argued that single mothers had long been viewed as a social problem 
that represented both a symptom and a cause of social breakdown in two contexts in 
particular: morality and welfare.  
Single Mothers and Poverty 
The most often cited problem occurring as a result of a single-parent family is 
poverty. According to data from the U.S. Census Bureau, 38.5% of single-mother families 
lived in poverty in 2009, and single-mother families with an income less than half the 
poverty level rose from 14% in 2000 to 19% in 2009 (Casey, 2011). A more in-depth 
discussion of single mothers in the context of welfare, and more specifically late-20th-
century welfare reform, is presented in Chapter 4. However, it is important to understand 
the shifts that led to these reforms and the consequences they have had on some of 
America’s most vulnerable families.  
The network of welfare programs available in the 1970s–1990s was vastly different 
than what was available in the earlier part of the century, although it was equally 
controversial. Also, much like today, there was an undertone, and sometimes an overt 
discussion, of “worthiness” and moralizing attached to various categories of recipients of 
government aid. Chapter 4 offers a further exploration of this divide. Nonetheless, a brief 
overview of the beginnings of welfare in the United States is warranted in order to 
understand how and why its recipients came to be so stigmatized and closely monitored. 
Prior to the 1900s, no organized system of federal welfare, or what was then called 
“public relief,” existed. Most aid, when available, came from local governments and private 





40 states did have at least some form of “mother’s pension”—public aid programs for 
mothers of dependent children. But these programs were usually piecemeal, and 
participation often came with many strings:  
Despite the spotlight on “innocent” widows, mothers’ aid was never meant to be 
open armed or trusting toward those it helped. To the contrary, mothers’ aid 
functioned and was intended to superintend and discipline as well as support its 
recipients. This is evident in the scrutiny of recipients’ morality . . . . Illegitimate 
children or male friends, alcoholic beverages, boarders or alien methods of 
housekeeping and childcare might disqualify a home. (Gordon, 1994, p. 45–46)  
It was not until the Great Depression era and the utter collapse of these local 
resources that the federal government stepped in to assist (Hansen, 2011). The next several 
years saw a slew of federal efforts to help relieve the crushing poverty and joblessness 
experienced by millions of Americans. The Emergency Relief and Construction Act of 1932 
was signed by President Herbert Hoover, which provided money to states for relief efforts 
and job creation. In 1933, President Roosevelt signed the Federal Emergency Relief Act, 
which allowed the national government to distribute more than $1 billion to temporarily 
bolster existing relief programs. In 1935, the Social Security Act (SSA) was passed. This is by 
far the most comprehensive legislation, establishing three types of programs designated to 
provide protections for distinct populations in different ways. First, it created a system of 
state-administered unemployment insurance to provide temporary financial assistance to 
able-bodied workers who lose their jobs through no fault of their own. Second, it established 
the Old Age and Survivors Insurance Program—a universal and contributor social insurance 
program for eligible wage-earners who retired or died, leaving a spouse or family. Finally, it 





and dependent children deemed unable to earn wages and therefore not eligible participate 
in the social wage-related insurance programs. Food stamps and Medicaid were added to the 
mix several decades later in 1965 (Hansen, 2011).  
 The federal program originally designed to be most useful to widowed and otherwise 
unmarried mothers was the Aid to Dependent Children (ADC, later changed to AFDC, Aid 
to Families with Dependent Children) program. Established by the SSA in 1935, ADC was 
designed to provide the 40 states that had passed mothers’ aid laws with federal grant money 
to help maintain the programs. The vision of the U.S. Children’s Bureau directors who 
drafted the plan was that the federal government would foot one-third of the bill so that 
poor mothers could stay home to care for their children, which was viewed as the best 
situation at the time. Mothers would also have access to cash stipends and social workers, 
since single mothers were viewed as in need of support and guidance. The program would 
be overseen by the Children’s Bureau, and all applicants would be treated equally regardless 
of race or marital status. The program also requested an initial appropriation of $120 million. 
 What happened instead was nearly the exact opposite of what was requested. State 
participation became voluntary, and in 1939, eight states had no ADC program, leaving 
hundreds of thousands of women and children without the opportunity to apply for 
assistance. The provision allowing for a cash stipend was removed, as was the guarantee of 
federal oversight that promised equal treatment to all racial groups and women of all marital 
statuses. Moreover, the appropriation was reduced to a paltry $20 million. All of these 
revisions functioned to effectively neuter the program for its first three decades. In 1960, 
when 79 out of every 1,000 children were in need, only 30 received assistance (Gordon & 





In many ways, AFDC functioned like the long-defunct private charities of the early 
20th century that gauged mothers’ worthiness based on their perceived morality. Only, in 
this case, it was individual government caseworkers who had the discretion to reduce or 
eliminate benefits with little to no notice based on subjective judgments of worthiness or 
perceived adherence to often vague and poorly worded rules. But recipients did not stand 
idly by and just accept their paltry handout and judgment in silence. Throughout the decades 
that followed, more than a dozen court cases sought to clarify and eliminate some of the 
confusing AFDC regulations that frequently subjected mothers to inconsistent, degrading, 
and unconstitutional treatment. While the courts did not always side with the plaintiffs, by 
the mid-1970s, they had struck down, on both statutory and constitutional grounds, many of 
the draconian provisions regulating AFDC (Gordon & Batlan, 2011).  
Beginning in the ’60s, shifts in cultural and social attitudes toward women, as well as 
new trends in women’s employment, led to new work requirements for welfare recipients. 
Women were penalized for refusing “suitable” jobs, and so-called workfare programs were 
implemented at the state and federal levels. Some provisions were initially carved out to 
allow mothers to attend school rather than work, but most were eventually removed even 
though educated women tend to earn more over time. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, 
reforms were implemented here and there; gross and household income limits were enacted 
in 1981, followed by the creation of childcare assistance, job training, and education 
programs in 1988 (Moffitt, 2008).  
As is likely evident by this point, what began as a few relatively modest federal 
programs during the Great Depression had, during the next 50 years, developed into a 
behemoth tangle of entitlement and means-tested programs that were so broad, complicated, 





state governments. Moreover, the public was becoming increasingly unhappy with the 
program. The 1980s were an unusually conservative era, and although the later part of the 
decade saw a 33% increase in the number of people receiving assistance, the overwhelming 
national sentiment was that people wanted entitlement reform (Rothman, 2016). It is an 
unfortunate irony that the program first created to help mothers stay home and care for their 
children eventually become a massive bureaucratic burden that undoubtedly made the same 
mothers’ lives more difficult.   
Despite the fact that three-fourths of single mothers are in the labor force and that 
they have slightly higher rates of labor force participation than women in married couples, 
the majority of employed single mothers—62%—work in low-wage service sector or 
administrative jobs that do not provide comprehensive, or any, benefits package (Mather, 
2010). These low-paying jobs are also far less likely to provide paid vacation, sick leave, 
flexible schedule, or other employee benefits and support programs conducive to work–life 
balance. Moreover, one-quarter of single mothers do not have health insurance coverage, 
and among those who are insured, two-fifths are covered by public assistance programs like 
Medicaid. Because single mothers are more likely to hold low-paying positions, their families 
also have significantly higher rates of poverty and reliance on “entitlement” programs like 
the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), also known as food stamps, and 
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), which provides limited cash assistance 
to very low-income families. In 2010, 41% of single mothers received SNAP benefits, up 
from 29% in 2001. Data on the number of single mothers receiving TANF benefits are not 
available, but one estimate claims that nearly 90% of TANF recipients are single mothers 
(Casey & Maldonado, 2012) Undoubtedly, the poverty rate among single mothers is high; 





of poverty in fact function to keep them there.  
 
Motherhood and Morality 
A second argument often employed in discourses against single mothers is one of 
morality, which is, unsurprisingly, linked to marital status. While single mothers have always 
existed, albeit typically in the periphery of society, historically it was only acceptable to 
become a single mother due to the death of a spouse. Divorce was taboo, and women who 
had children out of wedlock were considered “ruined” and often shunned by their families 
or sent to maternity homes to have their bastard children. The public shame and ostracism 
resulting from unwed childbirth throughout most of history led to a trend of infanticide and 
child abandonment (Thurer, 1994). In the early to mid-20th century, unmarried pregnant 
women in the United States and Canada were seen as “girls in trouble,” pegged as social 
deviants (Rains, 1970) and often sent to live in maternity homes, where they were given false 
names, discouraged from bonding with their children, and frequently coerced into giving up 
their babies for adoption (Schnarr, 2011).  
Throughout most of the 19th and early 20th centuries, motherhood and femininity 
were romanticized; women were relegated to the private sphere, as their proper role was to 
care for men, children, and the home. This “cult of domesticity” or “cult of true 
womanhood” reigned supreme until the first wave of the feminist movement gained steam 
in the 1920s, but it continued well into the 1960s, when the women’s liberation movement 
and sexual revolution took hold. During the last two centuries, a “true woman” possessed 
the virtues of piety, purity, submissiveness and domesticity (Welter, 1966), and, taken 
together, these characteristics gave women the promise of happiness and power. Women 





women were said to be “tampering with society, undermining civilization” (Welter, 1966, p. 
173). Not only were they condemned, they were read out of the sex. “They are only semi-
women, mental hermaphrodites” (Welter, 1966, p. 173). Unwed mothers, then, epitomized 
the antithesis of femininity and womanhood during this time. Perhaps this explains the 
nearly nonexistent literature on the conditions of single mothers in the United States prior to 
1900; they were simply written out of history, not worth the paper upon which they would 
be written about.  
Conceptual Frameworks  
Intensive Mothering 
The entrenchment and idealization of the nuclear family in the United States has led 
to a cultural environment in which any other family form, particularly one that defies 
patriarchal norms and acceptable standards and practices of motherhood, is viewed as 
problematic. Single mothers violate all of these norms and are therefore often viewed as 
social deviants. In addition to having their character and morals questioned, single mothers 
have been ridiculed for their (in)ability to properly raise and nurture their children. During 
the 1970s–1980s, and arguably even now, the overwhelming philosophy of acceptable 
parenting practice was/is that of “intensive mothering” (Hays, 1996).  
This ideology, Hays (1996) argued, requires that individual mothers, not fathers or 
other family members, be responsible for child-rearing. Moreover, the tenets of intensive 
mothering compel mothers to rely on child-rearing experts—most of whom are men—for 
advice about child development and to invest all their time, energy, and financial resources 
into their children (Hulbert, 2003; Martin, 2005).  
A mother must put her child’s needs above her own. A mother must recognize and 





child’s emotional and intellectual development. This means that a mother must 
acquire detailed knowledge of what the experts consider proper child development, 
and then spend a good deal of time and money attempting to foster it. . . . In sum, 
the methods of appropriate child rearing are construed as child-centered, expert-
guided, emotionally absorbing, labor intensive, and financially expensive. (Hays, 
1996, p. 8) 
Given the wide variety of parenting practices and methods present throughout time 
and geography, Hays (1996) argued that intensive mothering is a socially constructed 
ideology perpetuated by the media, accepted cultural and social values, and patriarchy. 
Moreover, it is excessive and unnecessarily strenuous.   
. . . this form of mothering is neither self-evidently natural nor, in any absolute sense, 
necessary; it is a social construction. Child-rearing ideologies vary widely, both 
historically and cross-culturally. In other times and places, simpler, less time-and-
energy consuming methods have been considered appropriate, and the child’s 
mother has not always and everywhere been the primary caregiver. The idea that 
correct child rearing requires not only large quantities of money, but also 
professional-level skills and copious amounts of physical, moral, mental, and 
emotional energy on the part of the individual mother is a relatively recent historical 
phenomenon. (p. 4)  
Hays also asserted that intensive mothering contradicts basic principles of reasoning and 
logic.  
. . . the ideology of intensive mothering seems to contradict the interests of almost 
everyone. Paid working women might like to avoid the extra work on the ‘second 





all of their paid laborers’ energy and attention, and husbands might prefer the career 
promotions of a woman who dedicates herself to bringing home the bacon. (p. 5)  
In sum, this ideology traps mothers in a cycle of impossible standards. If a mother 
works outside the home, she cannot possibly adhere to the tenets of intensive mothering 
that dictate and define “good” mothering. If a mother does not work outside the home, the 
time, energy, financial resources, and self-sacrifice required to observe and practice intensive 
mothering are largely untenable. Despite this double bind, research on intensive mothering 
has consistently found that women recognize it, albeit not by name, as the primary socially 
acceptable approach to motherhood, and even those who do not or cannot fully embrace all 
of its tenets position themselves in such a way that their choices (to work full time, for 
example) ultimately allow them to believe they are good mothers within this ideology (Blair-
Loy, 2005; Douglas & Michaels, 2005; Hays, 1996; Johnson & Swanson 2006, 2007; 
Newman & Henderson, 2014).  
 While intensive mothering has been studied by scholars from a variety of disciplines 
during the past 20 years, little empirical or conceptual work has considered this ideology 
from the perspectives of single mothers or mothers of varying socioeconomic, racial, and 
ethnic groups. This is despite the assertion of Hays (1996) and others (Douglas & Michaels, 
2005; Wolf, 2011) that intensive mothering is a near-universal American phenomenon. 
“Intensive mothering is coded White and middle class, and the bulk of scholarship on 
intensive mothering has focused on middle- and upper-class mothers” (Elliott, Powell, & 
Brenton, 2015, p. 352).  
 However, the small body of research undertaking the examination of intensive 
mothering by non-White and low-income mothers lends credence to the claim that the basic 





execution may be different from that of the middle-class, White, married mothers in the 
suburbs. Hays (1996) found that while class differences define baseline standards for “good” 
mothering, women of all class backgrounds “share a fundamental set of assumptions about 
the importance of putting their children’s needs first and dedicating themselves to providing 
what is best for their kids, as they understand it” (p. 86). These differences are well 
documented by Lareau (2003), who labeled the active support of children’s desires, talents, 
cognitive growth, and school performance by middle- and upper-class parents “concerted 
cultivation.” Working-class and poor parents, on the other hand, are more likely to engage in 
what Lareau called the “accomplishment of natural growth,” a strategy characterized by an 
emphasis on providing for children’s fundamental needs like food, clothing, and shelter.  
In this regard, the concerns and child-rearing approaches of low-income parents tend 
to be similar across racial lines, but Hill-Collins (1994) argued that, for White, middle-class 
children, physical survival is assumed, so emphasis is placed on psychological and emotional 
well-being. For minority children, however, survival must be fought for and guarded.  
The children of women of color, many of whom are ‘physically starving’ have no 
such choices. Racial ethnic children’s lives have long been held in low regard. . . . In 
addition, racial ethnic children often live in harsh urban environments where drugs, 
crime, industrial pollutants, and violence threaten their survival. (p. 49)  
Women of color and low-income mothers often lack the resources to provide their 
children with a packed schedule of extracurricular activities like middle-class mothers can, 
but that does not stop them from defining their own forms of intensive mothering. Edin 
and Kefalas (2005) argued that low-income single mothers in the Philadelphia 
neighborhoods they studied extensively define good mothering in much the same way as 





was a central tenet for these women, who often had children young and rarely stayed in 
relationships with the fathers of their children. Also, much like White, middle-class, stay-at-
home mothers, the women in Edin and Kefelas’s (2005) study wrapped their identities 
around their role as mothers.  
The redemptive stories our mothers tell speak to the primacy of the mothering role, 
how it can become virtually the only source of identity and meaning in a young 
woman’s life. . . . These mothers, we discovered . . . manage to credit virtually every 
bit of good in their lives to the fact that they have children—they believe 
motherhood has “saved” them. (p. 14) 
More recent work also has supported the notion that poor and working-class 
mothers practice intensive mothering despite a lack of resources. Elliott et al. (2015) found 
that low-income Black single mothers “engage in intensive mothering using the resources 
available to them . . . . Their mothering largely involves fending of the dangers, indignities 
and vagaries of poverty, racism, and sexism” (p. 366). These mothers work to help their 
children navigate the impersonal and often hostile bureaucracies that frequently dominate 
their lives, and “much of their mothering thus involves ‘institutional advocacy’” (Elliott et 
al., 2015, p. 366). Moreover, in line with the intensive mothering ideology, mothers limited 
their own educational aspirations and social lives in order to put their children’s needs first.  
Through in-depth interviews with 18 mothers of teenage children, Elliott et al. 
(2015) found that mothers in their sample demonstrated a commitment to traditionally 
recognized good mothering practices despite the structural barriers they face.  
[Mothers] stress that although they might not have always done everything right, they 





have children who are struggling with issues like addiction, incarceration, single 
parenting, school suspensions, and poor academic performance. (p. 366) 
The inherent contradiction identified by the authors is the difference between 
ideology and lived experience for these women. If mothers believe, as these women do, that 
good mothering will lead to good outcomes for children, mothers will tend to blame 
themselves when their children do not achieve traditionally recognized and institutionalized 
forms of success.  
The ideology of intensive mothering reflects a version of privatized mothering that is 
not conducive with the constrains placed on low-income, Black single mothers, and 
instead increases their burdens, stresses, and hardships even while providing a 
convenient explanation for these very difficulties: mothers are to blame. (Elliott et al., 
2015, p. 366) 
The demands and expectations of intensive mothering contribute in a very real way 
to the lived experiences of American mothers, regardless of work status, marital status, racial 
and ethnic background, or social class. While the original iteration of this ideology certainly 
reflects White, middle-class privilege (Hays, 1996; Johnson, 2014), further research has 
indicated that mothers of all social positions feel the pressure to conform or risk being 
labeled “bad” mothers. Moreover, if their children fail, mothers still take the lion’s share of 
blame (Eyer, 1996). This framework is particularly useful throughout the present analysis 
because it connects modern standards of good mothering with dimensions of social class 
and socioeconomic status, consumerism, paid and unpaid labor, and morality. 
Folk Devils and Moral Panics 
Perhaps the most infamous and stigmatized image of single motherhood to come 





Ronald Reagan but was actually coined by a writer at the Chicago Tribune (Levin, 2013), the 
“welfare queen” evokes an image that has come to refer to a very specific type of welfare 
recipient. Almost always Black, and usually bilking the system, the welfare queen is 
unemployed with multiple children and spends her time perched in front of the television 
eating chips and watching daytime television rather than working. She unapologetically relies 
on government assistance and probably has acrylic fingernails, a designer handbag, and the 
newest iPhone. The welfare queen trope took shape in the mid-1970s and was in fact 
modeled after a real woman who, as it turns out, was suspected of crimes far more serious 
than welfare fraud. Linda Taylor drove a Cadillac, wore diamonds and fur, and had received 
at least $150,000 in tax-free welfare cash. She also had upwards of 80 aliases (Levin, 2013). 
Needless to say, Ms. Taylor gave single mothers on welfare a worse name than they 
already had. And although rates of means-tested welfare fraud were—and still are—low due 
to the amount of scrutiny faced by applicants, public opinion still reflected a general distaste 
for the program and those reliant upon it (Shapiro, 2007). Periodically, a story would surface 
about recipients abusing the system. One such instance occurred in Chicago in 1985, when a 
grand jury indicted 23 women on welfare fraud charges totaling more than $1 million 
(Mount, 1985). The next year, also in Chicago, federal officials charged 91 people with fraud 
totaling $2.5 million (Crawford, 1986). These types of headlines were not unique to Chicago, 
nor were they particularly rare despite relatively few instances of actual fraud.  
Public distaste for, and overall anxieties about, the welfare system created an 
environment in which single mothers were viewed not only negatively, but negatively in a 
particular kind of way—as “folk devils.” This term originated from the research of 
sociologist Stanley Cohen (2011/1973), who used it to describe the cultural reaction to two 





research, collective behavior, social problems, and law, Cohen developed a framework to 
help explain why societies go through intense, often short-lived, periods of deep fear or 
worry about a cultural phenomenon. By his definition, a moral panic occurs when 
. . . a condition, episode, person or group of persons emerge to become defined as a 
threat to societal values and interests; its nature is presented in a stylized and 
stereotypical fashion by the mass media; the moral barricades are manned by editors, 
bishops, politicians and other right-thinking people; socially accredited experts 
pronounce their diagnoses and solutions; ways of coping are evolved or (more often) 
resorted to; the condition then disappears, submerges or deteriorates and becomes 
more visible. (Cohen, 2011, p. 1)  
The subject of a moral panic, added Cohen (2011), can be obscure or relatively 
commonplace, and the consequences can range from almost none to serious long-lasting 
legal, political, and social change.  
The term “moral panic” itself is worthy of some unpacking. According to Thompson 
(2005): 
Implicit in the use of the two words “moral panic” is the suggestion that the threat is 
to something held sacred by or fundamental to society. The reason for calling it a 
moral panic is precisely to indicate that the perceived threat is not to something 
mundane—such as economic output or educational standards—but a threat to the 
social order itself or an idealized (ideological) conception of some part of it. . . . 
Events are more likely to be perceived as fundamental threats and to give rise to 
moral panics if the society, or some part of it, is in crisis or experiencing disturbing 





for greater social regulation or control and a demand for a return to “traditional” 
values. (p. 8) 
This articulation of moral panic accurately characterizes all but one of the sociocultural 
events selected for analysis in this research. In each case, some vital social institution or 
practice is observed to be decaying, resulting in a plea—or a policy mandate—to return to 
the status quo.  
Hall’s (1982) foundational work on moral panic inserted the Gramscian concept of 
hegemony into moral panics, arguing that ruling-class elites benefit from the demonization 
of outsiders—in his case young Black men—and the distraction they provide from the “real” 
causes of social ills. Hall (1982) further argued that media discourse often relies on an 
implied chain of argument, and that statistical data in the form of opinion polls are often 
deployed ideologically to ground and give legitimacy to “facts.” In much the same way that 
Hall’s case study of muggings in 1970s-era Britain examined the use of statistical data about 
crime rates to incite and justify moral panic, the current analysis will show how statistics 
about increased rates of nonmarital births, divorce, and cohabitation are used in media 
coverage to help rationalize the need for “traditional family values,” welfare reform 
legislation, and government expenditures for marriage promotion.  
Later research by Goode and Ben-Yehuda (1994) identified five key characteristics of 
a moral panic: (1) concern (some reported conduct or event sparks anxiety); (2) hostility (the 
perpetrators are portrayed as folk devils); (3) consensus (the negative social reaction is broad 
and unified); (4) disproportionality (the extent of the conduct, or the threat it poses, are 
exaggerated); (5) volatility (the media’s reporting and the associated panic emerge suddenly 
but can dissipate quickly too). Garland (2008) added two elements that he believed were 





(7) the idea that the deviant conduct is somehow symptomatic. “Together, these two 
elements are important because they point to . . . the anxious concern on the part of certain 
social actors that an established value system is being threatened” (p. 11). Moreover, Garland 
(2008) asserted moral panics are fueled by sensational media coverage but, at their core, stem 
from transitions in the social, economic, and moral order. Folk devils, then, function as 
cultural scapegoats whose conduct so appalls onlookers because it relates to personal fears 
or desires.  
Moral panics can also be viewed as narratives (Falkof, 2018; Wright, 2015). Wright 
(2015) argued that moral panics can be seen as enacted melodramas where “everyday citizens 
experience the role of the suffering victim, where ordinary outsiders are shaped into 
extraordinary villains, and where moral entrepreneurs ‘step in’ to become heroic” (p. 1246). 
Wright (2015) defined a melodrama as a story line “where nasty villains enact evil deeds 
against virtuous victims who are eventually rescued and have their virtue reinstated by gallant 
heroes” (p. 1246). Melodramas depict characters and behavior in exaggerated, emotional 
terms that allow for a clear demarcation of “boundaries between good and evil, right and 
wrong, truth and justice” (p. 1247). Through this process, audiences bear witness to the 
victim’s suffering in order to evoke empathy, and also to cultivate anger toward the villain—
for instance, the folk devils. Wright (2015) also advanced the view that moral panic research 
should renew its focus on the role of the media, which in her estimation has been neglected. 
Critcher (2003, 2008) saw moral panic research as a tool to elucidate the discrepancies 
between representation and reality and called for greater scrutiny of the role of media in the 
emergence of panic episodes. For him, the decentralization of media from moral panic 
research is problematic because “the media remain instrumental in creating moral panics, 





Whether popular or political, discourse deploying rhetoric about villainous welfare 
queens was both racially coded and heavily moralized. The use of the “welfare queen” label 
“transformed poor women from citizens into ‘welfare mothers,’” argued Shepard (2007). 
The strategic use of rhetoric constructing women who use social services as lazy and 
dishonest also functioned to delegitimize the validity of the welfare state as a whole 
(Shepard, 2007). If, as Habermas (1962) contended, only those with cultural capital can 
participate in the formal confines of the public sphere and its social privileges, then those 
without it, like single mothers, are viewed as social deviants (Shepard, 2007). Social class, 
race, and gender can provide, or suppress, what amounts to a protective shield for deviant 
behavior. The deviant behavior of the underprivileged is harder to conceal because they lack 
the resources that would otherwise enable them to hide their activities from public view 
(Shepard, 2007; Wagner, 1997). Thus, the welfare queen–as–folk devil was a product of 
Reagan’s calculated political rhetoric, racism, and vague, undefined fears about changing 
family structures in the United States.  
Moral Regulation 
Related to, but also distinct from, the concept of moral panic is the concept of moral 
regulation. Moral regulation has been theorized in a number of ways by scholars who 
interpret the original formulation differently. In practice, moral regulation has been 
occurring for centuries, but its formal development as a sociological framework did not 
begin until the 1980s, when Corrigan and Sayer (1985) undertook the task of attempting to 
remedy what they saw as deficiencies in Marxist theorizing about the role and nature of the 
state. While an in-depth discussion of the theoretical underpinnings and development of 
moral regulation as a theory is unnecessary here, it is valuable, in the context of the analyses 





and social institutions—like the media—and how mothers and children have been subject to 
projects of moral regulation in recent history. Moreover, it is useful to understand the 
frequently contentious relationship between the theories of moral regulation and moral 
panic.  
At its most simplistic, moral regulation is a “form of politics in which some people 
act to problematize the conduct, values or culture of others and seek to impose regulation 
upon them,” (Hunt, 1999, p. 1). Projects of moral regulation involve “the deployment of 
distinctively moral discourses which construct a moralized subject and an object or target 
which is acted upon by means of moralizing practices. Moral discourses seek to act on 
conduct that is deemed to be intrinsically bad or wrong” (Hunt, 1999, p. 7). Hunt (1999) 
isolated five elements present in all projects of moral regulation: agents, targets, tactics, 
discourses, and political context.   
 While other formulations of moral regulation have been developed (Corrigan & 
Sayer, 1985; Dean, 1994; Ruonavaara, 1997; Valverde, 1994), the value of Hunt’s (1999) 
interpretation for this work is threefold. First, he insisted that the targets of moral regulation 
projects have agency. Rather than being passive recipients of attempts to govern their 
behavior, Hunt argued, targets “may attempt to refuse the subjectification imposed on them 
and thus create the possibility of resistance and the formation of an alternate subjectivity” (p. 
8). Second, he rejected the idea that moral regulation movements are distinct from one 
another or that they exist in isolation. Rather, his position is that they form “an 
interconnected web of discourses, symbols and practices . . . that stretch across time and 
place” (p. 9). And finally, Hunt asserted that moral reform movements have an “umbrella 
effect” in that they garner support from diverse ideological and political positions. It is also 





projects are not exclusively the realm of government or political institutions. Indeed, he 
forcefully argued that “moral regulation manifests itself in many different guises; it may 
present itself as a medical project, a sanitary undertaking, a religious imperative or as a 
political strategy” (p. 17) and that these discourses will often coexist with other forms of 
regulation.  
Linking Moral Panic and Moral Regulation 
 Hunt’s work, however, is less useful in linking moral regulation to moral panic, 
which he summarily rejected due to its tendency to “import a negative normative judgment” 
(p. 19). Other scholars have disagreed with his outright dismissal of moral panic and have 
undertaken the theoretical task of linking the two concepts in a meaningful way. Hier (2002, 
2008, 2011) and Hier et al. (2011) in particular have endeavored to create a critical theory of 
moral panic that enables fusion between panics and regulatory projects. Hier (2002) situated 
moral panic as a form of moral regulation whereby moral panic is conceptualized as a critical 
ideology. He argued that “it seems as though the convulsive power of the ‘panic,’ combined 
with the long-term reserve of regulatory projects, is where the real thrust of moral 
governance (of the self as well as others) is to be located” (p. 332).  
Put another way, moral panic refers to short-lived bouts of outrage articulated in the 
media, while moral regulation refers to the more mundane and conventional discourses 
through which social identities and subjectivities are created (Lundstrom, 2011). But for 
Hier, the two concepts work in tandem, with moral panics functioning as “episodes of 
contestation and negotiation that emerge from and contribute to or reinforce broader 
processes of moral regulation” (Hier et al., 2011, p. 260). Critcher (2008) generally 
concurred, arguing that “moral panics may be an extreme form of moral regulation, most 







 As discussed in Chapter 1, this research used a critical rhetorical lens to interrogate 
media constructions of and discourse about single mothers in American news media. Critical 
rhetorical theory, in conjunction with the theoretical frameworks of intensive mothering, 
moral panic, and moral regulation, allows for a thorough interrogation of the ways in which 
these depictions and narratives have positioned single mothers as subjects and/or objects in 
media. Having considered the sociohistorical and cultural contexts discussed in this chapter, 
contexts through which single-mother families have come to prominence, the scaffolding 







CHAPTER 3. JUST ANOTHER LIFESTYLE CHOICE? SINGLE MOTHERS AND 
FAMILY VALUES 
The personal is political.  
— Carol Hanisch, 1969 
    
One of the reasons more young women are giving birth out of wedlock and 
more young men are walking away from their paternal obligations is that 
there is no longer a stigma attached to this behavior, no reason to feel shame. 
— Jeb Bush, 1995 
 
In May 1992, during a speech to the Commonwealth Club of California in San 
Francisco, former Vice President Dan Quayle decried the decline of traditional family values, 
blaming the infamous riots that had occurred in Los Angeles earlier that month on the 
“breakdown of family structure, personal responsibility, and social order in too many areas 
of our society” (Quayle, 1992). Quayle spent the majority of his speech articulating his view 
of the struggles of poor and working-class families, and presenting a program to solve what 
he saw as the deterioration of so-called family values. During his 40-minute presentation, 
Quayle, referring to the morality of marriage and sanctity of two-parent families, 
commented: 
It doesn't help matters when prime time TV has Murphy Brown—a 
character who supposedly epitomizes today's intelligent, highly paid, 
professional woman—mocking the importance of fathers, by bearing a child 
alone, and calling it just another ‘lifestyle choice.’ (Quayle, 1992) 
A media firestorm quickly erupted. The New York Times, USA Today, and Washington 
Post all ran front-page stories about this single sentence, and all three major network news 
programs broadcast the sound bite. In the weeks and months that followed, it was fodder 
for editorials in nearly every major news weekly magazine in the country, and many glossy 





In this chapter, I argue that family values rhetoric, particularly as it relates to media 
discourse about single mothers, functions as a heavy-handed tool of moral regulation that 
reinforces the ideology of intensive mothering (Hays, 1996). While discourse about single 
mothers in the nation’s top newspapers and magazines frequently attempted to contextualize 
the nontraditional family form historically and socially, the hegemonic ideology of the 
nuclear family and its embedded “traditional family values” were decidedly not 
contextualized by the politicians who espoused it, namely Quayle and his supporters.  
Relying on idealized notions of post-war family life to bolster claims about the 
benefits of marriage while simultaneously condemning a culture of “dependency” proves 
paradoxical; it is acceptable for a woman to be dependent on a male partner, but it is not 
okay to for her to be dependent on the government. Finally, this chapter contends that the 
media discourse about single mothers after the Murphy Brown speech contributed to a 
political climate in which unmarried women with children were viewed as a pathology—an 
out-of-control social problem in need of a government-imposed solution: welfare reform, 
the focus of analysis in Chapter 4.  
Dan Quayle vs. Murphy Brown 
In September 1992, a few months after Dan Quayle’s infamous speech, a response 
came from Murphy Brown, the fictional television journalist played by actress Candice 
Bergen on the hit CBS sitcom of the same name, via her fictional television news program. 
In the special one-hour episode, Murphy came home from work to see the vice president 
criticizing her on television, using real clips from his speech. Incensed, Murphy returned to 
her job to deliver a long, moralistic attack against the vice president on her television-show-
within-a-television-show: 





ills, we could choose to blame the media or the Congress or an Administration that's 
been in power for 12 years, or we could blame me. (Kolbert, 1992) 
The episode, entitled “Murphy’s Revenge,” drew an audience of roughly 44 million (Kolbert, 
1992).    
Much of the media discourse, political and otherwise, about nontraditional families 
during this time was firmly situated in a rhetoric of “family values” deployed by the 
conservative Bush/Quayle presidential campaign and ultimately co-opted by the Democrats. 
Cloud (1998) explored how the term “family values” functioned as an ideograph during the 
Bush/Quayle vs. Clinton/Gore campaigns, and argued it was a tool used in an attempt to 
usher in the return to “a mythic family ideal, even as it scapegoated private families—
especially those headed by single parents, racial minorities, and the poor—for structural 
social problems” (p. 411). The concept of the ideograph was developed by McGee (1980) 
and articulated in the Quarterly Journal of Speech article “The ‘Ideograph’: A Link between 
Rhetoric and Ideology.” Here, McGee discussed the ways in which language contributes to 
the construction and maintenance of ideologies, arguing that “human beings are conditioned 
. . . to a vocabulary of concepts that function as guides, warrants, reasons, or excuses for 
behavior and belief” (p. 6). The ideograph, he said, is 
an ordinary language term found in political discourse. It is higher-order abstraction 
representing collective commitment to a particular but univocal and ill-defined 
normative goal. It warrants the use of power, excuses behavior and belief that which 
might otherwise be perceived as eccentric or antisocial, and guides behavior and 
belief into channels easily recognized by a community as acceptable and laudable. (p. 
15) 





(1980), they are important for precisely this reason; the signifier is stable while that which is 
signified is unstable, making them “constitutive signs of American sociopolitical 
community” (Condit, 1990, p. 18). Thus, ideographs are sites of struggle or tension to 
determine meaning and social, political, or cultural contexts. Using this framework, Cloud 
(1998) posited the rhetoric of “family values” in the 1990s “structured policy discourse 
across partisan lines and re-invoked a long, deep-running familialist ideological thematic in 
US culture” (p. 388).  
These assertions are critical to understanding the sometimes explicit, but more 
frequently implicit, assumptions about the moral status of single mothers. “The word ‘values’ 
indicates a rhetorical emphasis on moral, character-based solutions rather than material 
redress of economic need or the remediation of structural racism” (Cloud, 1998, p. 391).  
The “family values” theme employed by Quayle and countless other political actors of both 
parties in the early 1990s clearly emphasized that those family values should be “traditional” 
ones.  
The Myth of the Traditional Family 
 At the core of the family values rhetoric so central to discussions of single mothers 
during the 1992 presidential campaign is the assumption that there is indeed such a thing as a 
“traditional family.” As family historian Stephanie Coontz (2000) argued, the 1950s middle-
class nuclear families so idealized in sitcoms like Ozzie and Harriet and Leave It to Beaver were a 
historical anomaly, the product of post-war economic conditions: a sharp decline in divorce; 
rising rates of fertility, marriage, and homeownership; and low rates of violent crime, among 
other factors. But, Coontz (2000) stated, most people of this era also understood the nuclear 





With this new family structure also came a shift in the ideology surrounding family 
life. The acceptance of domesticity on the part of women, and the centrality of family to 
ideas about personal happiness and fulfillment for both genders became more prominent. 
“The values of 1950s families were also new,” explained Coontz (2000). “The emphasis on 
producing a whole world of satisfaction, amusement, and inventiveness within the nuclear 
family had no precedents. . . . For the first time, men as well as women were encouraged to 
root their identity and self-image in familial and parental roles” (p. 27). 
 But these conditions, as romanticized as they were, did not hold true for many 
families of the era. A full 25% of Americans were poor in the mid-1950s, and one-third of 
children were considered poor by the end of the decade. Black and immigrant families 
suffered particularly crippling rates of poverty, not to mention racial discrimination, 
regardless of marital status. Gays and lesbians who were “found out” were systematically 
impelled out of their jobs and socially castigated. Moreover, the women who initially 
purported to be so fulfilled by their new domestic roles began to sow seeds of resentment 
and ambivalence about their wifely duties: “. . . no sooner was the ideal of the postwar family 
accepted that observers began to comment perplexedly on how discontented women seemed 
in the very roles they supposedly desired the most” (Coontz, 2000, p. 36). To cope, many 
suburban women turned to alcohol and tranquilizers. The problems of sexual abuse, incest, 
marital rape, and domestic violence did not yet have names, although Coontz (2000) 
presented evidence suggesting they were indeed features—if not fixtures—of family life in 
the era.  
 Unwed childbearing was also not an uncommon occurrence in the 1950s. It was 
uncommon, however, for young, unmarried women to keep and raise their children. “Rates 





because unwed mothers generally left town, gave their babies up for adoption and returned 
home as if nothing had happened” (Coontz, 1999, p. 1). In many other cases, Coontz (2000) 
argued, as soon as a pregnancy was discovered the woman was given a wedding ring and 
thrust into a marriage for which she might or might not have been ready.  
The idealized traditional family of the 1950s and the “family values” that came with 
it have been mythologized by contemporary and heavily whitewashed retellings of history. 
Our current understanding of the harmonious families of yore is informed in no small part 
by the media’s denial of diversity (Coontz, 2000). These myths have been entrenched and 
perpetuated without consideration of social class or, often by proxy, of race. Myths like the 
“American Dream” are supposed to be available to everyone regardless of where you were 
born and the station you were born into—after all, all men are created equal, yes? (Isenberg, 
2016). Dan Quayle, for his part, was a beneficiary of all the best elements of post-war family 
life, and many media commentators were quick to point out as much, like the editorial board 
of The New York Times in an article published on May 22, 1992: 
What the Vice President keeps failing to grasp is that the admirable values he asserts 
refer to a highly-idealized world, America by Norman Rockwell. That leaves him 
grimly insensitive to the real world, as newly laid bare by the Los Angeles riot. (Dan 
Quayle’s Fictitious World, 1992, p. A28) 
Family Values Rhetoric and the Moral Regulation of Single Mothers 
 While most of it was ignored by the press, the crux of Dan Quayle’s infamous 
speech to the Commonwealth Club could be classified as a treatise on the immorality of 
being poor. As Cloud (1998) has argued, the family values rhetoric of the time centered on 
the idea that material poverty was in many ways a result of a “poverty of values,” and that 





this view, single mothers, and particularly never-married single mothers, suffer from a lack of 
morals, not a lack of social support.  
 The idea that single mothers are morally deficient is certainly not new, nor is the 
belief that their immorality can be “fixed” with the proper mix of repentance and, in some 
cases, government oversight. In her thorough and enlightening book No Car, No Radio, No 
Liquor Permit: The Moral Regulation of Single Mothers in Ontario, 1920–1997, Margaret Little 
(1998) outlined the development of the Ontario Mother’s Allowance program and detailed 
the many pains single mothers went through to qualify and retain their benefits. She argued 
persuasively that welfare policies at the time were focused not only on need, but also 
deservedness, which was demonstrated through applicants’ pious conduct and tolerating 
never-ending surveillance of their private lives.  
Both public and private welfare administrators believed that welfare should 
distinguishing between the deserving and the undeserving poor, providing a minimal 
existence for the former and denying the latter. . . . In keeping with the popular 
Malthusian ideas of the time, the underserving poor were left to fend for themselves, 
allowing nature to take its course. . . . During this era poverty was considered both a 
moral and economic weakness, with emphasis on the former. As a result, even the 
most destitute were considered suspect and had to prove continuously that they were 
morally deserving. It was generally believed that the worthy poor required constant 
guidance to improve their moral life and strengthen their work habits. (Little, 1998, 
p. 2) 
The focus on moral worthiness and the notion that the poor must be taught proper moral 
conduct are two central features of moral regulatory projects. Alan Hunt, a key scholar in the 





politics in which some act to problematize the conduct, values or culture of others, and seek 
to impose regulation upon them” (1999, p. 1). Furthermore, moral regulation involves “the 
deployment of distinctively moral discourses which construct a moralized subject and an 
object or target which is acted upon by means of moralizing practices. Moral discourses seek 
to act on conduct that is deemed to be intrinsically bad or wrong” (p. 7). Most typically, 
projects of moral regulation are expressed with a language of deterioration or decline: 
“things” are not what they used to be, and this change, viewed destructively, is articulated 
within the framework of a moral discourse.  
Hunt (1999) isolated six distinct components that he argued are present in projects 
of moral regulation: (1) a moralized subject, (2) a moralized object or target; (3) knowledge, 
either expert or informal; (4) a discourse within which the knowledge is given a normative 
content; (5) a set of practices; and (6) a “harm” to be avoided or overcome. These roughly 
correspond to the five main elements of moral regulatory projects outlined in Chapter 1— 
agents, targets, tactics, discourses, and political context—but explicitly require the 
acknowledgment of a potential harm that project is intended to prevent. The following two 
sections trace the use of moral regulatory discourse in flagship newspapers and nationally 
circulated general interest news magazines during the 18-month period following Dan 
Quayle’s Murphy Brown speech.  
(Im)moral Single Mothers 
The first component of Hunt’s framework of moral regulation is that there must be a 
moralized subject. In this instance, that subject is the nuclear family. As previously discussed, 
the nuclear family model was a historical anomaly made possible by post-war economic 
prosperity; it was not a universally desirable or even historically common family model. But 





imparted upon it by those in power is singular. This view is implicit in much of the discourse 
surrounding the Murphy Brown speech, particularly when the focus is on the rhetoric of the 
Bush/Quayle administration.  
One of the more high-profile pieces published in the not-so-immediate wake of Dan 
Quayle’s speech ran in The Atlantic Monthly in April 1993. Summarily, the pages-long feature 
could be classified as a social-scientific indictment of nontraditional family types. Author 
Barbara Dafoe Whitehead systematically outlined the negative outcomes for children of 
divorce, single parenthood (especially single motherhood), and stepfamilies, citing studies 
from well-known (if ideologically and politically divergent) family sociologists like Andrew 
Cherlin and David Popenoe. While Whitehead stayed away from explicitly moral discourse, 
she argued in no uncertain terms that the nuclear family is superior to its alternatives.  
Though far from perfect as a social institution, the intact family offers children 
greater security and better outcomes than its fast-growing alternatives: single-parent 
and stepparent families. Not only does the intact family protect the child from 
poverty and economic insecurity, it also provides greater noneconomic investments 
of parental time, attention and emotional support over the entire life course. 
(Whitehead, 1993, p. 80) 
Whitehead’s (1993) use of the term “intact family” is significant here, because it imports a 
discourse of morality, functioning as an ideograph. “Intact” families are good, healthy, 
happy, secure, supportive, and safe. The opposite of intact is broken, and therefore broken 
families cannot also be good, healthy, secure, supportive, and safe families.  
As sex has become less intertwined with marriage and children, it has also become 
the basis for more significant cultural arguments about family and family values (Oldenberg, 





conservative family ideologies put forth by McClain (2006) and J. Q. Wilson (2002), 
respectively. In his book The Marriage Problem: How Our Culture Has Weakened Families, J. Q. 
Wilson (2002), a Harvard-trained political scientist, blamed the weakening of traditional 
family values on the Enlightenment’s focus on individual freedom, autonomy, and 
intellectualism. He believed marriage should occupy a unique place of social and cultural 
authority, and in order to facilitate this, he argued, the concept of shame should be 
resurrected to help enforce moral and social order. “He sees shame, for example, as 
inhibiting ‘women from having children without marrying and women from abandoning 
wives for trophy alternatives’” (Carbone, 2007, p. 811). Further, Wilson joined the chorus of 
conservatives who believe single and teenage mothers perpetuate cycles of generational 
poverty and violence; he espoused assorted benefits of marriage for men—but struggled to 
articulate the benefits for women—and summarily dismissed gender parity within marriage 
as “nonsense.” While he did not advocate for the elevation of a particular religious 
philosophy, Wilson did see religion as a useful institution for the promotion of marriage and 
morals (Carbone, 2007). 
 The conservative family values ideology relies heavily on a patriarchal model of 
family, mostly ignoring gender egalitarianism in favor of female domesticity, and eschewing 
ideas about marital equity and even happiness or satisfaction in order to uphold the 
commitment that allows marriage to retain its social and cultural power. Moreover, 
conservatives like Wilson have argued fervently that children raised outside of a nuclear two-
parent family, preferably one where the mother stays home, are tremendously 
disadvantaged—nearly to the point of being destined to lead lives of poverty, wracked with 





 Charles Murray, an author and fellow at the conservative think tank American 
Enterprise Institute, argued in a USA Today article that illegitimacy is the single most 
important social problem “because it drives everything else” (Welch, 1993, p. 8A). Speaking 
about welfare reform, Murray continued: “The whole welfare debate I think is focusing on 
the wrong question. The measure of success is not how many you put in jobs, it is whether 
the number of children born to single women falls” (p. 8A). By this metric, the 
unemployment rate could be zero, but if single women are still having children, society is in 
danger of crumbling. Murray also believed shaming single mothers would discourage them 
from having additional children, and he proposed eliminating welfare benefits altogether in 
order to make fatherless families “unviable as an economic unit” (p. 8A).  
On the other side of the ideological spectrum, Boston University law professor 
Linda McClain argued government should have a much more tolerant, broad, and accepting 
view of families. In her book, The Place of Families: Fostering Capacity, Equality, and Responsibility, 
McClain (2006) refuted the traditional conservative philosophies of family, arguing that a 
good liberal society should promote gender parity within families and among children 
regardless of the family form that brought them into existence.  
To remain true to liberal values, it [the family] cannot subordinate one gender to 
childrearing, denying it full participation in economic and civic life. Nor can the state 
condition access to the full benefits of citizenship on a family form beyond the reach 
or at odds with the cultural tradition of its poorest citizens. A liberal state should 
seek to create conditions in which all of its citizens should have an opportunity to 
flourish. (Carbone, 2007, p. 810)  
For McClain, the heteronormative, hegemonic, patriarchal nuclear family unit is an 





promoting partnerships of any kind that can be damaging to women or children. She did, 
however, believe the state has a substantial role to play in constructing institutions and 
policies that can bolster strong families.  
Carbone (2007) did not take sides or advocate for the correctness or superiority of 
either author’s position. Rather, she was more concerned with the value and contribution of 
both Wilson’s and McLain’s arguments to the discourse of American family life despite their 
discordant views.  
Whereas Wilson sees self-sacrifice as necessary to family success, McClain sees the 
sacrifices as unequally shared burdens that guarantee women’s subordination. Where 
Wilson sees the decline of family health, McClain sees a diversity of family forms 
that contribute to women’s equality and autonomy. Where Wilson sees the failure of 
private actors to provide for the well-being of family, McClain argues for the 
remaking the public-private compact to provide more societal support for the 
formative project she argues should be at the core of family promotion. Most 
fundamentally, Wilson and McClain differ on the role of the state. Where Wilson 
argues that the role of government is limited and only a cultural rebirth of the 
importance of marriage can adequately provide for children, McClain sees the ill 
health of the nation’s poorest families as a direct result of the failures of government 
policy. (Carbone, 2007, p. 824) 
These opposing positions are articulated in various ways throughout the media 
discourse. Conservative-leaning pundits, sources, letters to the editor, commentators, and the 
like may not always agree with Quayle about Murphy Brown, but they do tend to connect 
the concepts of personal responsibility and morality, emphasizing that dealing with the 





leaning commentators tend to think beyond personal circumstance and toward structural or 
institutional conditions. Rather than looking at individuals, they instead highlight, for 
example, high rates of unemployment for Black men and low marriage rates throughout 
history among Blacks.  
(Re)Defining “Family Values” 
 Not 24 hours after the Murphy Brown speech, Dan Quayle found himself on the 
defensive. Amid the criticism that he was bashing single mothers, Quayle quickly 
backtracked, clarifying that he never meant to criticize single mothers, but instead the 
Hollywood “cultural elites” who “glamorize illegitimacy.” “I have the greatest respect for 
single parents,” Quayle was quoted saying, “especially single-parent mothers. They are true 
heroes and inspirations—going against the tides. It’s a tough situation” (Yang & Devroy, 
1992, p. A1). For at least a few days, the media circus seemed to focus itself primarily on 
Quayle’s perceived hypocrisy. Diane English, creator and producer of the Murphy Brown 
sitcom, fired back at Quayle: “If the Vice President thinks it’s disgraceful for an unmarried 
woman to bear a child, and if he believes that a woman cannot adequately raise a child 
without a father, then he’d better make sure abortion remains safe and legal” (Wines, 1992, 
p. A1). But it did not take long for the discourse to take another turn.  
Among the back-and-forth of media reports and editorials about what Dan Quayle 
might or might not have meant when he referred to Murphy Brown’s decision to bear a 
child alone was a discussion about the meaning of “family values” and how those values 
manifest themselves in people’s everyday lives. In an interview with The MacNeil/Lehrer 
NewsHour, Dan Quayle defined family values as “parental involvement, personal 





[and] telling people that there is in some cases not a gray area, that there is a difference” 
(Oldenberg, 1992, p. C5).  
 Conspicuously absent from Quayle’s definition of family values was any discussion 
of the characteristics and traits typically associated with family: love, kindness, nurturing, 
generosity, fairness, thoughtfulness, consideration for others, fun, security, safety, happiness. 
And yet the media neglected to call attention to this, instead giving Quayle an uncontested 
platform to advance his conservative family values agenda—one that did not take into 
account the feelings most Americans had about the role families should play or the actual 
feelings people generally held about their families.   
Elsewhere, Quayle implied other standards related to family dynamics, including his 
contention in the Murphy Brown speech that marriage and procreation (and therefore sex) 
should be inextricably linked. Other stories characterized the Bush/Quayle campaign’s focus 
on family values as coded racism, classism, and homophobia: “the phrase became a synonym 
for GOP opposition to homosexual rights, welfare, feminism and abortion rights . . . . Bush 
has depicted family values as shorthand for policies he endorses: welfare reform, tax credits 
for private school students, prayer in schools . . . ” (Keen, 1992, p. 2A). Quayle, 
unsurprisingly, contested this view, saying in a speech to the Kansas City Chamber of 
Commerce that “I especially reject the notion that discussing this issue is intended to divide 
Americans from one another, or to imply that some families are superior to others. Family 
values is neither meaningless nor mean-spirited” (Sack, 1992, p. A20).  
But, arguably, dividing people and organizing family types in some moral hierarchy is 
precisely what he intended to do. In the Murphy Brown speech, Quayle stated: 
The intergenerational poverty that troubles us so much today is predominantly a 





people who have not been able to take advantage of educational opportunities, with 
people who are dependent on drugs or the narcotic of welfare . . . . Right now the 
failure of our families is hurting America deeply. When families fail, society fails. The 
anarchy and lack of structure in our inner cities are testament to how quickly 
civilization falls apart when the family foundation cracks . . . . Now it’s time to make 
the discussion public. It’s time to talk again about family, hard work, integrity and 
personal responsibility. We cannot be embarrassed out of our belief that two parents, 
married to each other, are better in most cases for children than one. (Quayle, 1992) 
If Quayle was trying to be inclusive with his rhetoric, he certainly did not do it in this speech. 
In the span of a couple of paragraphs, he managed to alienate Black families, poor families, 
gay and lesbian families, single-parent families, cohabiting couples with children, 
stepfamilies, and every other combination of adults and children falling outside of the 
traditional nuclear model. From a political perspective, alienating large percentages of the 
voting public by telling them they were morally inferior because their families were less than 
ideal was not a wise approach. It is not surprising, then, that many Americans were 
unconvinced the government should be in the business of discussing family values at all. 
According to one public opinion poll published in USA Today, 57% of respondents 
disagreed that government should have a role in promoting traditional values, 38% thought 
government should have a role, and five percent had no opinion (Keen, 1992, p. 2A).  
Mothers (and Others) Push Back 
 Despite Dan Quayle’s attempts to set the tone of the family values conversation by 
putting the nuclear family on a pedestal, major American newspapers were publishing stories 
that focused on the actual lived conditions and situations of real single mothers and their 





single mothers themselves to help explain why, for many women, single motherhood was 
anything but “another lifestyle choice.” In these stories, single mothers were quick to push 
back against Quayle’s assertions about their lack of values. In a lesser-quoted passage of the 
Murphy Brown speech, Quayle also said,  
Children need love and discipline; they need mothers and fathers. A welfare check is 
not a husband. The state is not a father . . . . And for those concerned about children 
growing up in poverty, we should know this: Marriage is probably the best anti-
poverty program of all. (Quayle 1992) 
In response, mothers in a number of news stories spoke of abuse or abandonment 
by their husbands or boyfriends and roundly rejected the idea that getting married would 
solve all their problems. For some mothers, like Debbie Spain, a single mother featured in a 
New York Times story, staying married was not an option: 
A 32-year-old medical secretary in Boston, Ms. Spain was beaten by the father of her 
first child and ended a brief marriage to her second child’s father, who was an 
alcoholic. “Just because you have someone’s last name doesn’t mean that’s going to 
solve any problems,” she said. (Suro, 1992, p. A12) 
Spain’s point is an important one; marriages can—and in some cases should—end. 
And when they do, oftentimes women—particularly mothers—are left in more vulnerable 
economic situations than they were in before they got married. That women bear a 
disproportionate burden when it comes to marital dissolution is the culmination of both 
gender and economic factors, including lower wages for women, unequal distribution of 
household labor, and childcare costs (Holden & Smock, 1991). Women who separate or 
divorce will experience, on average, a 25% decline in their standard of living, although the 





Wolfinger, 2001). Adding salt to an open wound, men experience the opposite. For them, 
divorce can lead to an increase in per capita income even after accounting for alimony and 
child support payments (McKeever & Wolfinger, 2001).  
In a few cases, the view of marriage as a panacea was rejected outright by single 
mothers. In the same article that featured Debbie Spain above, another woman talked about 
the importance of self-reliance and the limited ability of marriage to protect a family from 
poverty.  
“Many of the homeless are whole families—men, women and children—and they 
are still in poverty,” [Ms. Bryant] said. “A man can lose a job anytime. A man is not 
always the best means of support. A woman can be just as independent as a man.” 
(Suro, p. A12) 
 While it is true that single mothers experience higher rates of poverty than other 
demographic groups, married couples are certainly not immune. In the mid-1990s, 12.7% of 
married-couple families were at or under the poverty line (Seccombe, 2000). The lesson here 
is that while marriage certainly helps decrease poverty rates, simply combining the incomes 
of two poor people does not necessarily equal a middle-class lifestyle.  
 Single mothers also addressed Dan Quayle’s assumptions about them, some quite 
forcefully. In a USA Today article addressing the moral underpinnings of Quayle’s rhetoric, 
one 26-year-old mother questioned the logic of using a man as an economic strategy.  
“There is no guarantee a man would stand by me while I am raising a child,” she 
says. “The vice president doesn’t know anything about the real world. He should 
come out of his ivory tower and see what’s really going on. You do not have to have 





This is consistent with the findings of Edin and Kefalas (2005) discussed previously. Young 
women, especially single mothers, view marriage with both reverence and skepticism. For 
them, marriage is not a priority, but it is often a long-term goal. Further, Dan Quayle’s social 
and economic advantages were viewed with incredulity by many single mothers who 
resented his moralizing rhetoric about their lot in life, which did little to help improve their 
material conditions or address many of the large structural issues that contributed to them.  
This is what Dan Quayle failed to grasp when he went to San Francisco in May and 
sat down with a group of welfare mothers and told them, “Look around the table 
today—where are the men? These men have a responsibility too.” Here were a 
dozen women who had enough self-respect and determination not to wait for some 
man to turn up and be responsible and all the vice president could say was: “Where 
are the men?” For him to suggest that those women are somehow to blame for the 
disappearance of male role models is to deny them their self-respect and, in effect, to 
tell them that their model of individual responsibility—society’s highest principle—is 
not a factor in their children’s lives. (Horyn, 1992, p. D1)  
These comments from mothers and journalists are consistent with Hunt’s (1999) 
claim that the “targets” or “objects” of moral regulatory discourses will not necessarily be 
passive recipients of attempts at reform but will exert agency and “attempt to refuse the 
subjectification imposed on them” (Hunt, 1999, p. 8). Mothers refused to accept the 
politicized narratives being thrust upon them by conservatives like Quayle. For all of their 
emphasis on family values and personal responsibility, this era of conservative politicians 
missed the mark by criticizing women who were raising children alone because they left 





fact taking responsibility for their actions and indeed showing tremendous respect for family 
by stepping up and being the best mothers they could be in the circumstances they were in.  
The pushback against the idealization of American family values came from all over, 
including Quayle’s hometown of Muncie, Indiana. A 1992 Washington Post article with a 
Muncie dateline made a point of describing how out of touch Quayle was with the people he 
purported to be so closely tied to: working-class Midwesterners. Men and women of many 
ages quoted by reporter Mary Ann French described the ways in which their values were 
different from those espoused by the vice president and Bush administration.  
Rick, 29, is exhausted. He is also baffled by the vice president’s apparent belief that 
“values are what the American people care most about” as Quayle told a convention 
of Southern Baptists in Indianapolis earlier this month. . . . “It’s hard to focus on 
family values when you’re working all the time,” says Rick. “Now I’m working two 
jobs. I don’t know what more I can do . . . . Maybe one of these days I’ll find a third 
one. They sit up there and say they know what we’re going through, they know what 
it’s like. No they don’t. I’m sorry. They’ve never known what it’s like.” (French, 
1992, p. F1) 
Even White men felt alienated by Quayle’s intense focus on morality and family 
values. The phrase “It’s the economy, stupid” comes to mind here—even if Midwesterners 
had different “values” than coastal dwellers, they still needed good, stable, high-paying jobs 
to support the type of families Quayle promoted. Others saw the deployment of family 
values rhetoric as opportunistic and disingenuous, an insincere attempt at political posturing 
rather than a genuine expression of care toward the American people.  
Dominick thinks what Bush and Quayle are doing is shameful and manipulative. If 





they seek to save those values four years ago, he asks—when they first came into 
office? (French, 1992, p. F1) 
Articles of this kind sought to recontextualize the ongoing conversation about what 
family values meant to Americans and to call attention to the fact that Dan Quayle’s White, 
bourgeois definition was just one of many. Quayle must have gotten the message, because in 
the fall of 1992, his campaign began to soften its stance in a presumed attempt to appeal to 
more moderate voters and distance himself from party extremists.  
 But these stories also served another rhetorical purpose. While the intention of the 
reporters crafting these narratives about the lives of single mothers might have been to shed 
light on the lived conditions of single mothers, the result was often a reinforcement of the 
trope that single mothers were poor and struggling. To be sure, many were, but the majority, 
even by Quayle’s own admission, were not. In the Murphy Brown speech, Quayle rattled off 
the statistic that 33.4% of single-mother-headed households were in poverty. But that also 
means that 66.6% of them were not.  
The stories about single mothers in major American newspapers often contained 
descriptions of dilapidated housing or bad neighborhoods, job instability or unemployment, 
childcare issues, and reliance on government assistance programs to make ends meet. 
Struggle was the predominant theme, like in this excerpt from The New York Times: 
Tight finances can affect parenting decisions: Every morning after Paula Brightbill 
gets her two older children out the door for school and leaves for her job, her 6-year-
old, Michael, stays home alone for a half-hour watching cartoons until it is time to 
join a child next door for the walk to school. (Lewin, 1992, p. A1) 
Without question, low-income single mothers—and in fact all mothers—often have 





jobs, and low wages for the jobs that were available, some mothers were relegated to living 
in less-than-ideal conditions. Others had to choose between leaving their children home 
alone or losing their jobs. In 1997, New York City adopted an aggressive, punitive approach 
to child welfare cases. Previously, mothers who found themselves accused of non-violent 
child neglect or endangerment received counseling and help from social workers. But new 
policies enacted in the “tough on crime” mid- to late 1990s cracked down on these offenses, 
opting instead to arrest women and handle their cases through the court system (Swarns, 
1997). This approach disproportionally affected low-income single mothers of color, and in 
many cases mothers might have been neglectful in a legal sense but did not actually commit 
a crime.  
The struggle to find high-quality, reliable, affordable childcare is a universal one, 
even in relative terms. Regardless of race or social class, single mothers lack options when it 
comes to caring for their children, a fact acknowledged in some journalistic narratives.  
Finding affordable and reliable childcare was also a major concern cited by the 
mothers. Some hired live-in help; some found baby sitters or had relatives who 
would watch the children, and others waited their turns on the long waiting lists of 
certified daycare centers. All of the women interviewed said the process of raising 
children alone was physically and emotionally taxing and sometimes required the 
mother to take more than one job to make ends meet and always required a juggling 
act to meet the requirements of a job, or jobs, and the needs of children. The 
emotional strains of being a single mother were most acute, the women said, during 
emergencies—when either they or the children were sick, for example—and there 
was no one to turn to for help. At those times, they said, they felt a strong sense of 





Even when mothers manage to find childcare and affordable housing, they often 
struggle in other ways. While crime was not a predominant theme in the discourse, this 
excerpt from a USA Today story helps to situate the issues faced by single mothers beyond 
providing basic food and shelter.  
Edna McNeil and her 9-year-old daughter live in a two-bedroom, tidy apartment in a 
once-glamorous neighborhood that now nervously harbors drug dealers. McNeil’s 
mother and grandmother live in another apartment in the same building that time 
has treated with so little respect. Outside, restless young men often roam in clusters. 
And sometimes “bullets without any names on them” terrorize the neighborhood. 
(Peterson, 1992, p. 1D) 
While there is undoubtedly value in contextualizing the situations of low-income 
single mothers like the stories cited above, the repeated characterization of single mothers as 
poor, stressed, and harried does nothing to actually help them. If anything, this 
representation is detrimental and reinforces the already-ubiquitous conception that a) most 
single mothers are on welfare or are poor, and b) they, by nature of their circumstances, put 
their children in danger. Furthermore, these representations do not reflect the circumstances 
of even most single mothers, yet even stories that acknowledge the majority of single mothers 
are not poor still choose to focus on those mothers who are.  
The “Bootstrap” Principle 
 There are, however, some stories that do focus on the single mothers living in safe 
neighborhoods, working full-time, and generally making ends meet week after week. These 
stories offer a particularly valuable political narrative. Hunt’s (1999) third element of a moral 
regulation project is specialized knowledge, either expert or informal, and the fourth is a 





single women with children are able to overcome (sometimes significant) obstacles to be 
successful provide fuel for the moral fire.  
 For the last century, parenting manuals and magazines have functioned to create and 
socially construct ideas about culturally acceptable mothering practices (Hays, 1996). The 
discourses therein have been guided by so-called child-rearing experts, who provide 
parents—although almost exclusively mothers (Sunderland, 2006)—with advice about how 
to properly care for, nurture, discipline, feed, clothe, play, and interact with their children in 
developmentally appropriate ways. More recently, parenting websites, blogs, discussion 
forums, Facebook groups, and all manners of online environs have assumed this same role. 
To parent outside of the generally accepted standards will at best lead to a vicious verbal 
lambasting, and at worst to accusations of abuse or neglect accompanied by police 
intervention.  
The government itself also acts as a source of expert knowledge with regard to child-
rearing and parenting information. The United States Department of Health and Human 
Services was founded in 1953 and has been the umbrella department under which the 
Administration for Children and Families is housed. This agency functions as a 
clearinghouse for information related to childcare, early childhood development, Head Start 
programs, child welfare, and more. The Bush administration’s focus on family values, 
coupled with the parenting discourses presented by magazines and books, functions to 
create a body of “expert” knowledge by which most American parents should adhere. Dan 
Quayle’s speech provided an ideal scenario in which to normalize discourses about family 
values, morality, and how those ideas relate to mothering. 
Along with concern about the breakdown of families and traditional family values, 





and integrity. The single mothers featured in a 1993 Essence story embodied all of these 
principles and more, each overcoming obstacles, making sacrifices, and ultimately reaping 
the rewards of their hard work. The story went so far as to eschew the welfare mother 
stereotype by including an anecdote about how one of the mothers sold her diamond 
engagement ring in order to afford childcare, get bus fare to look for work, and get off 
welfare.    
Lydia also knew she had to get off welfare two years later when a problem with a 
check caused one son, only 5-years-old at the time, to complain loudly about not 
getting their money. “Being educated in sociology and psychology and having 
worked as a caseworker, I recognized that as being the beginning of the welfare 
mentality,” says Lydia. “And that day . . . I realized I had to get out.” Lydia sold her 
diamond engagement ring so she could afford day care for her sons and have bus 
fare to go on job interviews. (Cain, 1993, p. 3) 
Lydia embodied many of the characteristics lauded by Dan Quayle. And her story 
had a happy ending; her children grew up and graduated from college, and she eventually 
earned a master’s degree of her own. Lydia is thus the embodiment of conservative 
bootstrap rhetoric—women can, and should, do whatever it takes to get off welfare and 
better themselves.  
Two women in the story had similar tales; one got pregnant while in college but 
persisted and, at the time of the story’s publication, was nearing the end of her Bachelor of 
Arts. degree while working for an airline. Another ran her own business and went to school. 
Both lived with their parents. Compared to the tales of woe presented in more mainstream 
news sources, these stories about single mothers—particularly single mothers of color—





of fresh air. But they are also somewhat disingenuous. Each of the featured women had 
family to fall back on. Each of them had some resources at their disposal to be able to go to 
college. None of them did it entirely on her own, and the value of familial assistance cannot 
be understated. These kinds of feel-good feature stories are popular, argued media critic 
John Leo in a 1992 U.S. New and World Report column, because  
[m]edia culture tends to frame issues in terms of options, choice and lifestyle. This is 
a noncensorious culture in which it is considered tacky to emit any discouraging 
words about other people’s choices and lifestyles. Indeed, part of the silence of the 
media on the damage to children comes from the fear of seeming to criticize or hurt 
the feelings of parents, usually women, who are raising (or who are forced to raise) 
children alone. A byproduct of this attitude is an ocean of feel-good journalism and 
programming that’s intended to praise the self-esteem of single mothers. Part of the 
result is the detoxifying of people who put children through this intentionally . . . . 
This helps promote the birth of at-risk babies. It amounts to cheerleading for the 
unraveling of the social structure, a common affliction of those who labor in 
medialand. (Leo, 1992, p. 19) 
 In contrast to Leo’s (1992) claims about the feel-good nature of media discourse 
about single mothers and their families, the present analysis did not find a glut of these types 
of stories. They were few and far between, and when they were present, they certainly did 
not function to “praise the self-esteem of single mothers.” Further, Leo’s assertion that 
stories about single mothers overcoming obstacles promotes the birth of at-risk babies is 
preposterous. Women do not have children outside of marriage as a result of journalistic 





But Leo (1992) was right on one account: the direct, unabashed finger-wagging at 
single mothers was largely seen as unnecessary, and those who partook of it publicly 
sometimes found the tables turned. This is precisely what happened after Dan Quayle 
criticized Murphy Brown (and by proxy single mothers) and ultimately had to walk back his 
initial statements, saying instead that single mothers were heroines. Moreover, the reliance 
on family for support, like in the Essence story above, is acceptable in the eyes of the 
Bush/Quayle administration, because family is part of the moral value structure they 
believed should be the norm. Quayle’s personal responsibility–centered definition of family 
values might not have intended to encompass parents supporting adult children with 
children, but these extended networks of family support are commonplace among low-
income single mothers who must often cobble together informal systems of childcare, 
transportation, and additional income in order to make ends meet (Edin & Lein, 1997).  
The location of this particular narrative is also rhetorically significant. Essence’s target 
audience is predominantly Black women, and data have consistently shown that Black 
women are not only significantly more likely than any other racial/ethnic group to be single 
mothers (Centers of Disease Control, 1995), but they are also more likely to be poor. 
According to Dill and Williams (1992), White women may become poor as a result of single 
motherhood, but Black women are frequently already poor when they become single 
parents. By focusing the above-referenced feature story on women who overcame challenges 
to become successful, Essence was complicit in perpetuating the idea that Black single 
mothers can be prosperous if only they are willing to work hard enough. Of course, this fits 
right into the conservative family values rhetoric of personal responsibility, which summarily 
dismisses the roles government and other social structures and institutions may have in 





Sex, Welfare, and Single Women 
 The fifth element of Hunt’s (1999) moral regulation framework is “a set of 
practices.” By this, he meant a behavior that can be linked to some form of harm (“harm” 
being the sixth and final component). Hunt (1999) argued that the most fundamental of 
moralized practices/behaviors is sex, stating “that sex, sexuality and sexual conduct have 
rarely been far from the center of attention—to such an extent that for at least the last 200-
years sex and morals have been virtually synonymous” (p. 21). Hunt contended in Governing 
Morals: A Social History of Moral Regulation that most moral regulatory movements involving 
sex or sexuality originate from the middle classes and fan outward rather than moving from 
the top down. Using case studies from Britain and the United States, Hunt traced the 
evolution of several moral regulation movements beginning in the 17th century through the 
present.  
Hunt (1999) claimed that discourses surrounding health, in addition to projects of 
self-regulation, manifest themselves in the moral regulation of others. This does not, of 
course, happen in a vacuum. These movements are linked, through both time and 
institutions, and have significant political and sociocultural consequences. “Movements that 
originate in attempts to promote male sexual self-control find themselves pressing for 
extensions to the criminalization of sexual conduct” (p. 2). The same argument can certainly 
be made for movements involving women. Moreover, Hunt posited that the same issues 
cycle through discourses of moral regulation, but the contexts in which they are discussed 
are shifted. For example, “while smoking was for centuries locked into the politics of status 
and distinction, today it has been substantially harnessed by a powerful constellation of class 
cultures and state and medical institutions” (p. 3). These distinctions are important because 





time, shifted in ways that are largely ignored today. While we often think of the buttoned-up, 
chaste, politically correct sexual mores of the Victorian or Puritan eras, this was not always 
true in practice. Analyses of premarital pregnancy rates in the early United States indicate 
that the second half of the 18th century saw a peak in these figures, from around 10% in the 
17th century to 30% in the latter half of the 18th century (Smith & Hindus, 1975). 
Moreover, as discussed previously, sex before marriage in the early to mid-20th century was 
not as atypical as the family values politicians of the 1990s would have us believe. Women of 
this era married before their pregnancies became visible, were shuttled off to maternity 
homes and forced to give their babies up for adoption, or lived with the stigma of being 
unchaste. In 1950, nearly 40% of women were sexually active by the time they were 20 years 
old (Fessler, 2006). Clearly, abstinence before marriage was not as universal in practice as in 
theory.   
Although sex and sexuality are long-standing targets of moral regulatory efforts, the 
family values rhetoric of the Bush/Clinton era and all of its associated media commentary 
contained almost no discussion of sex. The exceptions were when Diane English, creator 
and producer of the Murphy Brown show, issued a statement immediately after Dan Quayle’s 
speech about upholding abortion rights. A similar remark was made by the mother of the 
twin boys who jointly played the role of Murphy’s infant son. The 33-year-old single mother 
urged Quayle to support abortion rights and the Family Leave Act in a 1992 USA Today 
article (Urschel, 1992, p. 1A).  
The most direct reference to sexual activity came in a July 1992 Washington Post 
feature about family values, in which Gary Bauer, president of the conservative Family 
Research Council think tank, discussed the dissonance between what people said family 





You get ready agreement on the concept [of family values] but as soon as you take it 
to the next step and suggest the culture has a responsibility here, or say virtue is 
important and thus we shouldn’t be giving our kids condoms, then you get a big, hot, 
nasty debate. My side would argue that you can’t be serious about virtue if in the 
same breath you are talking to children about how to make sodomy a healthful 
practice. (Oldenberg, 1992, p C5) 
The assertion here is that virtuous or moral families do not discuss sex, or if they do, 
it is in the context of abstinence until marriage. Unfortunately for Bauer’s “side,” copious 
studies have shown that abstinence-only education is ineffective in dissuading teen sex and 
indeed leads to higher rates of teenage pregnancy and sexually transmitted infections—
precisely the opposite of what he presumably hoped for (Stanger-Hall & Hall, 2011). It is 
also noteworthy that Bauer chose to highlight sodomy given that it is (or was at the time) 
most frequently associated with homosexual sex. This word choice appears to be strategic—
made for shock value, as if saying “making premarital sex a healthful practice” would not 
have been impactful enough. By choosing to use sodomy as an example, Bauer was 
essentially implying that so much as talking about gay sex was wrong, let alone actually 
engaging in it. The Family Research Council, it should be noted, is the political lobbying arm 
of the evangelical Focus on the Family ministry organization, which strongly opposes, and 
offers policy recommendations on, issues like gay rights and gay marriage, bisexuality, 
transgenderism, premarital sex, abortion, comprehensive sex education, single motherhood, 
stem cell research, and a whole host of other social “problems.” 
But as far as overt discussions about sex are concerned, Bauer’s remarks are as 
explicit as it got. The near total absence of discourse about sex, reproduction, and sexuality is 





bit shy about discussing the lurid details of President Clinton’s sexual affair with White 
House intern Monica Lewinsky. However, another far less subtle moral indictment of single 
mothers is running through some veins of the discourse. The view of single mothers as 
welfare-dependent is a moral critique as much as, if not more than, an economic one. This 
theme is discussed at length in the next chapter.  
Chapter Summary 
This chapter examined the construction of single mothers throughout news media 
narratives in the wake of Dan Quayle’s criticism of fictional television journalist Murphy 
Brown. Giving special consideration to the rhetoric of “family values” and the ways in which 
that rhetoric contributed to myths about nuclear families, I demonstrated that such accounts 
of single mothers functioned as mechanisms of moral regulation, which, intentionally or not, 
positioned single mothers as social deviants. Media narratives in this sample legitimized 
conservative “family values” rhetoric by consistently giving consideration to the arguments 
and positions of stakeholders who prescribed a frighteningly narrow definition of “family 
values” as a panacea for all manner of social ills. I also identified strains of discourse in 
which single mothers and their allies attempted to construct counter-narratives and define 
their own identities in the face of these unfavorable depictions. These counter-narratives 
were of critical importance given the subordinate status of single mothers in relation to the 
policymakers and social conservatives who wielded “irresponsible” sexuality as a rhetorical 









CHAPTER 4. ENDING WELFARE AS WE KNOW IT 
A long time ago, I concluded that the current welfare system undermines the 
basic values of work, responsibility and family, trapping generation after 
generation in dependency and hurting the very people it was designed to 
help. 
— Bill Clinton, 1996  
If we don’t deal with out-of-wedlock births, then we’re not really dealing 
with welfare reform. 
— Bob Dole, 1995 
During the same tumultuous presidential campaign in which Dan Quayle decried the 
loss of family values and called single motherhood “just another lifestyle choice,” 
Democratic presidential nominee Bill Clinton was making his own headlines. In his July 16, 
1992, acceptance speech at the Democratic National Convention, Clinton talked about the 
importance of a strong middle class, growing the economy, and, perhaps most famously, 
promise of ending “welfare as we know it.” Four years later, in August 1996, he did just that 
when he signed the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act 
(PRWORA) into law. This legislation effectively dismantled the more than 60-year-old Aid 
to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program, also known colloquially as welfare, 
which had been initially developed, along with Supplemental Security Income 
(SSI/Disability) and unemployment insurance, to support poor families during the 
depression in the late 1920s and 1930s. In its place, Clinton approved the Temporary 
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program, also referred to as “workfare.”  
The differences between TANF and AFDC were stark (see Table 4.1). Summarily, 
under AFDC all poor families with children (as defined by federal statutory language) were 
guaranteed to receive cash assistance. Eligibility and benefit levels were determined by the 
states but had to fall within federal guidelines, and funding was open-ended and shared by 





and consideration of certain expenses. There were no time limits associated with benefits, so 
families remained eligible as long as they met the guidelines.  
 
 
 This objective of this chapter is twofold. First, I examine coverage of 1990s welfare 
reform legislation and its impact on single mothers in primarily, but not exclusively, the top 
three nationally circulating newspapers at the time—The New York Times, The Washington Post, 
and USA Today—focusing most intensely on the 12-month period surrounding the passage 
Table 4.1. Key Differences Between AFDC and TANF  
 AFDC TANF 
Federal Funding -Unlimited for AFDC and 
emergency assistance for needy 
families 
-Capped for JOBS 
-Federal share of AFDC and JOBS 
costs varied with state per capita 
income 
-Fixed block grants to states 
-And (1) contingency funding and 
loans for states with high population 
growth and low welfare spending; (2) 
welfare-to-work grants through FY 
2003; (3) bonuses to states that 
reduce out-of-wedlock births and 
abortions 
State Funding Matching required for each federal 
dollar 
States must spend 75% of “historic” 
level (100% for contingency funds) 
and must provide matching for 
contingency funds 
Eligibility Children with one parent with an 
incapacitated or unemployed second 
parent 
Set by states 
Income Limits Set by states Set by states 
Benefit Levels Set by states Set by states 
Entitlement States required to assist all families 
eligible under state income standards 
Expressly denies benefits to some 
individuals 
Work Requirement JOBS program had participation 
requirements, but not work 
requirements 
By 2002, states must have 50% of 
caseload in specified work activities 
Exemptions from 
Work Requirement 
Parents with a child under age three 
(under age one at state option) 
None, but states may exempt single 
parents caring for children under age 
one 
Work Trigger None Work (as defined by the state) 
required after a maximum of two 
years of benefits  




Cooperation required Cooperation required 
Legal Non-Citizen 
Residents 






of the PRWORA and implementation of TANF in August 1996. Because the debate 
surrounding welfare reform occurred throughout the 1990s, meaningful and significant texts 
published outside this 12-month time frame were also included when pertinent. In addition, 
the sample also included select magazine articles, published nonprofit and government 
reports, television and radio transcripts, and high-profile speeches given by key figures that 
focused on relevant subject matters. This process was designed to uncover insights into the 
salient topics and themes of discourse during the time.  
 Second, using Hunt’s (1999) moral regulation framework, and the arguments of 
Mink (2001) and Smith (2002, 2007) that the PRWORA and TANF policies functioned as 
tools of moral and sexual regulation for single mothers, I focus on a key element of moral 
and sexual regulation in TANF, the collection of child support, and analyze the sample for 
discourses that ignored, reinforced, or pushed back against reforms intended to bring single 
mothers on government assistance in line with hegemonic, heteropatriarchal norms of 
behavior.  
I begin with a broad outline of the development of entitlement programs in the 
United States as they relate to single mothers, followed by a critical analysis of dominant 
discursive themes in conjunction with an overview of relevant literature. In the second 
section, I present a tightly focused overview of the structuralist and individualist perspectives 
of poverty and analyze the moral regulatory discourses about single mothers in media 
coverage of TANF/welfare policies, with an emphasis on child support collection practices.  
The Development of Welfare 
In 1988, the Family Support Act established the Job Opportunities and Basic Skills 
Training (JOBS) program, which required participation in job training or education 





requirement, however, but participants who were employed had a proportional reduction in 
their benefit allowance. Critics of AFDC argued that it discouraged recipients from working 
and encouraged unmarried women to have additional children since their benefit allotment 
increased with each family member. Most AFDC recipients were also eligible for food 
stamps, subsidized childcare if they were working or pursuing an education, and subsidized 
housing through the Section 8 program. All families receiving AFDC were automatically 
eligible for Medicaid.  
TANF completely dismantled the entitlement structure of AFDC, eliminating any 
guarantee of cash assistance or any assistance at all. One of the most notable and dramatic 
changes was to the overall funding configuration. Rather than leaving funding open-ended 
and matching federal funds with state contributions, TANF created a single federal block 
grant that allotted a lump sum of $16.4 billion a year to be divided among the states based 
on previous AFDC- and JOBS-related program expenditures. 
 Further, TANF implemented a cumulative lifetime benefit cap of 60 months for 
families, with a few narrow provisions for states to allow exemptions. There were also strict 
work requirements imposed on TANF recipients, requiring most to go to work within two 
years or lose their benefits, and states were penalized with funding cuts if they did not meet 
the established quotas. Funding for other related social service programs like food stamps, 
childcare assistance, unemployment insurance, SSI, and services for disabled children and 
legal immigrants were also dramatically cut or eliminated completely. Like AFDC, TANF 
required single mothers to cooperate with child support enforcement agencies to identify the 
biological father(s) of their children in order to attempt to recoup part of the cost of any 
assistance the mother might receive; put another way, mothers seeking welfare had to 





Unlike AFDC, though, TANF included a provision permitting states to implement family 
caps, allowing for the denial of additional benefits or reduction of existing cash grants to 
families who have additional children while on assistance. As of 2016, at least 15 states still 
had these caps in place, down from 23 in 2009 (Wiltz, 2016).  
Proponents of the PRWORA and TANF believed these sweeping changes would 
discourage (or render impossible) welfare dependency, curb out-of-wedlock childbearing, 
promote marriage, and encourage self-sufficiency and personal responsibility. Critics of the 
new program, on the other hand, insisted it would have the opposite effects—leading to 
greater levels of poverty and hunger, leaving the most vulnerable Americans with no reliable 
safety net. Moreover, some critics, like Cornell University legal and political theorist Anna 
Marie Smith and feminist legal scholar Gwendolyn Mink, argued that the legislation—
particularly the child support enforcement, abstinence-only sex education, marriage 
promotion, and family cap—functioned unabashedly as tools of sexual and moral regulation 
of poor women.  
Single Mothers and Social Safety Nets 
The Aid to Dependent Children (ADC) program, the precursor to AFDC, was first 
devised in 1935 in conjunction with the SSA and was viewed as a safety net program for 
children who either had been abandoned or whose parent—typically the mother—had been 
widowed. The inclusion of adult caretakers and parents (under AFDC) was not accounted 
for until years later. The SSA was not the first social program to offer assistance to poor 
children and families, however; most states, cities, and municipalities had individual formal 
and informal systems of aid for the poor that functioned to keep needy families and children 
afloat, if only barely, and each devised their own guidelines for deservedness and 





British. These systems of public aid were piecemeal, and most lone mothers were provided 
with what was known as “outdoor” relief—small gifts of food or money from public 
sources. The amount of aid varied, and the continuation of relief was never guaranteed as a 
right (Katz, 2013). It was not until after the Civil War and the advent of veterans’ pensions 
that White women began to fare a bit better. Some semi-skilled and unskilled jobs opened up 
to them, although only a tiny fraction of women worked outside the home, and a few states 
began to introduce mothers’ pensions. The situation for Black women, however, was vastly 
different, as they had long been working in the homes of White women or in agriculture for 
poverty-level wages, while local benefit agencies and social workers often conspired to deny 
them benefits (Katz, 2013).  
The creation of mothers’ pensions early in the 20th century was primarily the result 
of a grassroots lobbying effort on behalf of elite and middle-class women who rallied 
political support for public spending on behalf of poor women and their children, despite 
lacking the right to vote themselves. Skocpol (1995) argued that upper-class women were 
motivated to do this because they shared the common bond of motherhood with women of 
lower socioeconomic status, and also because it would strengthen their own status as 
mothers. Historian Linda Gordon outlined why Skocpol’s theory was likely correct. 
Gordon’s (1994) thorough history of single mothers and the welfare system documents how 
upper-class women were well aware of the ways in which the world of paid work was 
incompatible with motherhood. First, the pay for women’s labor was inadequate to support 
a family no matter how many hours she worked, and second, the work schedules and 
conditions of “women’s” jobs left mothers with no time or energy for housework or 
childcare. Single mothers were often forced to send their older children off to work while 





doing so, mothers risked permanently losing their children to orphanages if they did not 
concede to giving them up voluntarily (White, 1994).  
In the 1910s, a broad coalition of reformers headed by groups like the General 
Federation of Women’s Clubs and the National Congress of Mothers, as well as a collection 
of juvenile court justices, local law and labor unions, and media outlets, including The New 
York Evening World, Outlook, the Nation, and the Delineator, proposed that state and local 
governments provide poor single mothers and their children with cash payments (Howard, 
1992). While the coalition was met with resistance from private groups like the Charity 
Organization Society, the opposition was not enough to stop the effort, and mothers’ 
pensions spread rapidly throughout the country, with 20 states adopting some sort of 
program between 1911 and 1913. By 1920, a total of 39 states had done so. Within another 
15 years, every state except Georgia and South Carolina provided some sort of mothers’ 
pension program. Although initially limited to providing relief only to widows, by the 1930s, 
in nearly all states benefits were expanded to other classes of women (never-married, 
abandoned, and divorcees) and the age limit was increased for eligible children.  
Ironically, the term “mothers’ pension” is itself a bit of a misnomer given that the 
amount of aid administered per household depended exclusively on the number of children 
and did not make any provision for support of the mother herself (Howard, 1992). 
Moreover, even the most generous states had what could be considered draconian criteria 
for eligibility. These standards were typically based on three broad and often loosely defined 
categories: financial need, the status of the children’s father, and “suitability” of the mother.  
Stringent means and asset tests were put in place to ensure only the neediest cases 
received assistance. In Massachusetts, for example, a single mother was deemed ineligible if 





home equity or other property. Liquid assets of more than $200 were also impermissible. In 
Illinois, welfare officials would track down relatives of an applicant and ask them to provide 
the applicant with financial support. If the relatives were able to provide help but refused, 
the applicant would be required to sue them or else be deemed ineligible (Howard, 1992).  
Women who applied for aid nearly always had to prove that the father(s) of their 
children were absent, dead, or otherwise unable to support them, and there was a clear moral 
hierarchy of deservedness when it came to a woman’s pathway to single motherhood. 
Widows had—and in the eyes of some today, still have—the moral upper hand when it came 
to being worthy of taxpayer-funded state help. One opponent of expansion to non-widowed 
single mothers stated:  
To pension desertion or illegitimacy would, undoubtedly, have the effect of a 
premium upon these crimes against society . . . . It is a great deal more difficult to 
determine the worthiness of such mothers than of the widow, and a great deal more 
dangerous for the state to attempt relief on any large scale. (quoted in Bell, 1965, pp. 
6–7)  
Perhaps the most notorious requirements of mothers’ pensions and subsequent 
welfare laws were the mandatory home visits recipients were often subjected to, usually with 
little or no notice, under the guise of ensuring their homes were fit for children. What 
mothers and case workers both knew, however, was that the true reason for these home 
visits was to make sure the women did not have male housemates, that their homes were not 
too nice (a signal of too high an income) but also not too dirty (a sign of laziness). In her 
thorough and fascinating investigation of mothers’ allowances in Canada from the early 
1920s to the late 1990s, Margaret Little (1998) argued that these intrusive home visits and the 





regulation intended to both shame and scare single mothers into compliance with welfare 
law and middle-class financial and sexual mores.  
There are a number of others who volunteer to scrutinize a mother’s behavior. 
Again, this is often justified on financial grounds. Teachers, judges, landlords, and a 
number of taxpayers have made it their personal mission to ensure that single 
mothers do not “cheat.” The implication in much of this scrutiny is that those who 
pay the bills also have the right to define moral codes of behaviour for society. 
Similar to charity work, these workers and volunteers feel justified in imposing their 
moral values upon the others they are “helping.” (Little, 1998, p. 173) 
While Little’s research focused on Canadian women, American single mothers were 
also subjected to home visits and concentrated scrutiny by welfare agency workers, the state, 
and their communities in a process that sought to determine whether they were deserving of 
aid. Requirements varied by location, but generally case workers were supposed to visit 
recipients’ homes at least a few times a year, and as frequently as once a month.  
While social workers enjoyed considerable latitude in determining the substance of 
these visits, they were instructed to look for signs that aid was no longer needed. A 
typical mothers’ pensions law directed social workers to investigate “the condition of 
the home and family and all other data which might assist in determining the wisdom 
of the measure taken and the advisability of their continuance.” (Howard, 1992, p. 
198) 
The passing of the SSA in 1935 helped reshape the welfare landscape in the early 
part of the 20th century by providing some standardization to the laws and policies 
governing the distribution of federal funds, as well as the asset and eligibility parameters for 





AFDC program, taking into account the needs of the mother/caretaker as well as the 
children. Then, in the mid-1960s, the Food Stamp program (later renamed the Supplemental 
Nutrition Assistance Program, or SNAP), the Women, Infants and Children (WIC) program, 
and Medicaid were implemented, giving single mothers additional forms of public assistance 
to rely on in addition to the meager cash payments provided by AFDC. In 1974, Congress 
authorized the Section 8 program under the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development. Section 8 provides housing assistance vouchers to low-income families and 
was originally designed to help poor urban families move out of crime-ridden 
neighborhoods and into communities where their kids could attend better schools. However, 
since its inception, Section 8 has been woefully underfunded and poorly designed, serving 
only about 25% of eligible households.  
In much of the country, landlords can refuse to take Section 8 vouchers, even if the 
voucher covers the rent. And, unlike the landlords in poor neighborhoods . . . many 
landlords of buildings in nicer neighborhoods will do anything to keep voucher-
holders out. The result is that Section 8 traps families in the poorest neighborhoods. 
(Semuels, 2015)  
Anyone lucky enough to get off the sometimes years-long waiting list for Section 8 housing 
vouchers are then tasked with the onerous chore of finding suitable housing in the 60- to 90-
day timeframe or they risk losing the voucher. Since landlords are not required to accept 
vouchers, and those who do accept them often cluster voucher-holders in lower-income 
areas, many Section 8 recipients find themselves not much better off with the voucher in 
securing better-quality housing.  
Taken together, AFDC, SNAP, WIC, Medicaid, and Section 8 made up the core of 





funded and operated by different government agencies, eligibility for one program usually 
meant eligibility for the others, and sometimes applications for services were combined or 
considered in tandem. However, when Bill Clinton and other politicians in the late 1980s 
and 1990s began talking about welfare reform, they were primarily concerned with altering 
the structure of AFDC and cash payments to families.  
While the original intentions of these social safety net programs were to provide 
relief to the most vulnerable populations of Americans and alleviate poverty in the United 
States, it took a few decades for these programs to become associated with social decline and 
deviance.  
ADC began to gain the public perception that it was a program for “undeserving 
single mothers” after survivor benefits in Social Security shifted most widows—the 
mothers considered deserving of help—to Social Security benefits. This turn of 
events led to the public perception of ADC as a program for morally corrupt single 
mothers and African Americans who were ineligible for Social Security. (Hancock, 
2004, p. 35) 
Part of the reason for this negative view of AFDC was the low rate of workforce 
participation among its female participants, despite a huge increase in the number of women 
working at least part time since the 1950s. Further, the “welfare queen” stereotype 
introduced by Ronald Reagan in 1976 had long permeated public perceptions about female 
public assistance recipients, creating what Hancock (2004) termed a “politics of disgust” 
surrounding single mothers on welfare, particularly Black single mothers on welfare: “the 
public identity of welfare recipients—created from the misperception that they are all or 





disgust to produce legislative outcomes that are undemocratic both procedurally and 
substantively” (p. 6). She continued: 
The politics of disgust is an emotion-laden response to long-standing beliefs about 
single, poor African American mothers that has spread, epidemiologically, to all 
recipients of Aid to Families with Dependent Children/Temporary Assistance for 
Needy Families and to recipients of other welfare program, including Social Security 
Income (SSI) and related programs for what citizens previously considered “the 
deserving poor.” (p. 9) 
Importantly, public perception of the average welfare recipient and the actual racial 
composition of program beneficiaries have always been vastly different. Before World War 
II, only about 14% of African-American applicants were allowed ADC (Abramovitz, 1996). 
But longitudinal data from the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (1995) 
found the proportion of White and Black parents and children among AFDC recipients to 
be roughly equal—within about a five-percentage point range—from 1983 to 1996, with 
neither racial group exceeding 42% of total recipients. So, while Whites and African 
Americans were receiving welfare benefits at about the same rates, public resentment was 
rapidly mounting toward the “undeserving poor”—that is, unmarried, sexually promiscuous 
Black women who were unwilling to work for their keep.  
There were also growing middle-class anxieties about the perceived rise in welfare 
dependency among these women. Fraser and Gordon (1994) argued that the very word 
“dependency” was “the single most crucial term in the current U.S. debate about welfare 
reform” (p. 4).  
[The phrase “welfare dependency”] entered the American lexicon early but 





pauperism, modified in the Progressive Era, and stabilized in the period of the New 
Deal, this use of the term was fundamentally ambiguous, slipping easily, and 
repeatedly, from an economic meaning to a moral/psychological meaning. The 
United States was especially hospitable to elaborating dependency as a defect of 
individual character. (Fraser & Gordon, 1994, p. 319)    
Changes in public perception about who was receiving welfare also led to shifts in public 
opinion about welfare programs and their participants. MacLeod, Montero, and Speer (1999) 
examined changing attitudes toward welfare and welfare recipients between 1938 and 1995. 
Their findings indicate 71% of respondents in 1987 believed the government had a 
responsibility to take care of those in need. By 1995, only one year before Clinton signed the 
PRWORA, that number had decreased to 61% (see Table 4.2). This was coupled with some 
dramatic swings in opinion about other issues. In 1992, 29% of those polled agreed welfare 
recipients could “get along without” public assistance if they tried, while 50% stated they 
thought most welfare recipients “really needed the help” to get by. A mere two years later, 










Table 4.2. Attitudes Toward Government Responsibility to Provide for Those in Need, 
1938–1995  
Year* Yes (Favor) (%) No (Oppose) (%) 
1938 68 28 
1940 65 28 
1946 72 19 
1947 73 19 
1948 73 19 
1964 72 20 
1973 68 27 
1983 83 11 
1987 71 24 
1988 74 23 
1990 67 29 
1992 69 28 
1993 62 35 
1994 57 41 
1994 65 29 
1995 63 30 
1995 61 30 
Results from MacLeod et al. (1999). *Data reported twice in one year indicate that the 
question was asked twice in the same year. **The question asked, “Do you agree or 
disagree: It is the responsibility of the government to take care of people who cannot take 
care of themselves?” Over the years, slight variations were made in the wording of the 








Even more radical was the shift in the number of people who believed the poor were 
responsible for their own poverty (Table 4.4). In 1990, 30% of respondents thought the 
main cause of poverty was “a lack of one’s own effort,” while 48% thought it was a result of 
“circumstances beyond his or her control” and 20% said “both.” Only five years later, those 
figures had moved to 60%, 30%, and 7%, respectively. In other words, Americans were far 
more likely to believe that poverty was a result of a lack of individual effort, even though a 





Table 4.3. Attitudes Toward Welfare Recipients, 1976–1994  








1976 52 38 -- 10 
1976 51 36 -- 13 
1977 54 31 -- 14 
1980 51 39 -- 10 
1981 55 32 -- 15 
1986 40 35 20 4 
1992 29 50 16 4 
1994 48 35 13 4 
1994 46 44 -- 10 
Results adapted from McLeod et al. (1999). *Data reported twice in one year indicate that 
the question was asked twice in the same year. **The question asked, “In your opinion, 
do you think that most people who receive money from welfare could get along without 







As a specific segment of the welfare-receiving population, mothers on welfare were 
not regarded sympathetically by the general public but were generally viewed with a level of 
suspicion. A nationwide focus group conducted by the Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation 
(Farkas, 1995) between June and July 1995 found that “welfare moms” were a common 
source of frustration for participants, who perceived these benefit recipients to bear children 
carelessly and use their welfare checks as an alternative to work.  
When confronted with the issue of mothers on welfare, people express the same 
desire for firmness and fair warning as they do in their approach to time limits and 
able-bodied recipients. “We can understand one mistake,” people say, “but be 
warned: you will not get additional money for additional babies.” (p. 19) 
Table 4.4. Attitudes Toward the Cause of Poverty 




Both (%) Don’t Know 
(%) 
1982 37 39 17 7 
1984 33 34 31 2 
1988 40 37 17 6 
1989 38 42 17 3 
1990 35 45 17 3 
1990 30 48 20 2 
1992 27 52 18 3 
1993 48 33 17 2 
1994 44 34 18 4 
1995 60 30 7 3 
Results adapted from McLeod et al. (1999). *Data reported twice in one year indicate that 
the question was asked twice in the same year. **The question asked, “In your opinion, 
which is more often to blame if a person is poor—lack of effort on his or her own part or 





Focus group participants also consistently and strongly believed welfare mothers should 
work or perform community service in exchange for their benefits. They reasoned that work 
provided mothers with a sense of self-respect and self-worth and would teach their children 
the value of earning their way in the world (Farkas, Johnson, Friedman, & Bers, 1996). Reese 
(2005) argued that these overwhelmingly negative attitudes toward welfare programs and the 
poor mothers receiving them were fueled by a backlash against welfare expansion in the 
1960s. It took an amalgam of social and political factors to ultimately coalesce and push the 
PRWORA through Congress in 1996. According to Reese (2005): 
Anti-welfare propaganda and bipartisan attacks on welfare mothers spread through 
the mainstream media, increased public opposition to AFDC. Anti-welfare rhetoric 
resonated with the broader public, especially more affluent and traditionally minded 
whites, because it tapped into broadly held values, resentments, stereotypes, and 
concerns. Attacks on welfare mothers exploited racist stereotypes of poor blacks and 
Latinos and appealed to white resentment toward taxes, civil rights gains, and the 
recent wave of immigration. The rise in women’s labor force participation also 
increased expectations that poor mothers work. Finally, traditional ‘family values’ 
and concerns about the rise in single motherhood, especially among blacks and 
Latinos, created support for punitive policies toward “deadbeat dads,” unwed 
mothers, and teenage mothers. Rising public opposition to welfare in turn put 
increased pressure on politicians to champion tough welfare policies. (p. 172)   
From Political Rhetoric to Painful Reality 
Even before President Clinton officially signed the PRWORA into law in August 
1996, many states had already begun to experiment with cuts to benefits and developing 





cultural rhetoric had shifted since Dan Quayle’s blunder about Murphy Brown. To be sure, 
single motherhood was still seen as immoral, but it was immoral largely because it 
encouraged reliance on public assistance. Rather than handwringing about single mothers 
being detrimental to children and the need for “family values,” media buzzwords in the era 
of welfare reform included terms like “personal responsibility,” “dependency,” 
“opportunity,” “illegitimacy,” “self-sufficiency,” and “self-esteem.” In a 1996 welfare 
reform–focused story in The New York Times (“Some Look at the Welfare Plan with Hope,” 
1996), Florida Republican Representative E. Clay Shaw Jr. discussed the welfare system and 
its goals in these words, activating several of these buzzwords along the way:  
It definitely helps the poor; that is the way it should be. It helps build their self-
esteem and puts them to work. The measure replaces a welfare system with a work 
program. It will be a revolutionary way we attack poverty. . . . We have a 
responsibility to see that everyone is given the opportunity and is able to accept a 
job. It is the obligation of government to allow everyone the opportunity to share in 
the American dream. We are helping more than halfway to that goal. (p. A26) 
Later in the same article, which was a compilation of quotes from various welfare reform 
stakeholders, Christopher Bond, a Republican senator from Missouri, offered his 
perspective, once again deploying the language of responsibility, illegitimacy, and 
opportunity:  
There can be no doubt that the current system is a failure. That should be one thing 
that is agreed upon by Republicans, Democrats, liberals, conservatives and anyone 
else who is concerned about their fellow man today. It is cruel to adults who are 
treated like numbers when they need public assistance. It is even crueler to the 





atmosphere without hope. The current system discourages work, but it encourages 
illegitimacy . . . . (p. A26) 
The issues of morality playing out in media discourse focused much less on the lack 
of family values displayed by single mothers, and instead concentrated on the strain lazy 
single mothers and their illegitimate children placed on the hardworking, taxpaying citizens 
funding the welfare infrastructure.  
Politicians were not interested in allowing welfare mothers to stay home and care for 
their young children to provide stability. An at-home mother is, after all, an upper-middle-
class luxury. Most policymakers in Washington, D.C., and the leaders of state governments 
seemed all too eager to get welfare mothers off the dole and into jobs as soon as possible, 
often with little to no regard for whether those jobs were actually able to support the 
women’s families.  
Single mothers repeatedly discussed the difficulties they encountered in trying to get 
themselves off welfare—a lack of job skills, transportation, reliable childcare, and scheduling 
flexibility, coupled with the loss of already-meager food stamp, cash, and childcare benefits 
as soon as employment kicked in, often left mothers in the red after working 40-plus hour 
weeks. For most, like Jewell Bibbs, a 21-year-old single mother cited in a 1996 New York 
Times story, the stress of grinding through weeks of sometimes physically demanding jobs 
away from their children only to still not be able to pay the bills was too much: 
“They made it sound so good,” she said of her experience in the program. “They 
help you with childcare. They help you with bus fare. But they tell you you can find a 
good job. And to them, any job is a good job. You can get one of them and you’re 





This was a common refrain among mothers. In another 1996 New York Times story, reporter 
Lizette Alvarez talked to mothers in an emergency shelter, many of whom were concerned 
about their economic prospects under welfare reform.  
But where, they ask, are the jobs that will pay their bills? Who will take care of their 
children when they are at work? How will they ever find an apartment they can 
afford? New York City, they say, is not Idaho, and $4.25 an hour does not add up to 
$800 a month in rent. “If you work a minimum wage job, that’s nothing,” said 
Teresa Falu, 33, who wound up at the center with her three children. “Think about 
paying rent, with a family, working at McDonald’s. You will rob the cash register is 
what you will do.” (Alvarez, 1996, p A23)  
Single mothers on welfare regularly discuss the disparity between actual wages and 
cost of living. Conservative policymakers typically argued that pushing mothers into low-
paid work functioned only as a starting point and that those positions would allow them to 
gain job skills, whereby improving their wages and eventually their socioeconomic status 
overall. But the reality, as it so often is, was far less idyllic.  
Peter Edelman was President Clinton’s assistant secretary for planning and 
evaluation at the Department of Health and Human Services. Edelman, along with two 
other administration officials, resigned in protest after Clinton signed the PRWORA and 
wrote a biting critique of the legislation, which was published in The Atlantic in March 1997. 
Edelman (1997) argued forcefully that Clinton had chosen to restructure welfare funding 
into block grants in part because  
Medicaid block grants would have negative consequences for a much larger slice of 
the electorate than would welfare block grants. Large numbers of middle-income 





say nothing of the potential impact on hospitals, physicians, and the nursing homes 
themselves, all of which groups have substantial political clout. Welfare had no 
politically powerful constituency that would be hurt by conversion to block grants. 
(p. 46)   
In other words, Clinton chose the most vulnerable, least politically vocal and influential 
segment of the population to play political chess with. Edelman (1997) further argued that 
the entire structure of the PRWORA is actually hostile to the poor. “So this is hardly a 
welfare bill. In fact, most of its budget reductions come in programs for the poor other than 
welfare, and many of them affect working families. Many of them are just cuts, not reform” 
(p. 49). And while proponents of reform believed these cuts would ultimately benefit the 
poor by ushering them into the labor market, Edelman (1997) contended that the mass 
exodus of benefit recipients off the rolls was unrealistic and problematic for two reasons. 
First, there were not enough appropriate jobs in the right locations to accommodate the 
people who would be required to work to sustain their now time-limited benefits. Second, 
the labor market was not (and arguably still is not, some 20 years later) friendly to those with 
little work experience, skills, training, or education. Additionally, the types of manual labor 
and service industry jobs welfare recipients were pushed into were not amenable to working 
around health, personal, and family problems that poor, unskilled workers brought with 
them, and the PRWORA had no supports in place to help people stay working once they 
found a job.  
Like many others who worked closely with underprivileged populations, Edelman 
(1997) was aware that welfare-reliant individuals were frequently in that position for reasons 
other than economic choice or laziness. Rather, he argued, it was most commonly their 





dependence on AFDC and other safety net programs. “Many long-term welfare recipients 
are functionally disabled even if they are not disabled in a legal sense” (1997, p. 53). Edelman 
believed the real impacts of these so-called reforms would not be more employment and 
self-sufficiency, but rather increases in homelessness, higher demands on already-strapped 
soup kitchens and shelters, more malnutrition and crime, greater rates of infant mortality, 
and drug and alcohol abuse. “There will be increased family violence and abuse against 
children and women, and a consequent significant spillover of the problem into the already-
overloaded child-welfare system and battered women’s shelters” (p. 53). Tragically, Edelman 
was right about many of his predictions.  
Consequences for Children 
One consequence of requiring hundreds of thousands of single mothers nationwide 
to seek work at the same time was the increased demand for childcare. Concerns were raised 
from all sides about how to address these challenges, but since the primary feature of the 
PRWORA was that it gave states huge amounts of leeway in crafting their own programs, 
state and local governments were essentially left to their own devices to figure out how to 
develop job creation programs for tens or hundreds of thousands of welfare recipients and 
childcare programs for their children. Post-PRWORA, New York City spent about $100 
million to subsidize childcare for roughly 65,000 children, with tens of thousands more 
qualifying for a spot in one of the city’s 300 formal childcare centers. However, according to 
a New York Times article on childcare centers and welfare (Sexton, 1996), informal and home-
based childcare centers had become increasingly popular among welfare recipients because 
of the flexibility and reduced cost. But they also came at a much greater risk. 
. . . the city conducts no background checks or performance evaluation of the people 





care can also mean exposing children to care providers with no training, experience 
or aptitude, or with criminal records. Of course, the lack of monitoring means there 
is no documented history of children abused by city financed care providers. But that 
is hardly a comfort to critics among child-care experts and elected officials who 
question any significant expansion of informal care without a concentrated effort to 
improve the early development of many of the city’s impoverished children. “The 
tendency for public administrators will be to create the cheapest kind of child care, 
and that’s exactly the opposite of what these children need,” said Barbara Blum, 
president of the Foundation for Child Development and a top advisor to Nicholas 
Scoppetta, Commissioner of the city’s child welfare agency. “The danger is that all 
sorts of short cuts will be taken.” (Sexton, 1996, p. 1B)  
The article goes on to cite a 1995 study of informal, unregulated childcare in four cities, 
conducted by the Work and Families Institute, that found only nine percent of households 
provided “good quality care.” More than a third of the care in observed households was 
determined to have adversely impacted the children’s developmental progress. This left a lot 
of single mothers frustrated and fearful of what could happen to their kids, even if they were 
not particularly upset about having to go to work or the new time limits placed on benefits. 
Molissa Smokes said the assignment she was given as part of the city program that 
requires welfare recipients to work for their benefits conflicts with the hours that her 
4-year-old daughter attends a Bronx Head Start program. Ms. Smokes said welfare 
officials told her that she would have to find someone to pick up her daughter from 
the East Side House Early Childhood Center in the South Bronx and care for the 
child during her work hours. To Ms. Smokes, a 28-year-old single mother, the 





day-care center to send her daughter to every afternoon, she said she could either 
find a neighbor to care for her child or she could defy the work requirement, keep 
her child in the highly regarded Head Start program and risk being cut off from her 
cash and food stamp benefits . . . . She said the thought of entrusting her child to a 
neighbor or local unlicensed household offering informal daycare was too 
frightening. “You can’t trust people out there,” she said. (Sexton, 1996, p. 1B) 
Another single mother, this one homeless and living at a Bronx shelter, was 
concerned about childcare, the new work requirements, and how she would manage to 
complete her education at the same time. “I want to further my education so I don't have to 
depend on the city . . . . I have a 7-year-old daughter, and I’m not going to allow just any to 
take care of my daughter,” she said in an August 17, 1996 New York Times article (Firestone, 
1996, p. 1). 
These fears were common; women wanted to pursue education and training 
programs that would eventually allow them to pursue professional careers, but welfare 
reform regulations, either in federal language or those imposed by the states, took a work-
first mentality that likely did more harm than good toward the ultimate aim of moving 
women permanently off welfare.  
Education Takes a Backseat  
 Requiring welfare recipients to cease training and higher education programs for 
low-wage employment was also a hallmark of TANF workfare rules. Under AFDC and the 
JOBS act, welfare participants could be exempted from some work assignments or decline 
offers of employment and still retain benefits if the employment conflicted with eligible 
training or continuing education endeavors or if satisfactory childcare was not available. 





passage of the PRWORA, like the one headed by Mayor Rudy Giuliani in New York, made 
no such allowances.  
Mothers frequently lamented about the double bind this put them in. “I had a 
problem finding a job because I needed more computer skill in order to get, you know, a 
good paying job, and I had to bring my typing skill speed up,” stated one mother in a June 
1996 NPR interview (Fertig, 1996). The reporter went on to explain how the mother, Lizzie 
Middleton, enrolled in a computer class in order to improve her skills, but a month later was 
given a 20-hour-per-week minimum-wage workfare assignment in an office. The hours of 
the computer class conflicted with the work assignment, so she brought a letter from the 
school asking to be excused. “And I gave it to the gentleman. So he took it and he said, ‘Oh, 
we’re not accepting this anymore.’ I said, ‘Well, you expect me to drop out of school to work 
in this office?’ And he said ‘Yeah, you gotta do it’” (Fertig, 1996).  
 In the same interview, NPR reporter Beth Fertig (1996) talked to several other young 
mothers, who said they were hopeful workfare would not interfere with their longer-term 
goals. “I wouldn’t do it. If they call me for sanitation or the parks, I wouldn’t do it. You 
understand? I don’t think it’s fair when I’m trying to empower myself when I’m thinking 
about my future.” 
I don’t mind going to work, but not for—if I’m going to school to learn one thing, 
I’m not going to turn around and go to work—go to work in a park. If I’m going to 
school, I want to try to be an accountant. I’m going to go work in a park? Where’s-
what learning am I getting out that? What math am I getting out that—how many 
leaves I’m going to pick up today? (Fertig, 1996) 
 Work-first mandates were heavily criticized by more liberal and moderate 





initiatives, not low-wage labor, were the true ticket off welfare. “A college education is the 
surest way off welfare and to a successful life,” said W. Ann Reynolds, chancellor of the City 
University of New York, in a June 1, 1996, New York Times article (Arenson, 1996, p. 1A). 
CUNY was one of many colleges and universities nationwide that saw enrollment figures 
decline under the new rules. According the Arenson New York Times article, from 1995 to 
1996, CUNY enrollment of students on welfare dropped 17%. By the year 2000, CUNY had 
lost 81.5% of its welfare-receiving students (Cox & Spriggs, 2002).  
 These types of precipitous declines in education and training program enrollment 
held true across the country post-TANF. Cox and Spriggs (2002) found a 20% drop 
nationwide in the college enrollment of all welfare recipients during the first two years of 
TANF.  
The result of our empirical research indicates that on average, state policies account 
for 13% of the drop in the probability that welfare recipients would enroll in college 
relative to other poor women after implementation of TANF . . . . The most 
disturbing part of our finding was that African American welfare recipients who 
reside in states with strict “work first” TANF programs are most affected. (p. 4) 
Proponents of the work-first philosophy, however, argued that welfare recipients had 
an obligation to earn their benefits and that workfare jobs functioned both as a way of 
earning a living and as a type of job training in and of itself, as evidenced in a later portion of 
the above-referenced New York Times article.  
But a growing number of cities and states, impatient with the continuing high cost of 
welfare, have made a job the top priority, letting education and training fall into the 
background. Some of them have pointed to studies that suggest pressing people to 





widely cited study, the Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation of New 
York City examined six counties in California, some that placed more emphasis on 
giving welfare recipients more training and education, and one that put more 
emphasis on pushing welfare recipients into jobs right away. The one with the 
emphasis on finding quick employment showed better results in moving welfare 
recipients into jobs and in cutting welfare costs. “We don’t have evidence that 
pushing welfare recipients en masse into education and training is generally effective 
in improving their earnings and reducing their use of welfare,” said James Riccio, a 
senior research associate for the Manpower corporation. “A strategy emphasizing job 
search first and education and training for some may be a more effective approach.” 
(Arenson, 1996) 
Advocates of college programs pushed back, however, arguing that welfare recipients 
with training or a college education often leave welfare and stay off because they earn higher 
wages. Their children experience better outcomes as a result as well. A 1996 NPR report 
(Fertig, 1996) featured New York Legal Aid Society attorney Richard Blum, who said his 
office had been “flooded” with requests from people in education and training programs 
who were told they could not continue, or who wanted to enroll but were told programs 
were no longer available:  
The new practice . . . is to disregard the needs of the person. It’s to disregard the- 
what makes the most sense to get a job that will provide for the household and will 
keep the person off public assistance. It’s to disregard all of that and instead have a 






 Given the evidence about education programs and improved job prospects, it stands 
to reason policymakers would be more interested in providing access to these programs for 
welfare recipients to foster higher incomes and help keep them off welfare for good. But the 
opposite was true with TANF—women were forced to unenroll, or were prevented from 
enrolling altogether, in programs that would ultimately have well served the goals of TANF 
reforms. What policymakers viewed as an obligation of recipients to work for their benefits 
functioned primarily to keep them in low-wage, dead-end jobs that perpetuated the cycle of 
poverty.  
Moral and Sexual Regulation of Welfare Mothers Under PRWORA/TANF 
Before signing the PRWORA in 1996, President Clinton had vetoed two earlier 
Republican-drafted versions of welfare reform legislation. The battle over welfare reform 
had been waged for at least four years, and the Republicans in Congress had been heavily 
pressured by conservatives outside of Congress to make combating “illegitimacy” a primary 
feature of any welfare proposal sent to President Clinton. 
Upon passage of the PRWORA, the four explicitly stated purposes of the TANF 
program, according to the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (About TANF, 
2017), are to: (1) provide assistance to needy families so children can be cared for in their 
own homes; (2) reduce the dependency of needy parents by promoting job preparation, 
work, and marriage; (3) prevent and reduce the incidence of out-of-wedlock pregnancies; 
and (4) encourage the formation and maintenance of two-parent families. It does not take a 
critical analysis of any kind to see the carry-over of family values rhetoric in these goals. 
Government intervention in and promotion of marriage and marital childbearing behavior is 
on its face paternalistic and patriarchal. Moreover, the use of the word “parents” in the 





much a lone newspaper or magazine article or radio or television transcript explicitly 
identified a single father being dependent on welfare. A few male welfare recipients were 
quoted throughout the sample of texts, but not one was identified explicitly as a single father 
in the same way women were identified as single mothers.  
 The observation that welfare policies, and TANF in particular, function as tools of 
moral regulation on behalf of the state is not original. In particular, legal scholars Gwendolyn 
Mink (2001) and Anna Marie Smith (2002, 2007) have both argued fervently that welfare 
policies subject recipients, specifically women, to a series of requirements aimed at correcting 
what is viewed as deviant behavior and bringing them in line with patriarchal social norms.  
In exchange for welfare, TANF recipients must surrender or compromise their 
vocational freedom, sexual privacy, and reproductive choice, as well as the right to 
make intimate decisions about how to be and raise a family. As TANF’s foremost 
objective is to restore the patriarchal family, numerous provisions promote marriage 
and paternal headship while frustrating childbearing and child-raising rights outside 
of marriage. (Mink, 2001, p. 79) 
Mink (2001) criticized TANF’s substitution of employment for marriage and the 
assumption that “fathers are the best substitute for welfare” (p. 81). She also railed against 
the claim that TANF work requirements help mothers regain self-sufficiency: “Far from 
‘ending dependency,’ the TANF regime actually fosters poor mothers’ dependence on 
individual men” (p. 81), thereby upholding the heteropatriarchal societal norms most 
beneficial to the status quo. Smith (2002, 2007) furthered these arguments, focusing most 
acutely on the nature of welfare reform’s sexual regulation provisions via what she dubbed 
“paternafare” (i.e., child support), family caps, family planning, and child relinquishment 





While my examination of moral regulatory discourse was heavily informed and 
influenced by the works of Mink (2001) and Smith (2002, 2007) insofar as I accepted their 
arguments and resultant conclusions, my focus here is not on the moral underpinnings of 
specific statutory or regulatory language. Rather, I turn my attention to the ways in which 
those moral underpinnings are reflected—if they are reflected at all—in media discourse 
about TANF and the PRWORA. Using the conclusions of Mink and Smith about 
PRWORA’s infringements of poor mothers’ rights as a starting point, the following section 
scrutinizes media discourse regarding child support collection and sexual regulation.  
It is worth noting here that, because a primary feature of TANF was marriage 
promotion, and the next chapter looks at the implementation of the Healthy Marriage 
Initiative under President George W. Bush in the early 2000s, there is substantial overlap 
between these two discussions. However, the analytical timeframes and texts are different, as 
were the sociopolitical climates under which the discourses about these subjects occurred. 
Welfare reform took place under a Democratic president, during a strong economy with low 
unemployment rates, and after a period of decline in teen births (Kost & Henshaw, 2014). 
Marriage promotion, on the other hand, was the project of a Republican president in the 
wake of 9/11, amid growing unemployment rates and a 0.5% decrease in GDP (Roberts, 
2009).  
The Structural and Individualistic View of Poverty  
In order to properly contextualize moral regulatory discourse and the arguments of 
Smith (2002, 2007) and Mink (2001), it is first necessary to understand the two dominant 
competing theoretical perspectives in discourses about welfare and single mothers.  
Participation in capitalist economic behavior has long been a hallmark of the 





character has been substantially documented (Handler & Hasenfeld, 1991; Katz, 2013; 
Romano 2018). There are multiple competing theories about the root causes of poverty, but 
the current capitalist American dogma has fixed blame squarely on the backs of the poor 
themselves (with a few rare caveats, generally revolving around deservedness, such as in the 
case of widows and the disabled). For the most part, reliance on others for economic 
support is a sign of personal failure, weakness, laziness, or, according to some fringe 
theories, even biological inferiority (Herrnstein & Murray, 1994). These explanations, 
according to Royce (2009),  
rely on an individualistic perspective of poverty which view poverty as a result of 
individual weaknesses, failings, and inadequacies. People are poor for some 
combination of the following reasons: they are deficient in intelligence, competence, 
and ability; they are insufficiently experienced, skilled and educated; they lack 
ambition, determination, and perseverance; they have poor attitudes, motivations 
and values; they make bad choices and engage in self-destructive behaviors; and they 
are unable or unwilling to exert the necessary effort or take advantage of the 
opportunities available to them. Poverty is an individual problem, according to this 
perspective it is a by-product of the characteristics and behaviors of the poor . . . . 
The individualistic perspective explains poverty mainly by reference to the choices 
and actions of the poor. They drop out of high school; they reject marriage and 
sexual monogamy; they have children out of wedlock; they join gangs, do drugs, and 
commit crimes and they refuse to stick with a job. From the individualistic 
perspective, poor people are victims of their own bad decisions and lifestyle 





Conversely, a structural perspective of poverty attributes the condition to a variety of 
political, economic, cultural, and social forces outside the immediate control of any one 
individual; instead, it examines the actions of cultural, political, and economic elites who 
make decisions about welfare legislation, taxation, corporate profit structures, and job 
creation. A structural perspective looks at, according to Royce (2009), 
a shortage of jobs that pay a living wage; a corporate profit-making strategy focused 
on the reduction of labor costs; a governing system that caters to the concerns of the 
wealthy while ignoring the interests of low-income families; a political and media 
rhetoric that variously disparages the poor, treats them as objects of charity, and 
renders them invisible; and the persistence of discrimination, residential segregation, 
and social isolation. Poverty is a social problem, according to this perspective; it is a 
by-product of the distribution of power and the organization of society. (p. 14)  
In line with the critical perspective discussed in Chapter 1, this portion of the project 
assumes a structuralist perspective of poverty. Just as structuralism views social issues like 
poverty as the product of systems of power, critical theory understands traditional mass 
media as a reinforcer and maintainer of power systems. In this view, media function  
not as an autonomous organizational system, but as a set of institutions closely 
linked to the dominant power structure through ownership, legal regulation, the 
values implicit in the professional ideologies in media, and the structures and 
ideological consequences of prevailing modes of news gathering. (Gurevitch, 
Bennett, Curran, & Woollacott, 1982, p. 11) 
Therefore, the ways in which moral regulatory discourses about mothers on TANF and 





implemented welfare policy and sought public support for their positions, and also for the 
women and children whose lives were directly affected by these policies.  
Extant literature on media representations of the poor, specifically of welfare 
mothers, is too copious to summarize (see in particular Bullock et al., 2001; Fineman, 1991; 
Gilens, 1996, 2004; Gilliam, 1999; Huda, 2001; Katz, 2013; Kinnick, 2009; Misra, Moller, & 
Karides, 2003; Romano, 2018; Williams, 1995), but studies overwhelmingly indicate that 
welfare recipients, single mothers generally and single mothers of color in particular, are 
viewed with disdain and even disgust (Hancock, 2004). Interestingly, African Americans, 
according to sociologist Michele Lamont, are more accepting of the poor, “offering 
structural, rather than individual, explanations of poverty” (2000, p. 4). Moreover, African 
Americans, while still buying into the so-called “American dream,” are more critical of the 
middle-class values White Americans hold so dear. The imposition of these bourgeoisie 
values by both government and other sociocultural forces are particularly problematic for 
low-income Black mothers. They had to contend with not only patriarchal legislation that 
punished them for rejecting marriage to men they did not wish to spend their lives with, 
having children out of wedlock, and seeking public assistance to raise those children, but 
they must also wrestle with a salient, pervasive cultural discourse that categorized them as 
lazy even when the economic realities of working dictated it was in their best interest to 
receive government welfare benefits.  
This struggle played out in media discourse about welfare reform in a couple of 
important ways. First, the use of the explicitly moralizing terms “dependency,” “self-
esteem,” “self-sufficiency,” “opportunity,” “personal responsibility,” and “illegitimacy” was 
extremely common, and not just because two of them were in the title of the legislation. 





mothers on welfare. Some terms like “dependency” are so salient that studies have 
specifically examined their use in the context of welfare reform legislation. Fraser and 
Gordon traced the genealogy of the use of the word “dependency” in welfare discourse 
(1994a) and critiqued its use in political discourse in order to challenge the prevailing 
authoritative ideology (1994b).  
Second, the words of welfare mothers were sometimes used both to impugn their 
own moral standing and to push back against the regulatory efforts of the state. In some 
cases, mothers were depicted as flippant, dismissive, defiant, obstinate, or entitled. This was 
particularly striking in a 1995 CBS News exchange (Smith, 1995) between reporter Harry 
Smith and welfare recipient Renee Piko. (Reproduced here in the style of the transcript for 
clarity): 
SMITH: Renee Pico, who is 44-years-old, has been on public aid for 20 years. 
She receives $824 a month in AFDC for her six children. People 
would sit here and watch this and say “What is this woman with a 
college education…” 
PIKO:  …doing on welfare? 
SMITH:  …the six kids? 
PIKO:  Yes.  
SMITH:  One dad, two dads? 
PIKO:  Five fathers.  
SMITH:  Five fathers? 
PIKO:  Yes. 
SMITH:  Any money from any of these guys? 





SMITH:  Why don’t you stop having kids? 
PIKO:  Because I love children, and I was not going to limit what I wanted 
just because I didn’t have the money.  
In other cases, however, mothers worked to position themselves rhetorically as 
members of the “deserving poor” who faced insurmountable structural and institutional 
barriers to economic self-sufficiency, and whose use of welfare was a byproduct of forces 
beyond their individual control. Harry Smith, the reporter who interviewed Renee Piko 
quoted above, also interviewed 27-year-old divorced single mother of two, Aline Nunes, in 
the same story. Unlike Renee Piko, Nunes described her experience on welfare as more of a 
necessary evil rather than a subsidy for her lifestyle, calling it a last resort. (Reproduced in the 
style of a transcript for clarity): 
SMITH:  Talk of reform on Capitol Hill has her scared. What would happen to 
you if, two years from today, they said ‘No more AFDC, nothing, 
you’re on your own. Have a nice life.’ What would happen to you and 
your kids? 
NUNES:  I would be homeless, first of all, because I live month to month. I 
don’t have a savings account. I don’t even have a checking account, 
because there’s no money left over. I have a box back in my back 
room that I’ve tried to save canned goods and I’ve tried to save 
beans, because it’s coming. If, in the 100 days, if they actually pass 
this, it’s coming. And with these institution orphanages they’re 
talking about, my children would be ripped from me., which would 
leave me destitute. I would just—I would want—if they took my 





live anymore, and I would just pretty much want to throw my hands 
up and give up at that point.  
Nunes’s account of her life and the challenges welfare reform posed to her and her family 
was not uncommon. Women feared for their futures, and their children’s futures, under the 
new reforms.  
At times, special interest commentators and journalistic narrative also helped bolster 
welfare mothers’ credibility and arguments. In other cases, mothers were cast in a morally 
redemptive frame that constructed them as grateful recipients of the requirements of reform. 
And not all single mothers saw themselves as prisoners of the system. Some mothers pushed 
back against the depiction that they were lazy or unwilling to work or that their childcare 
responsibilities did not count as work, and they highlighted the problems of workplace 
inflexibility, lack of childcare, transportation issues, low wages, and inaccessibility of 
healthcare benefits as reasons for cycling through jobs or not working at all. This was 
evident in a September 23, 1995, CNN report “Welfare Mothers Say Welfare Is Not the 
Easy Way Out” by reporter Joie Chen (Chen & Wenge, 1995). Chen interviewed two 
women, Theresa Funiciello, a former welfare recipient and single mother-turned-writer, and 
Bianca Vela, a current welfare recipient. In the report, Chen addressed the stereotypes 
welfare recipients faced and how the women felt about the current system and the proposed 
reforms (segment reproduced here in transcript style for clarity):  
CHEN:  What is the biggest misconception, Bianca, in your mind to what 
people think about people on welfare? 
BIANCA VELA: There are so many of them and to pick one of them it’s really hard, 
but I- probably the one that jumped right out at me is that welfare 





talking a-I think- I hope I’m saying it right but they are saying that 
‘they’re talking a free ride of taxpayer’s back.’ That really burns me.   
CHEN:  Theresa, one of the senators who spoke on our program earlier today 
said it was the easy way out. Do you see it as the easy way out? 
THERESA FUNICIELLO: Anybody who’s ever had to raise a child ought to know 
that it, by itself, is work. If those people had to do it with something 
like $373 a month in this given year, they would find out how hard 
that really is. There’s nothing easy about being on welfare. And, in 
fact, for many women a job outside the home is a much easier deal. 
We are worried in this country about what’s happening to children 
who have no adult caretakers. Maybe we ought to be asking questions 
about whether $373 a month is a cheaper way is to go if that’s all that 
we’re concerned about. But we really ought to be concerned about 
the wellbeing of children—how they are and whether or not anyone’s 
watching them.  
These mothers spoke eloquently about the issues they had experienced, what they 
saw as the structural deficiencies of the system, and what impact they thought reforms would 
have. Neither woman was in favor of the changes proposed by the 1996 legislation, but they 
did agree there should be some changes in the way the system was set up, primarily because 
so many of the reforms being proposed did not take into account the lived experiences of so 
many of the people it would impact.  
TANF as a Tool of Moral Regulation 
Referring once more to Hunt’s (1999) framework for moral regulation projects, in 





generally), since the PRWORA was crafted by the federal government and handed down to 
individual states, which could then deploy the legislation in a variety of ways. While states 
were given wide latitude to implement their own policies, nearly all enacted similar 
provisions that functioned to restore the patriarchal family (Mink, 2001). The explicit targets 
of moral regulation in this context were welfare recipients broadly and single mothers on 
welfare specifically. Much of the statutory language of the PRWORA was aimed specifically 
at single mothers, and the effects of reforms were felt most acutely by this population. The 
tactics used by the state included the construction of unambiguously moralizing, often 
punitive, legislation, and the enforcement of that legislation in various ways that specifically 
targeted single mothers on welfare, but not so much fathers or “intact,” traditional families.  
Mink (2001) identified several interconnected components of TANF and the 
PRWORA that specifically sought to limit the rights, behaviors, and personal autonomy of 
poor mothers. First, TANF restricted vocational liberty by forcing mothers to work for no 
pay in some cases, take jobs with sub-livable wages and no benefits, and with no regard for 
working conditions. Second, family freedom was restricted by TANF provisions that forced 
mothers to yield some parental rights to fathers by way of child support payments, visitation, 
or partial custody; benefits could also be reduced or eliminated if a mother cohabited with a 
male partner or got married. Third, TANF policies constituted a violation of sexual privacy 
and reproductive rights. Mothers were often required to name their sexual partners in order 
to identify the biological fathers of their children, and family cap regulations punished and 
deterred women from having additional children while on TANF. Another aspect of TANF 
policy provided five states with so-called “illegitimacy bonuses” if they reduced nonmarital 
births without raising the abortion rate. States therefore discouraged conception by offering 





education programs funded by TANF money were required to teach women “not to have 
sex, let alone babies, until they are economically self-sufficient” (Mink, 2001 p. 86). Program 
funds were often diverted to religious organizations that imparted their own dogmas. 
Further, statutory rape prosecutions were invigorated under TANF, which assumes teenage 
sex is non-consensual, thereby reinforcing the abstinence-only message with the threat of 
criminal prosecution. Unmarried teenage mothers were further punished by TANF 
provisions that eliminated their access to benefits, required them to live at home, and 
mandated school attendance.  
Discourses about these moralizing tactics were both generated by and circulated via 
media, which was skeptical, even critical, of some components (like the reality of TANF 
work requirements and cuts to food stamp benefits) but uncritically accepting of others. One 
example of this uncritical acceptance is the media’s treatment—or more accurately lack of 
treatment—of PRWORA’s more stringent paternity establishment and child support 
enforcement requirements.  
An August 23, 1996, New York Times article outlined the impacts of welfare reform 
on specific segments of the TANF receiving population. Under the heading of “Missing 
Father” the article described the effect of TANF on single mother families:  
A woman will be required to provide information about the father of her child as a 
condition of receiving welfare. If she does not cooperate with state authorities, she 
will lose at least 25% of her family’s welfare benefit. Using a national database, the 
Federal Government will help states locate the father and force him to pay child 
support. States may require genetic testing of the child and parents in some cases. 
(Shaver, 1996, p. A22) 





collect child support from an uncooperative parent was at worst an unconstitutional breach 
of Fourth Amendment rights, and at best an overreach of government authority into the 
realm of bodily autonomy. Legal scholar Anna Marie Smith (2007) argued that these kinds of 
paternafare measures extended into the realm of biopolitics, and consequently functioned as 
virtual 18-year prison sentences for poor mothers, children, and biological fathers. The 
paternafare system doled out material and symbolic rewards whenever  
a member of the dyad serves as a State informant against the other. The custodial 
mother is pressed to help the State locate the payer and to report to the State any 
evidence suggesting that he is concealing income from the paternafare system. 
Insofar as the payer is encouraged by the paternafare system to regard himself as the 
children’s bona fide father—regardless of the custodial mother’s wishes, his actual 
parenting record, and in some cases, the needs of the children themselves—he is 
given every opportunity to take revenge by suing for visitation and custody or 
advancing damaging allegation of abuse and neglect against her. (Smith, 2007, p. 74).  
Smith (2007) further stated that while the act of collecting a DNA sample was, by all 
accounts relatively non-invasive in and of itself, and a mother’s consent was required, 
mothers who relied on welfare benefits to survive and support their children were 
nonetheless coerced into giving consent since TANF, unlike AFDC, allowed states to delay 
the distribution of benefits for children until the custodial mother could demonstrate her 
cooperation with support enforcement agencies. “The single mother knows that if she does 
not comply with the paternafare system, her children will go hungry; she is hardly in a 
position to walk away” (Smith, 2007, p. 121).  
Given the coercive and personally invasive nature of these mandatory child support 





intense media scrutiny. (Just imagine middle-class White men and women being subject to 
the same measure for social security or Medicare. The horror! The outrage!) However, this 
was not the case at all. Little media attention was paid to expanded child support 
cooperation requirements, and in the limited circumstances in which it was discussed, most 
discourse was primarily favorable toward it. In December 1996, New York Times welfare 
reporter Jason DeParle crafted a 5500-word feature about David Ellwood, a professor of 
public policy and dean of Harvard’s John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard 
University. Ellwood was an unwitting architect of the welfare reform package passed by 
Clinton after his 1988 book Poor Support was picked up—and distorted—by reform 
proponents. Ellwood ultimately opposed many PRWORA provisions, but one thing he was 
strongly in favor of was guaranteed child support because “one parent shouldn’t be expected 
to do the work of two” (DeParle, 1996).  
The few stories that did highlight child support measures were uncritical in their 
stance, making no mention of the invasion of mothers’ sexual histories, bodily autonomy, 
family structure, or their desires to be involved in any capacity with the biological fathers of 
their children. Even DeParle’s (1996) deep dive into Ellwood’s original blueprint for reforms 
did not question whether mothers would want this level of intrusion into their lives. 
Moreover, mothers’ voices were all but absent from discourse about child support 
enforcement. One 1996 New York Times article (Kilborn, 1996, p. A12) focused on the 
elimination of pass-throughs, which were small bonus payments of about $50 a month 
provided to mothers who cooperated with child support officials under AFDC. Per the 
article, this bonus was created by Congress in the 1980s to reward single mothers when 
fathers paid child support. The aim was to encourage mothers’ cooperation with state 





recoup some of the cost of the mothers’ welfare benefits. Under AFDC, the federal 
government paid between 50% and 80% of the cost of these pass-throughs, but TANF 
eliminated that budget. Further, instead of using a carrot approach to entice mothers into 
cooperation, the states switched to using a stick—and rather large one—choosing to reduce 
the welfare benefits of uncooperative mothers by up to 25%. This article did not quote any 
mothers or fathers affected by this provision, opting instead to interview policy experts and 
think tank researchers.  
 Another story focused on child support collection under TANF ran on ABC News 
in February 1995, more than a year before the formal implementation of TANF and passage 
of the PRWORA. This story is remarkable in its candor regarding the coercive nature of 
some enforcement strategies. While interviewing a new father and his 16-year-old girlfriend 
in the hospital, reporter Michele Norris’s voiceover stated, “This is perhaps the best time to 
get unmarried dads to sign legal forms that establish paternity and their financial 
responsibilities to their children” (Norris, 1995). A hospital representative was then 
immediately featured, saying, “It’s the prime time because they’re still goo-goo eyed over the 
baby’s birth and at that time they’re willing to sign.” By approaching new parents in the 
hospital and asking them to sign legally binding documents, the state was unscrupulously 
manipulating both mothers and men into signing legally binding, long-term commitments to 
one another.  
The same story later discusses the Clinton administration’s strategies for imposing 
tougher penalties on “deadbeat parents,” including measures to revoke driver’s and other 
professional licenses from parents who refused to make payments. “Both parties want 
fathers to know that even if they break the emotional bonds with their children, the financial 





suspending the professional and driver’s licenses of men who did not pay effectively 
removed their ability to work and potentially pay support in the future.  
  Mink (2001) contended that TANF, in particular its child support enforcement 
components, impeded “poor mother’s rights to form and sustain their own families—as well 
as to avoid or exit from untenable relationships with men . . . ” (p. 80). She argued that these 
requirements constituted an invasion of sexual privacy that only poor, unmarried mothers 
were subject to because they were poor and unmarried.  
These provisions single out nonmarital mothers for scrutiny and punishment, as 
paternity is automatically established at birth if a mother is married. A mother who is 
not married, does not know who her child’s biological father is, or who does not 
want anything to do with him must nevertheless provide welfare officials with 
information about him. (p. 85) 
Discussion about single mothers’ wishes regarding child support payments or, more 
importantly, maintaining state-mandated financial relationships with their children’s father(s) 
was wholly absent. Also absent was discourse regarding the so-called “family cap,” or limits 
on benefits for women who had additional children while receiving TANF. The obvious 
purpose of such a cap was to discourage TANF recipients from bearing children. The 
equally obvious assumptions underpinning the family cap rule were that welfare mothers 
were either unfit and should not be having more children in the first place, or they were 
promiscuous money-grubbers having babies to increase their welfare checks.    
Chapter Summary 
Taken together, the components of TANF and the PRWORA function to openly 
limit the sexual and bodily autonomy of poor unmarried mothers. The legislation assumed 





is as if affluence was the lone yardstick by which their fitness as human beings had been 
measured, and they had no chance of measuring up. Thus, the state took it upon itself to 
impose restrictions on nearly every aspect of their lives, and the media did little to critique 
these conditions beyond discussing the difficulties of putting welfare recipients to work en 
masse. It is not as though the media were unaware of the invasive provisions of TANF—
they were printed in black and white in the pages of newspapers. But public sentiment 
toward welfare reform was generally positive, and sentiment toward welfare recipients was 
assuredly not positive.  
There are a few likely explanations for why journalists or media entities writ large 
neglected and ignored other intrusive elements of the PRWORA like child support 
enforcement and family caps. First, men’s participation in the lives of their children was, and 
still is, seen as positive both for the men and for the children. The term “deadbeat dad” is 
widely used to refer to men who do not provide financial support to their children. The 
payment of child support is a natural extension of that paternal responsibility. It is also the 
case that no mothers in the sample I analyzed for this chapter, or any chapter, protested or 
criticized child support enforcement procedures. There did not seem to be any pushback 
from mothers regarding this measure. However, I surmise this may be because they were 
unware of the extent to which their bodily autonomy could be invaded, and/or they were 
never asked their opinions about it.  
Second, the lack of newsroom diversity might have stifled any attempts at covering 
the more controversial gender-specific parts of TANF legislation. Women, minorities, and 
women minorities have long been grossly underrepresented in both television and print 
newsrooms for decades. A 2018 report issued by the Women’s Media Center found that 





news staff, and 6.2% of local radio staff (Gray, et al., 2018). This lack of diversity likely 
resulted in—intentionally or not—largely whitewashed coverage of TANF and its 
consequences for poor women, particularly poor women of color. Despite one’s best 
journalistic efforts, it can be impossible to fully understand the systematic, structural, and 
institutional barriers placed upon poor communities. True, the middle and upper classes are 
subject to state regulation in daily life, but the poor experience a level of state scrutiny and 
intervention that middle- and upper-class Americans would never tolerate. It is reasonable, 
then, that journalists, White male journalists in particular, who have never experienced 
poverty would not be in a position to thoroughly scrutinize and critique the state policies 
governing the poor communities they were trying to cover. Moreover, documenting the 
lived experiences of a community from which one is so far removed is extraordinarily 
challenging and time-consuming. Reporters must gain the trust of a community, but 
journalism is a deadline-driven business where time is both money and of the essence, so 
dedicating precious resources to long-form, deep-dive pieces on the structural misalignment 
between TANF and say, civil rights, was likely not a high priority for the White male news 
directors and editors of the nation’s top newspapers and television news programs.  
Third, the most formidable and widespread challenge of the PRWORA and new 
TANF reforms was certainly the placement of millions of unskilled workers into jobs. In 
that way, it makes sense that media outlets would focus coverage on that particular 
component of the legislation. However, as I will explore in the next chapter, the objectives 








CHAPTER 5. THE UNFINISHED BUSINESS OF WELFARE REFORM 
Rather than simply helping single-parent households figure out a way to 
generate earnings in the absence of a father, state reforms must find ways to 
bring more fathers back into (or into for the first time) the lives of their 
children. 
 
The problem is that strategies for promoting fatherhood and marriage are, to 
a very large extent, in conflict with those that seek to help single mothers 
achieve self-sufficiency through work. Indeed, a welfare system that helps 
single mothers become employed, but ignores the need to promote 
fatherhood and marriage, may only lead to more single parenting by mothers.  




Shortly after winning his second term in office, President George W. Bush and his 
administration presented the Deficit Reduction Act (DRA) of 2005 to Congress. This 
legislation was, on its face, a routine federal budget proposal—mostly unremarkable. Except, 
buried on page 133 of the 182-page document, under the innocuous heading “Title VII --
Human Resources and Other Provisions” was the allocation of $150 million federal dollars a 
year over five years for “grants for healthy marriage promotion and responsible fatherhood.”  
Dubbed the Healthy Marriage and Responsible Fatherhood initiative (HMRF), these 
programs were functionally separate but two sides of the same coin; the Healthy Marriage 
Initiative (HMI) programs would focus on marriage education between low-income couples, 
while the Responsible Fatherhood programs were aimed at helping poor fathers improve job 
and education prospects, as well as parenting and communication skills. All this sounded 
harmless enough. What could possibly be bad about the government encouraging healthy 
marriages and involved fathers? As time would eventually reveal, quite a bit.  
This chapter examines news media coverage of the HMRF and related state marriage 
and fatherhood promotion programs during the George W. Bush administration from 2001 





stories about the HMRF. In particular, I am interested in the responses of single mothers 
and their allies to these programs, as well as the ways in which marriage promotion efforts 
functioned as a mechanism of moral regulation and was forced upon (via policy changes) 
and rhetorically “sold” to single mothers and the public. I begin with an overview of the 
sociocultural development of American marriage, followed by a review of the two 
predominant but competing sociological views of marriage and family being articulated via 
media discourse at the time. Next, a more thorough explanation of the development of the 
HMRF initiative and associated policies is presented to contextualize the scope and nature of 
its resultant state-level programs and their various impacts. Finally, I analyze a wide variety 
of news media sources, including traditional newspaper articles, TV and radio transcripts, 
magazine articles, and their related social media counterparts to determine the salient 
discursive themes and perspectives being presented in public discourse about the HMRF and 
its goals.   
The Healthy Marriage and Responsible Fatherhood Initiative 
Heading up these programs was Wade F. Horn, Ph.D., Assistant Secretary of 
Children and Families and the first president of the National Fatherhood Initiative (NFI), a 
nonprofit organization founded to end “father-absence.” By today’s standards, Horn, a child 
psychologist by training, sounds much like a men’s rights advocate. Many of the policies and 
rhetoric he advanced early in his position were little more than thinly veiled attacks on 
women’s civil rights. Prior to his appointment in the George W. Bush administration, Horn 
was promulgating the restructuring of public aid to favor married couples over singles, 
encouraging states to redirect TANF funds toward job-placement services for low-income 
men, advocating for “aggressively publicizing the advantage of adoption,” and using block 





(Horn & Bush, 1997). Suffice to say, Horn was not an advocate for single mothers and was 
wholly disinclined to use his position to help unburden them. 
According to the Administration for Children and Families (Healthy Marriage, n.d.), 
the Healthy Marriage Initiative (HMI) allowed for federal and/or state funds to be used for a 
wide array of marriage promotion activities, including: 
• Public advertising campaigns on the value of healthy marriages and the skills needed 
to increase marital stability and the health of the marriage 
• Education in high schools on the value of healthy marriages, healthy relationship 
skills, and budgeting 
• Marriage education, marriage skills, and relationship skills programs, which may 
include parenting skills, financial management, conflict resolution, and job and career 
advancement, for non-married pregnant women and non-married expectant fathers 
• Premarital education and marriage skills training for engaged couples and for couples 
or individuals interested in marriage 
• Marriage enhancement and marriage skills training programs for married couples 
• Divorce reduction programs that teach healthy relationship skills 
• Marriage mentoring programs that use married couples as role models and mentors 
in at-risk communities 
• Programs to reduce the disincentives to marriage in means-tested aid programs, if 
offered in conjunction with any activity described above 
• Research on the benefits of healthy marriages and healthy marriage education 
• Technical assistance to grantees who are implementing any of the above activities to 





Marriage promotion was indeed part of the initial statutory language of the 
PRWORA. The opening lines of the 1996 legislation refer explicitly to marriage, proclaiming 
that “Marriage is the foundation of a successful society,” and that “Marriage is an essential 
institution of a successful society which promotes the interests of children.” Moreover, as 
discussed in the previous chapter, three of the four articulated goals of TANF refer, at least 
implicitly, to marriage. This made the diversion of TANF funds to marriage and fatherhood 
promotion programs an option for states pre-HMI, but few states had yet to do much in this 
regard because it was not a particularly popular move fiscally or socially, but also because 
states were too overwhelmed by implementing the stringent work requirements of TANF to 
be bothered with marriage programs.  
President Bush’s supporters immediately applauded the HMRF, arguing it would 
help solidify his reputation as a “compassionate conservative.” Not only was it a relatively 
inexpensive proposal, they said, it was a move toward the conservative family values his 
administration was striving to foster. Wade Horn was a near-constant presence in media 
coverage about the HMRF, and his attempts to frame the initiatives as educational 
opportunities were skillful. In a January 22, 2004, NPR story (Conan, 2004), Horn answered 
questions from listeners about the goals and objectives of the HMRF (quotes are presented 
in transcript style for clarity): 
MARK (Caller): Hi. Thank you very much. And Dr. Horn, my question is: Why is it 
that our federal government feels like they need to intervene or 
encourage something that’s essentially a personal choice that people 
can decide to make or not to make? I mean, what is the precedent for 
this? And, you know, is there any kind of—you know, is there some 





HORN:  Well again, this proposal is not about interfering with the free choice 
of couples to get married. That’s completely up to the couple. I am 
conservative, I believe in limited government, and I think that 
government ought not to get into the business of influencing the 
decision of individual couples about whether or not to get married. 
That’s up to them.  
. . . 
MARK:  Well, excuse me. If I may interrupt, the federal government coming 
out and making a statement is certainly not forcing the public to do 
one thing or another, but it's a little bit more than encouragement as 
well, I think. It's a fairly powerful statement when, you know, the 
folks that we vote for come out and say, 'Well, we're going to help 
you make this decision, and if you make this decision, we're going to 
help you do it better.' I also don't know, you know, what sort of 
validity there is in our federal government telling us how we're going 
to have a better marriage. I think that that's a deeply personal thing 
that may have to do with faith or it may have to do with something 
else, but it's not a governmental thing. It has nothing to do with 
running the country. And it seems like... 
HORN:  Well, one could also... 
MARK:  ...we're doing less of running the country and more of offering ways 
for people to live a life that reflects some people in the government. 
HORN:  Well, one could also argue that parenting is a personal relationship 





people or not helping people or helping people to become better, 
more effective parents. And yet we've been providing parenting 
education subsidized by the federal government for decades now, 
and I don't hear a whole lot of cry, you know, in the public to get rid 
of parenting education. 
On the other hand, critics of HMRF programs were quick to point out what they 
viewed were the myriad problems associated with a governmental role in marriage 
promotion, including an increased risk of domestic violence, a shifting of scarce resources 
away from women’s economic empowerment toward marriage promotion, using marriage as 
a poverty-reduction mechanism, and a perpetuation of the idea that women, particularly 
single mothers, were to blame for poverty in the United States (Fineman, Mink, & Smith, 
2003). In the same NPR story cited above (Conan, 2004), family historian Stephanie Coontz 
provided a counter-narrative to Horn’s description of the program. In response to a 
comment from a caller about promoting marriage in the Black community, Coontz replied: 
. . . I am in favor of good marriages, too, but I think there's a lot of naiveté here that 
is being played upon in this. What about the people that we get married and then get 
divorced two or three years down the road? Their kids could be worse off. The 
mothers are more likely to be in poverty if that happens than if they'd never gotten 
married in the first place. We have to think this through more carefully. And I think 
it's being thrown out as a political bone to a particular constituency right now, and 
it's not a really serious, well-thought-out program. 
This sort of back-and-forth played out frequently in media narratives about marriage 
promotion. Wade Horn or other Bush administration proxies sought to frame HMRF 





as a way to strengthen their relationships. Critics of HMRF programs often countered 
Horn’s claims by explaining the ways in which marriage, when not considered carefully, can 
essentially backfire on women, leaving them in dire or dangerous situations.  
Shifting Meaning of Marriage 
Ancient Roman emperor Augustus Gaius Octavius issued a set of laws concerning 
marriage and childbearing in 9 A.D. that, in some ways, bear resemblance to those issued by 
the Bush administration thousands of years later. One such reform, the de maritandis ordinibus, 
was implemented to “encourage marriage by members of various classes of citizens” (Frank, 
1975). The lex Papia-Poppaea outlined a duty to marry among all Roman men 25–60 years of 
age, and Roman women 20–50 years of age. A quota was placed on procreation, and failure 
to bear children was punished by the reduction or elimination of inheritance rights. The lex 
Papia-Poppaea also established relationships between marriage, rank, and status and gave 
preference for political and bureaucratic office to married men with three legitimate children 
(Frank, 1975, p. 45).  
Much like his more contemporary political counterparts, Augustus saw great 
sociopolitical value in marriage, specifically procreation within marriage. As early as the mid-
17th century, colonies were issuing official marriage licenses, and by the mid-19th century, 
state licensure of marriage was common practice. In 1862, marriage was officially declared a 
monogamous institution when President Lincoln banned bigamy (Parker, 2009, and more 
than a century later, the Supreme Court held in Loving v. Virginia, the landmark Supreme 
Court case legalizing interracial marriage, that marriage was one of the “basic civil rights of 
man” and “fundamental to our very existence and survival” (Parker, 2008, p. 495). Currently, 
more than 1,000 federal laws privilege married couples over the unmarried, providing 





benefits, and other rights not conferred to any other status, such as spousal privilege in 
criminal proceedings (DePaulo, 2018).  
Marriage in the United States has undergone some radical cultural transformations 
since settlers brought the tradition first to the American colonies. As historian Stephanie 
Coontz noted in her 2005 treatise on the history of marriage, “for most of history it was 
inconceivable that people would choose their mates on the basis of something as fragile and 
irrational as love and then focus all their sexual, intimate, and altruistic desires on the 
resulting marriage” (Coontz, 2005, p. 15). To be sure, people throughout history have felt 
the same kind of romantic love we experience today, but the mores of those eras did not 
view such intimate connections as necessary or sufficient for the basis of marital unions or 
child-rearing.  
The centrality of marriage to early American family life cannot be understated. It was 
indeed the foundation of colonial society, so much so that laws were passed forbidding 
people to live alone. On one hand, these laws reflect the near impossibility of survival on 
one’s own in an unforgiving environment, but on the other, they also reveal “a moral view 
that the marriage-based family, with the husband at the helm, was the foundation of virtuous 
community” (Cherlin, 2009, p. 41). However, this does not mean married couples formed 
their unions as a result of romantic attraction. Prior to the 20th century, spousal selection in 
the United States was based more on pragmatism, utility, and location than anything else.  
Rural men and women needed competent, hardworking partners to make a go of 
farming. City dwellers needed a marriage in which the husband was a steady wage 
earner and the wife raised children, sewed clothes, and perhaps earned some money 
by taking on borders and lodgers. Without enough help from your spouse, you could 





way, but they believed that following the lure of romance and sex would lead to poor 
choices they couldn’t afford to make. (Cherlin, 2009, p. 63) 
As the economy shifted from agricultural to industrial, more people moved from 
rural to urban areas, and farming as a family business declined. Child mortality rates also 
declined, as education reforms and laws against child labor were developed. Families began 
having fewer children, who lived longer. Men and women started to realize they could spend 
several years together before having children, and many more together once the children 
were grown. These shifts led to what Cherlin (2009) referred to as the “companionate 
marriage,” in which couples formed their unions based on the emotional ties, friendship, 
compatibility, and sexual chemistry. Companionate marriage, put simply, is the type of 
marriage exemplified in classic American television shows like The Adventures of Ozzie and 
Harriet, Leave it to Beaver, and Father Knows Best. But these unions were also paradoxical; a 
love-based relationship presumes partners’ equal status, but the husband-as-breadwinner 
model implies wives’ deference to their husbands, as well as separate roles in the household 
with vastly different degrees of status and influence (Cherlin, 2009).  
 The companionate model of marriage remained the norm until about 1960, when 
marriage developed into more of an exercise in individuality, self-actualization, and personal 
fulfillment. It was at this same time that divorce laws became more liberal, the feminist and 
women’s liberation movements pushed for women’s social equality, and family law began to 
recognize women’s autonomy even within the institution of marriage. Dubbed the 
“individualized marriage” by Cherlin (2009), this type of relationship became disposable 
when it no longer functioned to fulfill both partners. Because women were no longer 
economically dependent upon their husbands’ earnings, a woman had no reason to stay in 





the outcomes of children of divorced couples also began to find that living between two 
separate households or primarily with only one parent (presupposing the receipt of child 
support and continued involvement of the non-custodial parent) did not inherently mean the 
children of divorced parents were doomed to a life of substandard achievement.  
 This, therefore, is the historical context in which the Bush administration found itself 
at the time it proposed the HMRF: marriage rates were down, divorce rates were up, and 
research about children of divorced parents had begun to shift slightly away from the doom-
and-gloom tone of previous decades, although few of these studies were picked up and 
discussed by mainstream media outlets. Welfare reform had succeeded in moving millions of 
previously welfare-dependent women into the labor force, although it had not necessarily 
moved them out of poverty’s grasp. As discussed in the previous chapter, many, if not most, 
of those women still found themselves living at or only slightly above the poverty level and 
reliant upon government subsidized healthcare, childcare, food stamps, and other services. 
The Center for Budget and Policy Priorities issued a report in 2001 claiming that while the 
overall poverty rate had fallen between 1990 and 2000, “those who were poor remained 
poorer than at any time since 1979” (Jaffe & Bazie, 2001, p. 3). Data also indicate that 1990s 
welfare reform had failed to reduce rates of out-of-wedlock childbearing, and unmarried 
women were having children at the same rates as before welfare reform was enacted (Rivers, 
2001).  
Perhaps most notably, these changes were all occurring at the same time gay and 
lesbian couples were beginning to push back against the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) 
signed by Clinton in 1996. The DOMA defined marriage, for federal purposes, as the union 
of one man and one woman as husband and wife, and although a few states had legalized 





All these changes taken together posed a serious threat to the patriarchal, heteronormative 
social order held dear by traditionalists in power at the time. The HMRF initiatives proposed 
by the Bush administration were one way to continue reinforcing the rhetoric of family 
values while bulwarking the government’s bottom line. Poor people, particularly single 
mothers and their children, are expensive to take care of, and the Bush administration’s 
assumption, even if they publicly stated to the contrary, was that marriage functioned as a de 
facto anti-poverty program. It made sense then, in their view, to promote marriage as a way 
to both strengthen families and reduce spending on social safety net programs.  
Bush’s Marriage Promotion Agenda 
 From the beginning of his administration, President Bush was interested in bringing 
marriage and family to the forefront of American public policy. He used the 1996 welfare 
reauthorization bill as an opportunity to do just that. The result was Working Toward 
Independence, a proposal presented to the 107th Congress in which the president and his 
advisors sought to increase work requirements for TANF recipients and rearticulate the 
initially stated goals of TANF to more explicitly promote marriage. To this end, three 
measures were proposed. First, TANF goals would be clarified and include specific 
references to healthy marriage and responsible fatherhood. Second, a funding commitment 
of $300 million annually would allow states to design and implement programs designed to 
promote responsible fatherhood and marriage. Third, Bush’s proposal required states to 
devise metrics against which the success of their family formation efforts could be measured 
(Koons, 2004).  
 In early 2003, the House reauthorized TANF in H.R. 4, titled the Personal 
Responsibility, Work and Family Promotion act of 2003. This legislation included many of 





combination of marriage and fatherhood promotion efforts and research grants. Several 
months later, the Senate Finance Committee approved the Personal Responsibility and 
Individual Development for Everyone Act, which allocated $1.875 billion over five years to 
programs similar to those proposed in H.R. 4 (Koons, 2004). As is typical with congressional 
proceedings, the two chambers could not agree, and the proverbial TANF can was kicked 
down the road several times via temporary extensions until the innocuous-sounding Deficit 
Reduction Act of 2005 was ultimately passed by the 109th Congress (Congressional 
Research Service, 2007). Although the name of the DRA, as discussed in the introduction to 
this chapter, lacks the moralistic undertones of its welfare-reauthorization bill predecessors, 
it was certainly not lacking potency. 
 One change in policy between the 1996 welfare reform and the 2005 reauthorization 
is the way single-parent, cohabiting, and married families are treated under TANF guidelines. 
Both proponents and critics of welfare reforms have long pointed to so-called “marriage 
penalties” in TANF that actively discourage marriage among welfare recipients by reducing 
benefits or eliminating TANF eligibility altogether if a couple marries. Painting a 
comprehensive picture of these changes and their effects is tremendously complex due to 
state-by-state variance in policies. Such a review is also unnecessary to situate the current 
analysis, but a brief explanation of the marriage penalty is useful in contextualizing media 
discourse about marriage promotion and fatherhood programs.  
When a man is present in the household, TANF programs nationwide base benefit 
eligibility not on marital status per se, but on the biological relationship between the man in 
the household and the child(ren). If the male in the household is the biological father of the 
children, programs tend to treat families the same whether the couple is married or 





mother and her children differently (Moffitt, Phelan, & Winkler, 2017). Summarily, if a low-
income mother marries or cohabits with the biological father of at least one of her children, 
both adults’ wages are counted toward the household income, typically resulting in an 
income above the threshold for TANF eligibility. If the mother cohabits with a male who is 
not biologically related to the child(ren) in the household, usually only a portion of his 
income is considered or, depending on the state, not considered at all, in benefit eligibility 
calculations. Moffitt et al. (2017) contended that these regulations ultimately function to 
discourage exactly the types of families the Bush administration sought to promote with the 
HMRF, because while “most welfare-reform elements had no significant effect on women’s 
family structure . . . some work-related waivers and work-related TANF policies increased 
single motherhood and decreased marriage to biological fathers” (p. 34). These policies and 
penalties also alter eligibility for other safety net programs, including SNAP benefits, 
childcare subsidies, Section 8 housing, the earned income tax credit, and Medicaid. 
 Discussion of marriage penalties surfaced occasionally in media discourse about 
welfare and marriage promotion, most often in the context of government efforts to remove 
barriers to marriage for low-income people. This is illustrated in a 2002 USA Today article 
with a pro-marriage promotion stance.  
A single mom with two children who earns $10,000 a year at a minimum wage job 
qualifies for government financial help . . . . But if this woman marries a man who 
also earned $10,000, the couple’s higher combined income would disqualify the 
family from many benefits. Overall, the couple would lose $4 out of every $10 the 
man brought into the home, according to a Brookings Institution analysis. The 
marriage penalty worsens if the mom draws on Medicaid and federal housing help. 





Divergent Perspectives of Marriage 
The ideological underpinnings of both the PRWORA and HMRF are characteristic 
of what Amato, Booth, Johnson, Johnson, and Rogers (2007) referred to as the marital-
decline perspective, a view of marriage espoused by marriage and family scholars who share 
the following basic assumptions about the nature of marriage: 
1. The institution of marriage is weaker now than in the past.  
2. The most important cause of this change is the growing and excessive 
individualism of American Culture.  
3. The declining status of marriage has had negative consequences for adults, 
children, and society in general.  
4. We should initiate steps to strengthen the institution of marriage.  
The push for marriage promotion in this context makes sense—in fact, it is right out of the 
marital-decline playbook.  
In terms of specific policies, advocates of this view have called for public education 
programs focusing on the value of marriage, the introduction of course on 
relationships skills and conflict resolution in school programs, and greater 
government funding for marriage counseling and premarital education services. 
(Amato et al., 2007, p. 6)  
A competing school of thought, referred to by Amato et al. (2007) as the marital-
resilience perspective, views the cultural shift away from marriage quite differently. These 
scholars also share a basic set of assumptions: 






2. Americans have not become excessively individualistic and selfish during the last 
few decades.  
3. Recent changes in marriage and family have had few negative consequences for 
adults, children, or the wider society.  
4. We should support all types of families, not just married heterosexual couples 
with children. 
Those who espoused this view vigorously criticized government interventions into family life 
on the grounds that they upheld antiquated and privileged ideas about family that no longer 
reflect of the diversity of American life. 
Either we can come to grips with the postmodern family condition by accepting the 
end of a singular ideal family and begin to promote better living and spiritual 
conditions for the diverse array of real families we actually inhabit and desire. Or we 
can continue to engage in denial, resistance, displacement, and bad faith, by cleaving 
to a moralistic ideology of the family at the same time that we fail to provide social 
and economic conditions that make life for the modern family or any other kind of 
family viable, let alone dignified and secure. (Stacey, 1996, p. 11) 
Both the “decline” and “resilience” perspectives were represented in media coverage 
about Bush’s marriage promotion programs. Wade Horn and other conservative politicians 
like Rick Santorum, Sam Brownback, and Mike Huckabee (who, in 2005, publicly 
participated in a covenant marriage ceremony with his wife of 31 years) were widely quoted 
discussing the HMRF and its associated state-level programs, often reiterating that they were 
not intended to be coercive but rather to function as educational tools to provide couples 
with the communication and conflict resolution skills necessary to make a marriage work. In 





influencing the decision-making process,” adding that “the initiative is tied to changes in the 
welfare system because low-income people either don’t have money for counseling or such 
programs don’t exist where they live” (Zeller, 2004, p. 3). Even the HMRF’s detractors 
generally agreed that married, two-parent families were good for children and society. What 
they did not agree with was marriage promotion as a matter of policy and the allocation of 
already-scarce government resources for efforts that amounted to “thinly disguised social 
engineering” and “1965-style Great Society liberalism” (Zeller, 2004, p. 3).  
Consistent with the marital-resilience perspective, many critics of the HMRF argued 
that solving more pressing social problems in low-income communities would clear a better 
pathway to marriage for the poor than any government promotion efforts. Leslie Brett, 
executive director of Connecticut’s Permanent Commission on the Status of Women, stated 
in The New York Times that “In order to improve the outcomes for families that do not fit the 
‘ideal’ type . . . we can seek to change and broaden the systems to support more types of 
families, rather than seeking to change the families themselves” (Zeller, 2004, p. 3). This 
opinion was often echoed by low-income people featured in news stories about marriage 
promotion, such as in this exchange:  
Susan Torres, of Cortlandt, said: “Can anybody do something about affordable 
housing? I pay $900 a month for a one bedroom for me and my son. I have nothing 
left to eat with.” Aldo Duarte, 35, gestured to the group of 50 or so men and a 
handful of women who sat at tables, waiting their turn to line up for lunch. “All 
these people need jobs. Better to spend money on getting jobs for all the people out 







A Focus on Fathers 
Fueling HMRF policies were emergent data about the growing class divide in 
marriage. Studies had begun to show that upper- and middle-class women were still getting 
married at roughly the same rates, just later in life, but poor women, particularly poor urban 
women of color, were often eschewing marriage altogether, just not for the reasons many 
politicians proffered. Sociologists Kathryn Edin and Maria Kefalas (2005) meticulously 
documented the lives of several low-income urban single mothers in their book Promises I 
Can Keep: Why Poor Women Put Motherhood Before Marriage. The mothers interviewed by Edin 
and Kefalas indeed wanted to get married, so much so that if and when they finally walked 
down the aisle they wanted their lives to be stable. Marriage is, for them, the icing on the 
cake of an already well-established life.  
. . . these mothers told us repeatedly that they revered marriage and hoped to be 
married themselves one day. Marriage was a dream most still longed for, a luxury 
they hoped to indulge in someday when the time was right, but not generally not 
something they saw happening in the near, or even the foreseeable, future. Most 
middle-class women in their early to mid-twenties, the average age of the mothers we 
spoke to, would no doubt say the same, but their attitudes about childbearing would 
contrast sharply with those of our respondents. While the poor women we 
interviewed saw marriage as a luxury, something they aspired to but feared they 
might never achieve, they judged children to be a necessity, an absolutely essential 
part of a young woman’s life, the chief source of identify and meaning. (Edin & 
Kefalas, 2005, p. 6) 
The reverence for marriage and rationale for putting it off so long, or even forever, makes 





intensely apprehensive of the consequences marriage might have on their autonomy and 
independence.   
A young mother often fears marriage will mean a loss of control—she believes that 
saying “I do” will suddenly transform her man into an authoritarian head of the 
house who insists on making all the decisions, who think that he “owns” her. Having 
her own earning and assets buys her some “say-so” power and some freedom from a 
man’s attempts to control her behavior. After all, she insists, a woman with money of 
her own can credibly threaten to leave and take the children with her if he gets too 
far out of line. But this insistence on economic independence also reflects a much 
deeper fear: no matter how strong the relationship, somehow the marriage will go 
bad. Women who rely on a man’s earnings, these mothers warn, are setting 
themselves up to be left with nothing if the relationship ends. (Edin & Kefalas, 2005, 
p. 9) 
While this perspective is certainly reflected in media coverage about the HMRF, it is 
turned on its head. Rather than single mothers expressing ambivalence about marriage, it is 
primarily the men featured in stories who are hesitant to head down the aisle. One 
particularly in-depth New York Times feature story by DeParle (2004) followed Ken, an 
unmarried father in Milwaukee living with his child’s mother, Jewell. DeParle’s unraveling of 
the complications of Ken’s life was nuanced, thorough, and insightful, interwoven with data 
about welfare reform, the role of fathers, employment opportunities for men in low-income 
areas, and other social and cultural issues. Ken, a former drug dealer turned amateur rapper 
and pizza-delivery man, was the product of a broken home and wanted more for his son 






. . . now there’s Ken, who is in the house and has an income and has a least 
articulated marriage as a goal. When Jewell became pregnant with Kevion, Ken 
thought they would finally wed. “I had told my mother that I thought she was a 
good person, she having my son—I felt like she was the one,” he said. “It just didn’t 
happen.” He said he doesn’t know why, but he does know, at least in a general way. 
“I ain’t having a City Hall wedding,” he said. Ken said he sees himself marrying on a 
tropical beach, like the eponymous star of the sitcom “Martin,” who tied the knot 
with his girlfriend, Gina, among exotic flowers, crashing waves and a cellist in a black 
tie. His idealization of the wedding extends to the marriage . . . . “Once you get 
married, that means she’s everything in a woman you’re looking for and you’re 
everything in a man she’s looking for,” he said. Jewell says much the same: “It’s just 
you and that person, become one.” A marriage, therefore, carries intimidating risks, 
none greater than your partner cheating. “Oh yes, yes, yes,” Ken said. “If you’re 
married, and she goes out there and cheats on you, that’s like the worst thing in the 
world! ‘Cause you said those wedding vows. When you get married, you say you got 
an inseparable bond. So if she goes out there and cheats on you, she’s breaking laws 
and policies!” (DeParle, 2004, p. 27) 
A young man interviewed by the Philadelphia Inquirer (Chatterjee, 2004) expressed 
similar sentiments. Eric Vasquez, 21, was the father of a five-year-old boy conceived during 
a one-night stand while on vacation. After finding out the woman was pregnant, he brought 
her and the baby to live with him in Washington. But marriage was not on the agenda.  
Now, as he shuttles from his home to his job as a clerk at a sports shop, he reflects: 
Should he marry his child’s mother? Nah, he concludes. It’s too scary. Half of all 





big step; you have to be sure of what you are doing,” he said, afraid that his girlfriend 
and he wouldn’t survive the rigors. (Chatterjee, 2004, p. A02) 
If discourse and research during the welfare reform debate almost exclusively 
focused on single mothers, then the post-reform era shifted that focus 180 degrees and 
turned the spotlight on unmarried fathers. Perhaps because of the HMRF’s emphasis on 
fatherhood programs, much of the media discourse in this sample featured discussions about 
unmarried fathers and the role they play, or should be playing, in the lives of their children. 
News coverage repeatedly discussed the pervasiveness of absentee fathers, the importance of 
fathers in the lives of children, and profiled programs dedicated to teaching men skills that, 
at least theoretically, would help them become better role models and providers for their 
children. An April 2005 Washington Post report (Roberts, 2005) detailed a speech given by 
then First Lady Laura Bush at a National Fatherhood Initiative event. In her speech, Bush 
applauded the NFI’s mission and called for greater social supports for fathers.  
Helping men become good fathers who show their love is what this organization is 
all about, and that’s why your work is so vital . . . . Every father faces challenges, 
regardless of his circumstances. The father who’s absent because he’s in prison or 
the father who’s absent because he works 80 hours a week both have children who 
wish they could see their dads more. The National Fatherhood Initiative provides 
help for father sin just about every situation imaginable. (Roberts, 2005, p. C01)  
What makes this attention to fatherhood notable is the quantity of previous research 
about women and marriage, and relative dearth of research about how low-income men feel 
about marriage. For several decades, the focus of much media and scholarly work on and 
marriage and family trends had been on women and single mothers—why they are not 





are troublesome, why they are lacking values and morals, etc. My initial assumption regarding 
the cause of this shift was that the focus on mothers would continue throughout coverage of 
HMRF, but that speculation was not supported by the analysis. Coverage of the HMRF and 
its associated issues almost (with some notable exceptions) entirely ignored single mothers. 
Perhaps that is because previous efforts at governmental intervention into the lives and 
behaviors of single mothers (e.g., welfare reform) were met with intense criticism and only 
semi-successful, so focusing on men seemed to be more a promising strategy. Or, maybe, 
after spending years moving mothers from welfare to work, political leaders viewed 
promoting marriage and fatherhood as another step toward reinvigorating the nuclear 
family—minus a stay-at-home mother—and its dominance in American society.   
The Marriageable Men Theory 
One common sociological explanation for the retreat from marriage, particularly 
among low-income individuals, is the so-called “marriageable men” theory. First tendered by 
Popenoe (1935), it has been extended through the decades and is particularly pertinent to 
poor and low-income women and men. Initially, this theory hinged exclusively on men’s 
employment status and earnings. W. J. Wilson (1987) initially viewed marriageability as the 
ratio of employed men to all women of the same age; the assumption, of course, was that all 
women are equally marriageable, but men’s economic position determines their 
attractiveness on the marriage market. This view has changed somewhat in recent decades, 
however. A 2015 Brookings Institution report argued that a number of factors have 
converged to shape perceived marriageability for women.  
[Women] are now the primary breadwinner in 41% of all families. In addition, rising 
rates of unwed parenthood mean that a growing proportion of young women of 





men understandably reluctant to take responsibility for someone else’s child, but the 
single parents themselves have less time, and perhaps less inclination, to look for a 
new partner given their child care responsibilities and prior experience with 
relationships that didn’t work out. Women who had their first child outside of 
marriage are more likely to cohabit and less likely to marry than comparable women 
without children, and when they do marry, they do not marry as well (i.e., their 
marital partners are less educated and older). (Sawhill & Venator, 2015, p. 3)  
In a mostly indirect way, media coverage did reflect some of these marriageability 
issues, both via journalistic narrative and sourcing. In a 2006 National Public Radio report, 
journalist Rachel Jones went to a federally funded marriage education class in Baltimore and 
talked to the couples about their experiences. The couples uniformly agreed that the class 
helped strengthen their relationships, and many expressed a desire to marry once the 
conditions were right. “I think everybody that was basically really in the classes was 
considering marriage at one point,” said Alfreda Stewart, a program graduate who has been 
with her partner, Anthony Polk, on and off for 17 years. “He keep telling me once he in a 
better job he’s like he going to pop the question then.” “Once I get myself employed,” said 
Polk, “I can put a ring on layaway or propose to her, you know” (Jones, 2006).  
Coverage also highlighted the struggles many low-income men must confront in 
order to be seen as marriage material. High incarceration and criminal conviction rates 
among poor Black urban men limit not only their desirability on the marriage market, they 
also pose major challenges to those who want to form families or rejoin their existing 
families after being released. The Washington Post (Bazelon, 2004) outlined how the Bush 
administration’s proposal hindered efforts at rehabilitation and marriage among men with 





Woods’s boyfriend is an ex-convict, and variety of federal policies make marriage—a 
potential source of stability—more difficult for ex-felons even after their release 
from prison . . . . Because of his criminal record, he isn’t allowed to share Woods’s 
apartment in West Haven, Conn. Woods gets a subsidy from the federal housing 
program known as Section 8 that pays about half her $762 rent each month. The 
local housing authority that administers Woods’s subsidy bars former drug felons 
from signing or co-signing leases obtained through Section 8—or even living with a 
Section 8 tenant. That’s because federal laws passed in the 1990s encourage public 
housing agencies to deny housing to anyone who has committed a violent crime, 
drug offense, or any other crime that could affect the “health, safety, or right to 
peaceful enjoyment of the premises.” If Woods and her boyfriend want to get 
married and move in together, they have to find a new home and pay for it 
themselves. (p. B02) 
 The story continues, delving into the details of high incarceration rates: “African 
Americans are 44% of the incarcerated population in Connecticut and 9 percent of the 
general population. In the District of Columbia, 96% of the incarcerated population is Black 
compared with 60% of the general population” (Bazelon, 2004, p. B02). The subject of the 
story, 22-year-old Alisha Woods, described the view of marriage in her community as 
complex: “Woods says that most of the men she knows have been ‘on the street.’ The trick 
for any woman choosing among this pool of men is to find one who will get off the street 
and stay there” (p. B02). Ultimately, Bazelon concluded, the objectives of the HMRF were at 






If the administration wants to get serious about helping ex-cons, it could start by 
changing the rules that prevent them from living in public housing, hold onto 
driver’s licenses and receiving benefits like food stamps. Then it could use some of 
the $1.5 billion earmarked for marriage promotion to help former prisoners learn the 
skills they need to get decent jobs and, in the process, become better potential mates. 
If the goal is to transform the 13 million Americans with felony convictions into 
productive citizens—and perhaps reduce the chances that they’ll commit another 
crime—wouldn't it be better to make it easier for them to contribute to raising the 
families many of them will have? (p. B02) 
This is an important point. If the HMRF’s agenda is to promote and encourage healthy 
marriages and two-parent families, it overlooks large sectors of its target population by 
ignoring those with criminal histories who are not yet fathers. A report by the Pew Research 
Center (Gao, 2014) highlighted significant race and class disparities in incarceration rates 
nationwide, with less educated Black men facing the dimmest prospects. “In 2010, all Black 
men were 6 times as likely as all White men to be incarcerated in federal, state and local 
jails,” the report stated. But more shocking was the finding that Black men ages 20–24 “were 
more likely to be institutionalized than they were to be employed” (para. 2). The HMRF 
leaves out poor, previously incarcerated men who are not fathers with few supports and 
opportunities to improve their educational and economic prospects, and thus their 
marriageability.  
Silencing Single Mothers 
 Whether intentionally or not, one thing was conspicuously missing from media 
discourse on marriage and fatherhood education programs: the voices and perspectives of 





secondary in relation to quotes and perspectives from policymakers, academics, think tank 
representatives, religious leaders, and single fathers. This finding is surprising for a number 
of reasons. First, the link between marriage promotion efforts and welfare form indicates an 
ideological and economic relationship between the two measures on the part of the Bush 
administration. Connecting the HMRF directly to TANF reauthorization efforts and funding 
allocation suggests the objective of HMRF initiatives is to reduce poverty among single 
mothers since they are the primary recipients of TANF benefits. It stands to reason, then, 
that single mothers’ responses to the programs would be at the forefront of the media’s 
agenda.  
Second, because mothers are overwhelmingly the custodial caretakers of children 
born outside of marriage, the success of fatherhood-focused programs would necessarily 
require a mother’s involvement at some point. While it is certainly not necessary for a 
mother to participate in such programs, it makes sense that she would have to, at a 
minimum, consent to the participation of the father in her life and her child’s. After all, what 
benefit do fatherhood programs have if the father is estranged from the mother? Or if their 
relationship is too acrimonious to facilitate shared parenting responsibilities? If there is a 
history of abuse, is it even in the best interest of the child or mother for the father to remain 
involved? More than 60% of women receiving TANF have experienced physical abuse by an 
intimate partner, and battered women are more likely to drop out of education programs and 
miss days of school or work, thereby decreasing the likelihood they will be able to achieve 
economic independence (National Network to End Domestic Violence, 2004). Given the 
current cultural view that marriage is something couples do only after they have their 





empowering and supporting women who need to leave unhealthy relationships rather than 
providing economic incentives for them to get married.  
Wade Horn, the Bush administration’s marriage promotion figurehead, is frequently 
quoted in media reports about the HMRF and consistently states the programs are not 
coercive. In a 2002 USA Today story, Horn stated that HMRF programs are intended to 
“help couples who choose marriage for themselves to develop the skills and knowledge 
necessary to sustain healthy marriages” (Peterson, 2002). He further argued that “the 
government has no intention of forcing women to marry or to stay in harmful relationships” 
(Peterson, 2002, p. 1D). But there is still a risk that some poor women in abusive 
relationships may think marriage promotion programs are required for them to receive 
TANF, or abusive male partners may see states offering financial incentives to marry and 
coerce women down the aisle in order to cash in.  
For all his rhetoric about wanting to help single mothers and their children, Horn 
has consistently skirted any substantive discussion of critical issues facing low-income 
women and single mothers, and instead treated HMRF programs and marriage as a panacea. 
And although he has denied this view, Horn is betrayed by his own moralizing rhetoric 
about the benefits of marriage and expressed desire to see states implement policies favoring 
married couples.  
Marriage is our most vital social institution, the seedbed from which healthy children 
and, ultimately, a healthy society spring. It is no accident that communities with 
lower marriage rates have higher rates of social pathology. Marriage matters—to 
children, adults, and communities. Unfortunately, most states have been reluctant to 
even mention the word, let alone do something to encourage more of it. When it 





marriage, however, doing nothing hasn’t worked. Perhaps doing something might. 
(Horn, 2001, p. 42) 
 If states and the federal government focused more on easing the significant 
economic and social hardships faced by poor single mothers, they would not need marriage 
promotion programs to encourage them to marry. If single mothers were able to attain some 
semblance of economic stability, complete education programs, and find safe, reliable, 
affordable childcare, they would likely eventually marry of their own accord.  
Third, single motherhood as a demographic trend has been a prevalent subject in 
studies of marriage and family, and therefore related media coverage has tended to focus on 
single mothers as a bloc even if sociological literature on nonmarital childbearing does 
recognize and acknowledge significant differences across age and racial groups. Although 
coverage of the HMRF does not lack in its articulation of supporters’ claims and critics’ 
objections to government interventions into marriage and fatherhood education, it does lack 
any meaningful discourse from mothers themselves about their attitudes toward marriage 
promotion or fatherhood education.  
Chapter Summary 
 There is an indelible connection, in America and most Westernized societies, 
between marriage and morality. The view of marriage as an intrinsically moral institution 
dates back centuries and is reflected throughout the Bible and other religious texts. Despite 
the growing secularization of the Western world (Cooperman, Smith, & Ritchey, 2015), the 
relationship between marriage and moral standing has endured, even if many of marriage’s 
explicitly religious elements have faded. In order to be legally recognized in the United 
States, a marriage license must be issued by the government. Referred to as civil marriage, 





their marriage ceremony performed in a church or by a member of clergy, but without a 
government-issued marriage license, the union is not legally binding.  
Also indelible, at least historically, is the relationship between marriage, sex, and 
childbearing. Christianity, the most common self-reported religious affiliation in the United 
States, is the only major world religion to prescribe monogamy and views the union between 
husband and wife as the highest human expression of agape, the self-sacrificing love of God 
for man (Parrinder, 1998). In the view of traditional Judeo-Christian religious doctrine, sex 
should take place only within the sacred confines of marriage and for the purpose of 
childbearing. While this view seems archaic, it is rhetorically reconstructed and entrenched in 
public policy via the PRWORA, TANF, and HMRF initiatives. In a 2007 USA Today report, 
(Jayson, 2007) David Blankenhorn, a founding father of the National Fatherhood Initiative, 
who self-identifies as a liberal Democrat, sounded more like a member of the Bush 
administration. He told reporter Sharon Jayson his primary concern was for children: 
We’re either going to go in the direction of viewing marriage as a purely private 
relationship between two people that’s defined by those people, or we’re going to try 
to strengthen and maintain marriage as our society’s most pro-child institution. 
(Jayson, 2007, p. 1D) 
There is a consistent idealization of the “traditional” nuclear family, the institution of 
marriage is placed on a pedestal, and there is a repeated focus on the ways in which children 
benefit from living with married parents. This rhetoric came from both sides of the political 
aisle. The repeated focus on children and the way families “ought to be” has perpetuated 
moral regulatory elements in HMRF coverage beyond the policies themselves. Scholars, 
feminists, and progressive activists have long focused on sexuality as a primary site of 





…sexual relations in church- and state-sanctioned marriage establish a sexual 
division of labor and structure patriarchal domination; and . . . male sexual violence 
against women, both within and outside of marriage, works to subdue and contain 
women who might resist patriarchy. (Jakobsen, 2000, p. 107) 
Single mothers, then, eschew the hegemonic patriarchal sociocultural framework in ways that 
directly threaten the status quo and call into question the legitimacy of these historically 
oppressive institutions. When women are able to support themselves and raise their children 
without assistance or interference from the state or a husband, it becomes tremendously 
problematic for any institution or individual who benefits from or seeks to uphold 
traditional views about gender roles, family structures, childrearing, and sex. Ralph Reed, 
founder and chair of the Faith and Freedom Coalition and a senior advisor to the 
Bush/Cheney campaigns in 2000 and 2004, once complained that AFDC made the state into 
a father (Sands, 2000). Government marriage and fatherhood promotion efforts attempt to 
put men back in their rightful place—in control of women and children. Whether the 





CHAPTER 6. BEYOND THE WELFARE QUEEN 
  My mother was the one constant in my life. When I think about my  
mom raising me alone when she was 20, and working and paying the 
bills, and, you know, trying to pursue your own dreams, I think is a 
feat that is unmatched.  
— Barack H. Obama 
 
 
In previous decades, discourse about single mothers and single motherhood 
occurred primarily in the context of other newsworthy social and cultural issues. Earlier 
chapters have illustrated this by examining depictions of single mothers in coverage about 
family values politics, welfare reform, and the Healthy Marriage and Responsible Fatherhood 
initiative (HMRF). But 2012 seemed to indicate a shift in this trend; rather than discussing 
single motherhood as a cause or consequence of some other larger social problem, the status 
itself began to take center stage in media coverage. The New York Times and The Washington 
Post ran a handful of high-profile articles about single motherhood, including several op-ed 
pieces. Slate.com posted an article arguing single motherhood was bad for children, and The 
Atlantic magazine ran a feature praising single mothers’ fortitude.  
This year was also the 20th anniversary of Dan Quayle’s Murphy Brown speech, and 
many media outlets marked the occasion with think pieces examining whether Quayle was 
right in his assessment of single mothers. Further, studies were starting to pour in that 
focused on the results of President Bush’s HMRF initiatives, largely concluding they had 
failed to produce a difference in either relationship quality or the number of low-income 
couples tying the knot. What is more, the Obama administration loosened many of the work 
requirements implemented by Clinton in the 1996 welfare reform package, leading 
conservative critics to assert Obama had given people their welfare back (Ball, 2012). So, 





lives of single mothers, it was indeed a year full of discourse about them, which is why it was 
selected as the final representative anecdote for analysis.  
The focus of this chapter is threefold. First, I analyze news media discourse 
surrounding single mothers and single motherhood from a holistic perspective, focusing on 
the ways in which discourses rhetorically constructed single mothers without the subtext of 
an overarching cultural phenomenon like family values rhetoric, welfare reform, or 
government marriage policies informing the selection of the sample. Second, I compare 
discourse about single mothers in the current sample to that of previous chapters to examine 
if, and in what ways, the tone and focus has changed. Third, I revisit and respond to the 
research questions posed in Chapter 1 and offer a discussion of the significance of these 
depictions.  
Mixed Messages About Single Motherhood 
Defining Themselves 
 The most striking feature of discourse in 2012 is the emergence of single mothers’ 
voices. Mothers have become more actively engaged in constructing their identities than they 
were in previous discourses. Although not universally present in the stories analyzed for this 
anecdote, single mothers’ voices were discernably proliferated in narratives featuring them. 
Rather than journalistic narratives dictating the circumstances of their lives, single mothers in 
this sample actively pushed against negative stereotypes, embraced rather than lamented 
their status, and positioned themselves rhetorically as good, capable, loving parents.  
 A June 1 Washington Post blog (Henneberger, 2012) not only identified this trend, but 
illustrated it clearly. While discussing a new memoir by author Bay Buchanan, journalist 
Melinda Henneberger quoted a passage from the novel articulating how media coverage of 





“Shortly after I became a single mom,” she writes, “I began to take note of a 
continual stream of bad information coming my way. New studies were constantly 
being released on the impact that fatherless homes had on children—and I’d watch 
my fellow conservatives take to the talk shows, armed with the latest statistics, to 
make their case. The evidence is overwhelming, they would argue, a dad in the home 
is critical to the healthy development of his children. The picture they painted was 
frightening. I’d start to worry all over again that I couldn’t give my kids a childhood 
as good as my own.” . . . Buchanan told me she thinks some on the right have been 
“afraid to go any further and say, ‘Single moms. You can do this.’ For fear it would 
undermine their original argument about the importance of marriage and family. So 
instead, they act like you might as well keep the TV on all night and ‘have marijuana 
for dessert,” she added, “because the message is never ‘You can do this.’’’ 
(Henneberger, 2012, p. A02) 
 Author Buchanan and journalist Henneberger both touched on important points in 
this article. Media narratives about single mothers have indeed trended overwhelmingly 
negative, focusing on poverty, welfare, marriage, and all the ways single mothers failed to 
measure up to White, middle-class standards of contemporary intensive mothering. As 
Buchanan stated, the media message to these women was rarely, if ever, “you can do it!” or 
“you are doing a great job,” but rather “you are not enough.” Henneberger also articulated 
one of Buchanan’s strategies for overcoming the negative rhetoric.  
. . . for her, the first step to succeeding in spite of the naysayers was seeing and 
presenting her situation as a blessing and announcing to friends, “Hey, I’m a single 
mom now!” as if she’d won the lotto. Not because she was glorifying the breakdown 





dragged around thinking she’d drawn the black bean in life, how could that attitude 
be anything but harmful to her kids? (p. A02) 
Adopting a positive mindset and owning her new status was not just a psychological coping 
mechanism, it was also a rhetorical strategy. By positing herself as capable, competent, and 
successful, Buchanan (by way of Henneberger) was beginning to carve out a new media 
narrative of single motherhood.  
 A second Washington Post piece (“One- and two-parent homes,” 2012) provides a 
forum for readers to express opinions about a previously published story focusing on 
families in the Black community. In the compilation of reader feedback, another single 
mother echoed Buchanan’s sentiments. While she acknowledged the value of fathers, she 
also sought to define her own identity as a single parent and pushed against common 
stereotypes. Under the screenname “salonjoy1,” this mother stated: 
Although I am glad to see a father in the home, I just wanted to say as a single mom 
of a 15-year-old black male, I think I have done a GREAT JOB. My son is going 
into his senior year of high school, he is a peer leader and he is co-captain of his 
football team with a 3.3 GPA. My son’s father went to jail when he was 6 months 
old. He did not meet his father until he was 10 years old. Even now, his father is not 
in his life, but that does not stop him from focusing on his future. I think we focus 
too much on the fathers not being there are not enough focusing on what else the 
child needs to be complete. A father is needed, don’t get me wrong, but if they are 
not there, we have to learn to do the best we can and move on. (p. B02) 
This sentiment was a common one. Mothers seemed to be acutely aware of how society 
perceived them, and they made a conscientious effort to dismantle and deconstruct the 





these stereotypes and called out politicians and pundits who wanted to place the blame for 
every social ill squarely on their backs.  
 In an October 20, 2012, New York Times op-ed about a town hall–style presidential 
debate between Mitt Romney and Barack Obama, columnist Gail Collins discussed a 
controversial gun control question posed to the candidates by a member of the debate 
audience. The questioner, Nina Gonzales, asked the candidates to discuss their views of gun 
control, but Romney’s response was not she was expecting.  
Romney followed up with a long discussion on the virtues of two-parent families. 
(“But, gosh, to tell our kids that before they have babies, they ought to think about 
getting married to someone—that’s a great idea. . . .”) It was about here that he lost 
Nina Gonzales. “Single mothers have enough problems. Leave them alone,” she 
said. “Why are we even talking about that? That’s not the issue.” (Collins, 2012, p. 
A23) 
The notion that single mothers were responsible, at least in part, for a buffet of 
social problems has, in no small way, fed the larger—mostly conservative—cultural 
argument that single mothers in and of themselves constituted a social problem. That was 
part of what made this line of discourse so important; the construction and salient 
articulation of single mothers’ counter-narratives starved, or at least weakened, the 
sociopolitical beast that has for so long sought to devour them. Mothers in this sample were 
fighting back, using their agency to define their lives for themselves.  
Journalism professor and author Katie Roiphe is a vocal and ardent contributor to 
these counter-narratives. In an August 12, 2012, New York Times Sunday Review essay, 
Roiphe chided the bipartisan moralizing and handwringing about single mother families. She 





using her platform and privilege to question cultural assumptions about single mothers and 
their families. She called out vague media references to “studies” that faulted single mothers 
for all manner of social pathologies. She directly addressed the role academics played in 
constructing and perpetuating these narratives, calling out by name Princeton sociologist 
Sara McLanahan—a frequent contributor to media stories about marriage, children, and 
poverty—for taking a myopic view of single mothers.  
Studies like those done by Princeton sociologist Sara S. McLanahan, who is one of 
the foremost authorities on single motherhood and its impact on children, show that 
conditions like poverty and instability, which frequently accompany single-mother 
households, increase the chances that the children involved will experience 
alcoholism, mental illness, academic failure, and other troubles. But there is no 
conclusive evidence that, absent those conditions, the pure, pared-down state of 
single motherhood is itself dangerous to children. Professor McLanahan’s studies 
over the years, and many others like them, show that the primary risks associated 
with single motherhood arise from financial insecurity. They also offer evidence that, 
to a lesser extent, particular romantic patters of the mother—namely introducing lots 
of boyfriends into children’s lives—contribute to the risk. What the studies don’t 
show is that long for a married father at the breakfast table injures children. (Roiphe, 
2012, p. SR8) 
 Roiphe did not stop there. She railed against America’s unwillingness to address the 
structural and institutional deficiencies that contribute to single mothers’ financial instability.  
There is no doubt, however, that single motherhood can be more difficult than other 





mothers preferential access to excellent daycare. Here the response is moralism 
disguised as concern and, at other times, simply moralism. (Roiphe, 2012, p. SR8) 
Roiphe was right that other industrialized nations have far more progressive views 
and have taken concrete steps to improve the material conditions of single mothers and their 
children. In Iceland, where 67% of babies are born to unmarried mothers, social structures 
and attitudes have adapted to allow unmarried women with children to thrive. Mothers are 
not subjected to a stream of criticisms from social and political elites, and universal health 
care and paid parental leave policies help ease the financial burdens single mothers in 
American often face. Moreover, the language itself is different; single mothers in Iceland are 
not rhetorically positioned as problematic, deviant, or deficient. A 2017 CNN.com report 
(not included in the sample of analytic texts) speaks to how differences in language influence 
public perceptions of mothers.  
You have this horrible term in English, “broken families,” . . . “Which basically 
means just if you get divorced, then something's broken. But that's not the way it is 
in Iceland at all. We live in such a small and secure environment, and the women 
have so much freedom. So you can just, you can choose your life.” (Weir, 2017) 
While America may never look to Iceland or the European Union for inspiration 
about social policymaking, discourse in this anecdote did point to a shift in media narrative 
about single mothers and the language used to describe them. A September 2, 2012, New 
York Times piece (Kaufman, 2012) describes the home renovation project of single mother 
Joy Tomchin. Journalist Joanne Kaufman described Tomchin as a homeowner whose only 
child was leaving for college—two oft cited markers of middle-class success. A 
washingtonpost.com style section article (McCarthy, 2012) used the term “devoted” to 





said she was happy with her life before she met her husband: “I was content being a single 
mother . . . . I loved my job. I had a ton of friends. I have two great kids. I was done” (p. 
T17). Another Washington Post story (Jenkins, 2012) focused on the success of opera singer 
Marlissa Hudson: “A single mother, she wanted security for her family. But one day she 
knew what her purpose in life was: to follow her gift of expression” (p. B02).  
Rather than constant refrains about single mothers in poverty or descriptions of 
mothers struggling to survive, the tone of media narratives seemed, on the whole, to have 
become more tolerant in the year 2012. Single mothers were often described as complete 
people leading rich, complex, fulfilling lives without partners. And while discussions of 
poverty still frequently referenced single mothers, depictions within these narratives focused 
less on why mothers themselves were problematic and more on structural and institutional 
flaws that functioned to keep them in poverty. There was far more attention paid to 
structural issues like low wages, childcare, discrimination, transportation, food insecurity, and 
other complex social conditions than was present in previous historical representative 
anecdotes. While this is evidenced in stories throughout the sample for this anecdote, a few 
provide particularly clear illustrations. In a January 5, 2012, Washington Post story about a 
mother who received a vehicle from a local nonprofit organization, journalist Alex Ruoff 
explained how access to transportation can help improve earnings.  
The group gives vehicles because vehicle ownership is proven to help boost income . 
. . of the 3,600 people who have benefitted from the group since its inception in 
1999, 70% have seen their income rise by an average of $7,000 a year in the year after 
they received a vehicle . . . . Vehicles offer more freedom in choosing jobs, gaining 





Another Washington Post story (Boodman, 2012) examined the intricate relationship 
between poverty and health. It uses 35-year-old single mother Treshawn Jones as a jumping-
off point, beginning with a description of how she was jobless, behind on her utilities, and 
worried about keeping her child fed. Through a local nonprofit dedicated to identifying and 
meeting the unmet needs of at-risk families, Jones was able to participate in a job training 
course and get clothing, food, utility, and shelter assistance for herself and her son; within 
three months she landed a $37,000 a year job with health insurance benefits. Journalist 
Sandra Boodman also described the results of a study that found a curious correlation 
between health and poverty:  
[A] 2006 report in the journal Pediatrics found that children whose families cannot 
pay their utility bills are 30% more likely to be hospitalized—the medical and social 
service systems have long operated in largely separate and disconnected spheres. Too 
often, that results in a medical revolving door, as when doctors prescribe asthma 
medicines for children living in mold-infested apartments, only to have them wind 
up in the emergency room because their housing conditions were never addressed. 
(Boodman, 2012, p. E01).  
The media elaboration on structural issues is significant not just for its 
contextualization of the lives of the poor, but also because it shifted the focus from the 
rhetoric of morality, “personal responsibility,” and “family values” to the material conditions 
resulting from long-entrenched policies that perpetuate oppression—racism, classism, and 
other “-isms” associated with the traditional institutions of American life. Williams (1995) 
argued that the absence of media coverage of structural issues undermined the public’s 





Such omissions create inaccurate perceptions, which make it easier to blame the 
victim and to see poverty as a personal problem of the individual, thereby relieving 
society of any responsibility to support programs designed to help groups escape 
poverty. (pp. 1169) 
When media narratives ignore, minimize, justify, or misrepresent the multitude of 
factors that cause and preserve poverty, it becomes complicit in the maintenance of those 
conditions. News stories, despite claims of objectivity, do not report events neutrally 
(Williams, 1995), and these value-laden depictions inform public opinion that then informs 
public policy. Gilens (1996), for example, found that poverty was disproportionately 
portrayed as a “Black” problem. While it is true that, at 21%, poor African Americans are a 
greater percentage of the overall population than poor Whites (9%) (Fontenot, Semega, & 
Knollar, 2017)—Gilens (1996) argued that media representations are responsible, at least in 
part, for the public’s gross overestimation of the actual racial composition of the poor. By 
comparing national survey data about poverty to media representations, Gilens found a 
correlation between media depictions of poverty (was it Blacks or Whites who were featured 
in stories?) and public opinion poll questions about whether African Americans are more 
likely to be poor than Whites (who is more likely to be poor, Blacks or Whites?).  
. . . the poverty population shown in news magazines—primarily black, 
overwhelmingly unemployed, and almost completely nonelderly—is not likely to 
generate a great deal of support for government antipoverty programs among white 
Americans . . . . By implicitly identifying poverty with race, the news media 
perpetuate stereotypes that work against the interests of both poor people and 





Despite the noticeable shift in narrative tone, in 2012 there was still plenty of 
moralizing about single motherhood as a status—mostly from social and media elites who 
continued to insist upon the primacy of marriage and fret about the outcomes of single 
mothers’ children. On May 25, 2012, almost 20 years to the day after Dan Quayle’s infamous 
Murphy Brown speech, The Washington Post ran an op-ed piece written by economist and co-
director of the Center for Children and Families, Isabel Sawhill. The article, entitled “20 
Years Later, It Turns Out Dan Quayle Was Right about Murphy Brown and Unmarried 
Moms” (Sawhill, 2012), expresses continued concern about shifts in family structure, arguing 
that marriage benefits mothers, is good for children and has economic benefits that 
cohabitation does not. “In the end, Dan Quayle was right,” Sawhill wrote. “Unless the 
media, parents and other influential leaders celebrate marriage as the best environment for 
raising children, the new trend—bringing up baby alone—may be irreversible” (p. 3). 
Two months later, on Sunday, July 15, 2012, The New York Times ran a front-page, 
above-the-fold feature exploring the lives of two women, Chris Faulkner and Jessica Schairer  
(DeParle, 2012). Both women were White, from the Midwest, about the same age, worked at 
the same childcare center, and had children. Chris was a college graduate and a married 
mother of two. She was also the supervisor at the center where she and Jessica worked. 
Jessica dropped out of college when she got pregnant by her boyfriend, and by age 30 had 
three children and no husband, although she did eventually earn a two-year degree from a 
local community college. The story details the stark contrast between the lives of the two 
mothers. Chris and her husband made about $95,000 per year, and their children spent 
weekends being shuttled to and from scouts, swimming, baseball, and soccer. Jessica earned 
$24,500 a year and relied on food stamps, and her children were lucky to participate in one 





The story, titled “Two Classes, Divided by ‘I Do,” made waves, drawing response 
pieces by HuffingtonPost.com, The Nation, Forbes, PsychologyToday.com, and other New 
York Times contributors, to name just a few. It even inspired a five-part series by the Center 
for Economic and Policy Research dedicated to exploring DeParle’s claims about the 
relationships between family structure and social class (Fremstad, 2012). Some authors 
criticized DeParle’s depiction of Jessica Schairer as stereotypical, simplistic, and moralizing. 
They offered structural critiques of systems and institutions that keep women like Jessica 
from achieving greater economic security. Others argued that DeParle’s narrative was 
accurate; single motherhood is hard and does not bode well for women or their children. 
Jessica and women like her made poor choices, and poverty is one of the unfortunate 
consequences.   
Within the DeParle (2012) piece alone, there are a number of salient rhetorical 
elements worth noting. One of the most remarkable things about this story is what was 
missing; at no point did DeParle discuss any hardships research would suggest Chris 
Faulkner and her husband might face. Nor did he mention any of the difficulties they likely 
faced juggling full-time careers, childcare, multiple extracurriculars, and running a household. 
He did not even so much as hint at the possibility of any past or present marital conflict. If 
anything, he venerated the life they had, stating, “They did not inherit wealth or connections 
or rise on rare talent. They just did things in standard order: high school, college, job, 
marriage and children. . . . The result is a three-bedroom house, two busy boys and an annual 
Disney cruise” (DeParle, 2012, p. A1).  
Given that about half of first marriages are expected to eventually end in separation 
or divorce (Amato, 2010; Raley & Bumpass, 2003), the omission of any discussion about 





was her husband, Kevin, who was featured most prominently in the journalistic narrative. 
Moreover, when DeParle discussed an element of the Faulkner’s life, it was frequently 
immediately contrasted with Schairer’s circumstances. “Ms. Faulkner goes home to a trim 
subdivision and weekends crowded with children’s events. Ms. Schairer’s rent consumes 
more than half her income, and she scrapes by on food stamps.” Later, the pattern repeated: 
The secret to their success resides in part in old-fashioned math: strength in 
numbers. Together, the Faulkners earn nearly three times as much as what Ms. 
Faulkner earns alone. Their high five-figure income ranks them near the 75th 
percentile—hardly rich, but better off than nearly three of four families with 
children. For Ms. Schairer, the logic works in reverse. Her individual income of 
$24,500 puts her at the 49th percentile among parents: smack dab in the middle, but 
with only one paycheck, her family falls to the 19th percentile, lagging more than 
four out five. (DeParle, 2012, p. A1) 
It is worth mentioning that even if Jessica Schairer were to marry someone who earned as 
much as she did, their family of (at least) five would still be within 185% of the poverty level 
for 2012—hardly a comfortable middle-class income (U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services, 2012). Also notable is DeParle’s use of research by Princeton sociologist 
Sara McLanahan’s—the same academic expressly criticized by Katie Roiphe—to support his 
claims.  
DeParle (2012) delved at some length into Jessica Schairer’s economic circumstances 
and pathway to single motherhood. Her college boyfriend, the father of her three children, 
had promised marriage but eventually became abusive and they split. When Jessica met 
someone new, she waited a year before asking him to move in. Six months and one call to 





generic breakfast cereal and how she avoided giving her son, who had Asperger’s syndrome, 
$2 to buy a bagel at school. He mentioned a friend of Jessica’s daughter, who always wanted 
to raid the cabinets when she came over, so Jessica encouraged them to play elsewhere. 
DeParle described Jessica as “weary,” starved for adult interaction, and strapped for time as 
well as money. No such descriptions of Kevin or Chris Faulkner were offered.  
These two stories (DeParle, 2012; Sawhill, 2012) were not the only ones in the 
sample that maintained a deleterious tone about single mothers, but what makes these stories 
in particular so remarkable is that they held up the cultural yardstick for success and then 
quite literally compared single mothers against it. This is particularly evident in the DeParle 
(2012) article. Jessica’s life was hard, exhausting, chaotic; Chris’s life was joyful, promising, 
orderly. To use the words of one columnist who wrote a response to DeParle’s narrative, 
“The single mother and her children have a terrible life, and the married mother and her 
children have a great one” (Dougherty, 2012).  
As Hays (1996) asserted in her articulation of the ideology of intensive mothering, “it 
is neither self-evidently natural nor, in any absolute sense, necessary; it is a social 
construction” (p. 4). Our cultural standards of mothering, the time, labor, and financial 
resources required to be considered a “good” mother were largely out of reach for single 
mothers—even those not on the precipice of poverty. These injurious, largely one-sided 
depictions of single-mother headed families not only reinforced the ideology of intensive 
mothering and the impossible double bind they created for all working mothers, they also 
functioned rhetorically to position single mothers as “bad” mothers because they could not 
possibly fill the cultural prescriptions intensive mothering required. Shallow depictions of 
single mothers that neglected to address the full structural complexities of their lives also 





those complexities in the first place—like marriage. Reporter Nancy Folbre began to 
articulate this in a July 23, 2012 New York Times blog post:  
Most discussions of single mother focus on their choices, faulting them for deciding 
to raise a child without a secure commitment from a father. Yet the majority have 
been to the altar (or a justice of the peace) at least once. In 2010, about 62% of 
custodial mothers living with children whose biological father was absent were either 
divorced or married. (Folbre, 2012, paras. 4–5) 
Unlike DeParle’s (2012) interpretation of single mother Jessica Schairer’s life, or 
Sawhill’s (2012) selective recitation of data impugning single mothers, Folbre’s (2012) blog 
post explicated the multitudinous factors that contributed to single mothers’ material lives. 
In a mere 842 words, Folbre discussed marriage, nonmarital birth rates, fatherhood, poverty, 
the wage gap, access to healthcare benefits, child support, unemployment, and middle-class 
privilege, and linked them together in a way that helped explain how institutional structures 
worked against single mothers who try to help themselves.  
Revisiting Past Rhetoric 
 This chapter has already discussed one way in which rhetoric about single mothers 
was different in 2012 from previous representative anecdotes. The increased presence of 
single mothers’ voices was a definite shift in media narrative. But that was not the only thing 
that changed. While the explicit moralization of single mothers was still present, it was far 
less prominent during this timeframe. There were stories dedicated solely to countering and 
deconstructing the previous negative depictions of single mothers. One such story, 
published on The New York Times blog (Dell’Antonia, 2012a), argued that DeParle’s (2012) 





Consequently, Dell’Antonia asked if it was possible to promote parental preparedness 
without condemning single mothers:  
. . . the questions for society, and for parents raising children in a world of changing 
norms become complex and unwieldy. How can we help Ms. Schairer to best raise 
her children to be independent, happy and successful—to defeat the inequalities that 
could lead to a cycle of “diverging destinies”—while encouraging different choices? 
Many of us (myself included) don’t miss the days of moral judgements that coincided 
with a time when fewer children were being raise in single-parent households, but if 
children raised in unintentional out-of-wedlock households continue to struggle in 
comparison with children in two-parent homes. We need to find a way to replace the 
force of those social norms without going backward in social acceptance. (para. 6) 
Other stories took similar stances. Another New York Times blog (Dell’Antonia, 
2012b) called into question the legitimacy of our cultural assumptions and expectations 
about mothering. “Fathers help create those demanding proto-humans, too, and it’s long 
past time we stopped assuming that women are the default provider of that 24/7 care” (para. 
9). Folbre (2012b) also criticized the role of public policy in the perpetuation of poverty for 
low-income families.  
Today, in an era of serious economic distress, in which the best promises of 
capitalism have been broke, low-income mothers and children are threatened with 
major cuts to public assistance, yet conservatives staunchly defend the 
unprecedented riches of the top 1 percent . . . . (para. 16) 
These kinds of narratives were largely absent in previous representative anecdotes in 
which discourse focused more on personal choices, personal responsibility, and morality. 





showed the absurdity of the distinction between the “deserving” and “undeserving” poor. 
When the lives of single mothers were depicted in ways that examined not only their 
personal choices but the circumstances that might limit or define those choices, media 
coverage served the civic good. It was not only inaccurate to portray all single mothers as 
poor, struggling, desperate to get married, or neglectful to the needs of their children, it was 
irresponsible journalism. Yes, single mothers might experience higher rates of poverty than 
other demographic groups, but the majority of them were not poor even though media 
coverage has historically depicted them primarily in this context.  
A February 10, 2018, New York Times Sunday Review op-ed penned by three 
sociologists (Brady, Finnegan, & Hubgen, 2018) argued that single motherhood has not been 
the primary cause of poverty in the United States, despite perceptions to the contrary.   
Single motherhood is one of four major risks of poverty, which also include 
unemployment, low levels of education and forming households at young ages . . . . 
The reality is we have unusually high poverty because we have unusually high 
penalties for all four of these risk factors. For example, if you lack a high school 
degree in the United States, it increases the probability of your being in poverty by 
16.4%. In the 28 other rich democracies, a lack of education increases the probability 
of poverty by less than 5 percent on average. No other country penalizes the less 
educated nearly as much as we do. (para. 11) 
What is particularly unsettling is that single fathers fare much better than do single 
mothers. According to a 2017 report by the Institute for Family Studies, single fathers are 
more likely to be White, divorced, and better educated than single mothers. They also fare 
far better financially than do single mother families; the median household income for a 





mother (ElHage, 2017). But despite these advantages, Coles (2015) found that the children 
of single fathers seem to fare about as well as those of single mothers despite fathers’ higher 
age, educational attainment, and better financial position. She attributed this to a difference 
in parenting styles and argued that “resources play a lesser role than parental processes in 
these outcomes. . .” (p. 30).  
If the children of low-income single mothers fare just as well as children of higher-
income single fathers, then all the media and political pearl-clutching about the outcomes of 
children raised by single mothers did not provide a complete picture. Indeed, other research 
has found income plays less of a role in child outcomes than other factors. Waldfogel, 
Craigie, and Brooks-Gunn (2010) argued that family instability seems to matter more than 
family structure for behavioral and mental health outcomes. Put another way, “children 
raised by stable single or cohabiting parents are at less risk than those raised by unstable 
single or cohabiting parents” (p. 1). Moreover, Waldfogel et al. (2010) argued that research 
about family structure, stability, and child outcomes holds “that is in large part the stability 
of the traditional family structure that gives it its advantage” (p. 2).  
Thus, if stability matters more than structure, if children raised by low-income single 
mothers fare just as well, if not better in some cases, than children of single fathers, what 
explains the political, cultural, and media preoccupation with castigating single mothers? To 
explore this question, I turn once again to the moral regulation research of Hunt (1999) and 
Corrigan and Sayer (1985) explored in Chapters 2 and 3.   
Moral regulation is “a project of normalizing, rendering natural, taken for granted, in 
a word ‘obvious,’ what are in fact ontological and epistemological premises of a particular 
and historical form of social order” (Corrigan & Sayer, 1985, p. 4). Put another way, moral 





regulation as the natural and only possible ones” (Ruonavaara, n.d., p. 2). The traditional 
biological, two-parent, married, nuclear family is exactly that—a taken-for-granted historical 
social order that has been idealized and upheld as the “good,” “right,” and “best” 
arrangement for couples and children. Historically, as Coontz (2000) explained, it was not 
the norm, nor was it intrinsically better or worse than any other family structure. But as a 
society we have come to view it that way, for better or worse, till death do us part. People 
are simply not marrying at the same rates they used to, and the median age of first marriage 
is nearing 30 for both men and women (Jordan, 2018). Not only that, but nearly 40% of 
Americans believe the institution of marriage is becoming obsolete (Taylor, et al., 2010), and 
Census Bureau (2018) data suggested married couples now make up only about half of all 
U.S. households. By contrast, 61% of U.S. households were married in 1990 and 71% were 
married in 1970. While these trends have also made headlines, discourse about them typically 
employs the same moralizing “family decline” rhetoric in previous anecdotes. 
Chapter Summary 
 This chapter examined news media discourse about single mothers during the 
calendar year 2012. It found a marked increase in the presence of single mothers as subjects, 
as well as greater inclusion of the voices of single mothers and their allies. It further found 
that media narratives were more likely to contextualize poverty and the struggles of single 
mothers and their children by offering explanations about the structural and institutional 
challenges faced by these families.  
While stories painting single mothers and single motherhood stereotypically or 
negatively were still present, they were somewhat less salient than in previous historical 
periods. This shift marks a divergence from the previously analyzed news media narratives, 


































CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSION 
 
You have policy makers that are still stuck in the sort of idealized ‘Leave it to 
Beaver’ families where the wife stays home and the husband is the 
breadwinner. The reality for my constituents is most them are in two-parent, 
working-family households. And many of them are single-parent working 
households.  
— Linda Sanchez, U.S. Congresswoman, 2018 
 
 
This research has examined news media discourse about single mothers over the 
course of a 20-year timeframe. It explored five specific research questions about the 
rhetorical construction and ideological assumptions of these narratives. In the section that 
follows, I readdress each of these five research questions, examine the limitations of this 
study, and offer a discussion of the significance of this work to the media sociology 
literature.  
Research Questions 
RQ 1. How is the definition of single mother articulated rhetorically within news 
media? 
Single mothers in this analysis were rhetorically constructed as low-income women 
parenting without partners. While this may seem obvious, it is notable for two reasons. First, 
there was little discussion of co-parenting or cohabiting mothers in the sample. Given the 
increases in cohabitation and divorce, this is somewhat surprising. It would be reasonable to 
expect more discourse about mothers co-parenting with their ex-spouses or cohabiting 
partners, but this was not the case; women were most often described as living only with 
their children. Second, single mothers were rhetorically situated in relation to men. Media 
coverage typically included reference to a mother’s marital status, using terms like “divorced 





Reference to widows was extremely rare. By positioning mothers in this way, media 
narratives propped up the patriarchy; single mothers were not in and of themselves complete 
people—they were constructed as being part of a “broken” family; they, rhetorically 
speaking, were incomplete.  
RQ 2. What overarching themes are associated with discourse about single mothers 
in news media?   
Consistent with previous research, single mothers featured in news media coverage 
in this analysis were most commonly associated with the theme of poverty. This holds true 
throughout each representative anecdote, although it is less salient in the final one. A second 
common theme, also previously identified, is morality. Much of the media coverage 
examined here ideologically positioned single mothers in the context of conservative moral 
rhetoric about their life choices and the consequences of those choices on their children.  
With regard to the theme of poverty, several subthemes were present. First, single 
mothers were consistently depicted as struggling. To be sure, raising a child in poverty is not 
an easy or ideal circumstance, but media narratives consistently focused on the ways in 
which single mothers did not measure up to the standards of intensive mothering. While 
intensive mothering was not articulated by name in media discourse, the standards it 
prescribed were so deeply entrenched that nonadherence to them became grounds for 
condemnation. A second subtheme associated with poverty was personal choice. This theme 
is most salient in the first and second representative anecdotes, when the rhetoric of family 
values, welfare dependency, and personal responsibility were deployed leading up to and 
during the welfare reform debates. Media coverage consistently ignored, minimized, or 
justified the structural inequities of many American institutions that functioned to keep 





narratives, it was typically in the context of outcomes for children—that is, narratives 
primarily discussed structural institutions as they related to child achievement. The children 
of single mothers were often draped in a cloth of inferiority; they scored lower tests, 
performed worse in school, were more likely to involved in criminal activity, had higher rates 
of substance use/abuse, etc. This line of discourse contributed to the moralization of single 
mothers.  
As mentioned above, the theme of immorality is commonly attached to discussions 
about the outcomes of children of single mothers. Single motherhood was constructed most 
often in terms of deficiency or lack, particularly when their children were involved. Single 
mothers lacked good jobs, healthcare coverage, childcare, education, good decision-making 
skills, scruples, resources, partners, and on and on. One of the only conditions single 
mothers seemed to occupy in abundance was poverty. And because American culture most 
often viewed poverty as a personal character deficiency rather than a mere lack of money, 
mothers continually had their moral compasses questioned.  
RQ 3. How are media discourses about single mothers connected to larger 
sociocultural, policy, and political institutions? 
This question yields mixed results. Yes, discourses about single mothers were  
frequently explicitly tied to larger political and policy institutions. But again, it most often in 
terms of how they and their children failed to measure up against the standards these 
institutions have created that defined success in America. In the discourse following the Dan 
Quayle speech, mothers were situated rhetorically in relation to the institutions of family and 
government. In the welfare reform anecdote, they were considered most often in relation to 
work/employment, education, and government. In the marriage promotion anecdote, 





recent discourse, mothers were discussed in the contexts of social class and family, although 
narratives in this final historical representative anecdote were overall decidedly more positive 
than in the previous three.  
 These connections are most often articulated as a way to explain or describe single 
mothers’ difficult lives, and how mothers’ adherence to the prescriptions of these 
institutions would benefit them. This is most salient in the discourses of welfare reform and 
marriage promotion; if single mothers got jobs or got married, they would no longer burden 
the government, their children would fare better, and their behavior would be morally 
compliant.  
The ideological positioning of these narratives varied by anecdote. In the first three 
portions of the analysis, a conservative, traditional ideological position was favored. This is 
evidenced by the preoccupation with family values rhetoric, moral, and sexual regulatory 
nature of TANF and the PRWORA, and upholding of marriage as a primary social 
institution. In the final representative anecdote, the ideological position was mixed. While 
there was still a considerable amount of discourse that reflected a traditional view of family, 
there was a significant increase in the presence of discourses that reflected single mothers’ 
lives and perspectives more fully, providing a critique of the structural institutions that 
perpetuated poverty and patriarchy.  
RQ 4. Do stories about single mothers primarily feature the voices of single 
mothers?  
 In the first three historical representative anecdotes, the voices of single mothers 
were minimized. While they were present, they were not salient features of the rhetoric. 
Mothers’ voices were secondary to those of political pundits, think tank representatives, 





Journalists did not position single mothers at the heart of their stories—rather, they were 
used as examples of family decline, a rationale for welfare reform, a scapegoat for the 
problems of patriarchy. In the fourth anecdote, this changed. Mothers’ voices were much 
more salient. They were considerably more prominent within narratives, even in stories like 
DeParle’s (2012) exploration of marriage and social class.  
RQ 5. In counter-discourses, how do single mothers and their allies discuss 
themselves and the condition of single motherhood? 
 When mothers were given space to construct their own identities, they often used it 
to position themselves as good mothers whose children were loved and cared for. In 2012 
particularly, even when mothers were depicted as poor or in need, their voices were often 
accompanied by an institutional critique that was not present in previous historical 
representative anecdotes which situated them as “deserving” poor rather than social leeches. 
Their allies were sometimes academics, sometimes progressive policy wonks, and sometimes 
journalists who centered mothers’ voices over those of other stakeholders.  
News media narratives about single mothers largely supported what I have argued is 
a decades-long project of moral regulation undertaken by political and social elites who have 
a vested interest in maintaining the patriarchal status quo. When Dan Quayle made his 
comment about Murphy Brown, “mocking the importance of fathers and calling it just 
another lifestyle choice,” it sparked a moral panic about shifting demographic and social 
trends that undermined the “natural” social order of American family life. A few years later, 
a different presidential administration proposed and implemented a wholesale reformation 
of welfare policies that were seen to encourage single motherhood. Single mothers were 
pushed into the workplace even when evidence consistently demonstrated that their families 





policies proved controversial and yielded mixed results, yet another presidential 
administration undertook a different strategy—encouraging women to marry. While the 
Bush administration denied this was a coercive effort, allocating hundreds of millions of 
dollars over nearly a decade to marriage programs was an unprecedented expenditure that 
ultimately proved fruitless—marriage rates continued to fall and divorce rates remained 
stable (Manning, Brown, Payne, & Wu, 2014).  
Practical Applications 
 As a former journalist and educator who will likely be training the future generation 
of media professionals, the pragmatic uses of this work are of central importance. There are 
several key points that current and future media practitioners should consider. First, 
journalists would be wise to consider the ways in which race and social class are positioned 
in narratives about single mothers, their children, and the political issues that affect them. 
Research on heavily racialized and stereotypical depictions of poverty in media is not new, 
and these depictions can affect public perceptions and public policy. Journalists, editors, and 
producers should more carefully consider who they choose to feature in stories about 
poverty, particularly when addressing single motherhood.  
 Second, the use of single mothers as sources in stories that do not focus on poverty 
or welfare would more accurately reflect the reality that most single mothers are not, in fact, 
poor. The present study suggests journalists are starting to do this more frequently, but 
depictions of single mothers in general news and feature stories that do not focus on 
stereotypical subjects could help reposition single mothers in a more positive light.   
Third, single mothers should not be used merely as “humanizing” elements in stories 
about single motherhood, poverty, welfare policy, or other issues frequently associated with 





Their voices, and those of their allies, should be featured more prominently, and mothers 
should be able to construct their own identities within these narratives. Journalists should 
rely less on thinktank spokespeople and politicians to construct stories, and more on the 
people whose lives are impacted by policies and programs that often occupy a central 
location in media narrative.  
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, news and media professionals should, as a 
matter of ethics, include greater discussion of the structural barriers faced by the subjects of 
their narratives, particularly in the contexts of poverty, welfare, education, and other 
institutional pillars of American life. This recommendation does not apply only to stories 
about single mothers however; a more thorough contextualization of these barriers is 
necessary to accurately represent and discuss the lives of any marginalized population. Again, 
this study suggests progress is being made in this realm, but there is still much room for 
improvement.  
Limitations 
 This research is limited in a number of ways that require acknowledgment and 
consideration. First, the application of critical theory to this study is a useful way to view 
discourse and policy in the context of gender, power, and oppression, but it is only one tool 
in the theoretical toolbox. Critical theory does not demand impartiality, ideological neutrality, 
or detachment on the part of the researcher. Therefore, this work is not intended to provide 
an impartial or objective textual analysis. I entered the texts with an explicit ideological 
position in order to extract and examine rhetorical constructions of single mothers. Second, 
this work does not seek to examine the numerical frequency of discourses, nor does it situate 
itself in a framework of generalizability—that is, the sample is not intended to capture all, or 





sample, even if precisely replicated, could be analyzed by another researcher with similar 
results. Third, the sample for this project is intended only to function as a snapshot of 
discourses about single mothers and does not consider all discourse or seek to examine the 
proportion of single mother–focused discourse in relation to all available discourse. Fourth, 
the selection of four discrete historical representative anecdotes limits the sample and 
analysis to primarily major national publications and news programs. The selection of 
additional or different representative anecdotes, or an analysis of different texts, may yield 
different results. Further, the selection of texts is limited due to the availability of full-text 
articles and transcripts via academic databases. Finally, the analytic method employed here is 
insufficient to claim any causal relationship between discourse and policy. While I do suggest 
media discourse and representations of single mothers might have informed policy positions, 
this analysis does not claim there is a correlation between the events. However, given the 
rhetorical frame of this analytic mode, significance comes from the analysis of the contextual 
relationship between media discourse and public policy.  
Future Research 
The cultural shifts away from marriage and toward greater rates of single and 
unmarried motherhood show no signs of abating. These are important social signals worthy 
of media attention and scholarly evaluation. Future research should continue to examine the 
relationship between these demographic trends and media representations of mothers who 
bear and/or raise children alone. Because social media allows previously stifled voices to 
enter and engage in public discourse, further analyses focusing more narrowly on social 
media discourse about single motherhood could more closely examine public opinion and 
the ways in which single mothers position themselves rhetorically. More specifically, looking 





contemporary discourse about single motherhood. Additionally, greater attention should be 
paid to how mothers respond to these discourses. Focus group or interview-based analyses 
that give single mothers the opportunity to address their depictions in media coverage would 
also be useful in providing more nuanced contexts to media representations. 
Discussion 
 This study has considered media discourse about single mothers in the contexts of 
moral regulation, moral panic, and intensive motherhood, and has sought to extend the 
applicability and utility of these concepts in the study of media discourse. To be sure, this 
work is not the first to consider these frameworks as they relate to media representation and 
discourse, but it is unique in its focus on the ways in which these concepts intersect and 
interact to position single mothers politically and culturally.  
 News media narratives invoked moralizing language that added fuel to the moral 
panic fire about “family decline.” Rather than positioning or refuting the claims of 
conservative politicians who demonized single mothers, news media discourse instead gave it 
greater credibility by failing to properly situate their claims in sociopolitical context. This, in 
turn, helped bolster the top-down projects of moral regulation undertaken by consecutive 
presidential administrations, first with welfare reform, then with marriage and fatherhood 
promotion programs. Media played a central role in establishing the legitimacy of these 
projects by largely ignoring important critiques of the programs and excluding single 
mothers from discourse about them. Moreover, news media narratives contribute to the 
perpetuation of the ideology of intensive mothering by positioning single mothers as 
deficient. Since being a “good” mother under this ideology requires women to invest all of 
their time, financial, and emotional resources to the care of their children, and single 





women to also be “good” mothers. Morality, or at least the perception of it, is an innate 
feature of intensive mothering, thus women who are unwilling or unable to adhere to its 
tenets are, by definition, immoral. Notably, a new ideology of mothering has become 
prominent amongst employed mothers. Christopher (2012) argues the ideology of “extensive 
mothering” is beginning to replace that of intensive mothering, particularly among women 
who are employed. Extensive mothering reframes “good” mothering practices as being “in 
charge” of, and ultimately responsible for, the well-being of children. This includes the 
delegation of routine child care, and a rejection of the “ideal worker” script that permits 
employment to infringe upon family life (Christopher, 2012).   
If, as the saying goes, politics are all about perception, news media narratives about 
single mothers in the 1990s and early 2000s contributed to the perception—and thus the 
politics—that intruded upon and regulated the private lives of women who did nothing to 
deserve it. Single mothers are not criminals, nor are their children, and yet the American 
government has engaged in ideologically driven rhetoric and policy that has contributed to 
negative public opinion, which serves to bolster punitive policies. Meanwhile, the news 
media has largely played along, only recently shifting its narrative tone to include structural 
critiques and mothers’ voices. There are, however, some recent promising developments in 
the political realm that could have a powerful effect on not only media discourse, but also on 
public policy. 
In the 2018 midterm elections, approximately 2,200 women, single or not, ran for 
federal, state, or local offices, including no fewer than nine single mothers. Pattillo (2018) 
declared in the Pacific Standard magazine that “Single Mothers Are Having Their Moment in 
American Politics.” Not surprisingly, these mothers face an uphill battle in the arena of 





found that voters were concerned about female candidates’ abilities to simultaneously raise 
children and hold public office. The same report also found that voters believed the age of a 
female candidate’s children is significant, and voters were less readily to accept younger 
children than older children. 
 In a timely twist of irony, the television show Murphy Brown recently returned to 
network television, with showrunner Candace Bergen reviving her famed role behind the 
desk. Murphy did not waste time taking digs, by name, at President Trump and senior 
members of his administration. Murphy criticized Trump’s use of Twitter to convey policy 
decisions, discussed “fake news,” and seemed to be actively trying to stir up controversy 
(Saraiya, 2018). So far, it does not seem as though President Trump has taken the bait, 
History, it has been said, often repeats itself, and I for one am anxious to see what kinds of 
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